[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Mar 28, 2025, 3:12 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Wed, 26 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> >       I've been studying the source, and in terms of splits, Nozick
> lists the options:
> >
> >       1. Neither are you.
> >       2. Both are you.
> >       3. There are two different people later; but unnoticed, there
> always were two
> >       different people there, though this became evident only after the
> appearance of
> >       the tied continuers.
> >       4. One of Y and Z, and only one, is the continuation of the
> individual of
> >       which X at t1 (time 1)  was a part. There is no further fact in
> virtue of which it is,
> >       just the luck of the draw.
> >
> > Thanks for tracking down the original source on this. It is very useful.
> >
> > As to what Nozick says here, my comment is that a well-formed theory
> ought to
> > offer firm answers to these questions. Otherwise, what does the theory
> add if
> > it leaves open all these possibilities?
>
> You're welcome! Yes, I've skimmed the book and it is more of an
> exploration and
> clarification at times, than an attempt to come up with definite answers.
> This
> is my impression based on a very shallow and quick read.
>

I see. I did get some of that from the excerpts I came across. For example,
his leaving the definition of closest as up to the reader.



> >       > For example, if two simultaneous duplicates formed from a
> teletransporter each
> >       > the same number of Planck units away from the original?
> >       >
> >       > What should happen in that case?
> >       >
> >       > Do we then have to introduce a priority for Left-Right or
> North-South into our
> >       > definition of closest?
> >
> >       If we accept that after a split, neither is us, then that would
> solve the
> >       problem.
> >
> > Such thinking makes no sense to me. If one accepts their personal
> survival in
> > the case one person steps out of a teleporter, why should they conclude
> > personal death in the case someone else like them steps out of some other
> > teleporter elsewhere?
>
> Well, because of the split scenario. It is one proposed solution, and it
> depends
> on how the teleporter works. I consider splits to be impossible,


But you seemed to accept it as possible for the AI or uploaded human on a
VM.

so for me it is
> not a case I need to consider. But for the sake of our discussion,
> assuming the
> MWI, it is definitely a case that needs to be handled. I agree there.
>

Okay. And if it is handled, would you agree with my point that it makes
little sense to say I survived the split when one of me emerged, and yet I
will die if more than one emerge?



> >       > If you have no theory under which to operate and make
> predictions, then
> >       > counterfactual reasoning won't work. But you should be able to
> reason
> >       > according to temporarily assuming one theory vs. another, and
> find, for
> >       > example that one theory of personal identity predicts one thing
> while another
> >       > theory predicts something else. Then you can test this situation
> to see which
> >       > theorist right, or you can see if one theory leads to
> contradictions.
> >
> >       I think "what if" reasoning is fine as long as it is grounded in,
> or leads to,
> >       empirical results. My point is that if I test my theory with an
> impossible
> >       counterfactual, then I'd consider that a waste of time, and
> counter productive
> >       to making progress. If the counterfactual test of the theory never
> leads to any
> >       result in the real (TM) world, that I can verify or falsify, it's
> also not so
> >       good.
> >
> > If a theory fails for hypothetical situations it ought to handle, I
> think we
> > can discount it as a failed theory without even having to do the
> experiment.
>
> True, but that comes down to the point of view of what a theory ought to
> handle
> vs what it does not need to handle. Since I'm not an MWI:er for instance,
> my
> theory of identity would never have to deal with splits. But for an
> MWI:er, it
> would have to, since I think that would be the case constantly happening
> everywhere and for everyone if I understand it correctly.
>

One risks creating a fragile theory if it only works according to results
made in areas far outside the scope of that theory.

For example, it would be like having a theory of consciousness that only
works if dark matter happens to be X. This is why hypothetical questions
and situations are important: "well why wouldn't the theory work if dark
matter was Y rather than X?", "Can we modify the theory to be resilient in
either case?" Etc.



> > For example, consider Einstein's proposed EPR experiment involving
> sending
> > entangled particle pairs across space (an experiment well beyond the
> > technology of his day), yet it highlighted the fact that Copenhagen
> > Interpretation implied faster-than-light influences, in clear
> contradiction to
> > his relativity. And some 50 years later, when we did have the technology
> to
> > perform such experiments, they confirmed Einstein's point, the effect was
> > observed, and one cannot accept CI and believe that nothing can travel
> faster
> > than c.
>
> Ah, but observation was key here. And as long as observation is possible
> for us,
> I have no quarrel with theories, explorations and so on.


Presumably observations will be possible one day (should we develop mind
uploading and transfer technology).

Einstein's paper is widely considered significant, even without the
empirical result, for it showed what the assumed theory of the day
predicted. To show a problem with a theory, one need only assume the theory
is true and show what it predicts.

So if we want to highlight problems in some theory of personal identity,
for the most part experiments aren't needed (and experiments themselves
wouldn't tell us much), they would only be meaningful to the person/people
who underwent the procedure.

Though perhaps you can have while teams of scientists step into the same
teleporter and then they can all publish their shared result of all
subjectively feeling as though they survived the process. And other teams
of scientists can replicate the result for themselves. Does that make it
objective repeatable science? ��


>
> >       > Namely, that *you* inhabit this particular brain and body. The
> experiences
> >       > that happen to this brain and body are *yours*, and will be
> experienced by
> >       > *you*.
> >
> >       I think that takes us into the subject/object divide, and can
> easily lead us
> >       astray into needless speculation. I could say that this brain and
> body, a mass
> >       of particles, is what is, and it reacts to the laws of physics.
> >
> > You think that you are Daniel, and no one else. What objective physical
> fact
> > makes this so? Must we not consider the subjective aspect of reality
> when we
> > deal with areas such as consciousness and personal subjective survival?
>
> I don't think we can. The subjective is per definition directly
> inaccessible to
> us,


No I think rather that the subjective is *the only thing* that we can
access or have access to.

The limitation is that one person's subjective is inaccessible to others.

Then we create objective models of the world, (models based formes to
explain our subjective experiences) then we end up with a picture of the
world that mostly sweeps under the rug the fact that in doing so we create
a model that ignores the subjective, the model is devoid of it. This is a
limitation of our models, but we should not take our models so seriously
that we deny the subjective, which is the entire source and reason for
existence of the very objective models we created to explain the subjective
appearances.


"We find that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most
conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality
beyond our perceptions. This model of a material world obeying laws of
physics is so successful that soon we forget about our starting point and
say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions are nothing but a
useful tool for the description of matter. This assumption is almost as
natural (and maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only
a mathematical tool for the description of matter. We are substituting
reality of our feelings by the successfully working theory of an
independently existing material world. And the theory is so successful that
we almost never think about its possible limitations."
-- Andrei Linde in “Inflation, Quantum Cosmology, and the Anthropic
Principle” (2002)


Or as Democritus wrote thousands of years ago:

"Intellect: Ostensibly there is color, sweetness, bitterness, actually
there is only atoms and the void.

Senses: Poor Intellect, do you hope to defeat us while from us you borrow
your evidence?"



and therefore, unless it can be verified, the question should be dropped.


Everything you experience you personally verify. It is only in your
objective models of reality that you cannot explain, and hope to sweep
under the rug, the subjective.


In
> terms of physical facts, what makes me, me, is a combination of my mind
> and body
> and uniqueness in space, as per my formula.
>
> Also note that from a pragmatic point of view, our legal definitions and
> processes for proving that I am I work perfectly fine, so that is another
> way to
> discuss it based on an external point of view.
>

Laws are written by politicians, who I don't see as possessing any special
wisdom on deep philosophical problems.



> But subjectively understanding it, is impossible from a scientific
> perspective,
> and I advocate for dropping the question until new experiments are devised.
>

I think we ought to recognize the limitations of our current models in
explaining certain aspects of reality, rather than redefine reality to
pretend those phenomenon don't exist.


> >       > Now then, the real difference between closed and open
> individualism comes down
> >       > to a single question: is this fact (that it is *you* who is in
> this particular
> >       > body) conditioned on something or not?
> >
> >       What is "you"? How would you define it? My body is part of the
> chain of cause
> >       and effect, going back as long as we can trace it. Do we need to
> say more?
> >
> >       >       There is not condition here, it is just an event along a
> long chain of causes
> >       >       and effects. It is the same with reality. It happens to
> us, we have no choice. I
> >       >       think this also shows us that probability is part of the
> language of math, that
> >       >       is only meaningful for us as conscious human beings.
> Without human beings,
> >       >       "speaking" the language of math and probability, the
> concept is meaningless.
> >       >
> >       > If there is no condition that determines you being in some body,
> and not in
> >       > others, then that is open individualism.
> >
> >       I don't see how that follows. We can trace a path of cause and
> effect that
> >       resulted in me sitting in my chair. How does open individualism
> follow from
> >       that?
> >
> > Because similar cause effect paths lead to all other persons. What makes
> yours special?
>
> I don't think the question is meaningful. What do you mean with "special"?


What makes Daniel special, under the closed individualism viewpoint, is
that you will only ever experience the experiences that happen to be
generated by Daniel's brain and its material (or psychological)
continuations.

What imbues Daniel's brain with this unique power?


We
> can trace cause and effect from my parents (or their parents) to me. That
> is a
> fact. I don't see why anything else need to be said about it?
>
> >       > Logic works, but this shows how important starting assumptions
> are for
> >       > reaching correct conclusions.
> >
> >       Not only assumptions, premises, verification and falsification,
> and keeping the
> >       results to what we can check.
> >
> > This must be another point of fundamental disagreement between us. I
> believe
> > that logic/rational works and can provide meaningful results absent
> empirical
> > verification.
>
> Yes, this is correct. I think we established that in the previous thread.
> This
> flows from our view of science and the sources of truth.
>
> >       >       That would be my arguemnt regarding counterfactuals. I
> think your intuition was
> >       >       the right one here.
> >       >
> >       >       But if I look at the AI:s definition of open individualism
> vs closed
> >       >       individualism:
> >       >
> >       > These are terribly misleading and wrong definitions, as I will
> point out below.
> >
> >       This is a good point! I thought it was an established point of
> view, with one
> >       definition. Maybe there are many nuances here?
> >
> > I think it stems from the poorly written wikipedia article. Wikipedia is
> > heavily weighted in most AI training sets, so one bad article will cause
> > most AIs to give bad answers.
>
> True. Let me check what you say below.
>
> >       >       "Closed individualism is a philosophical concept that
> posits that each person is
> >       >       a distinct, separate individual with a unique identity
> that does not extend
> >       >       beyond their own consciousness.
> >       >
> >       > This is circular and meaningless since it doesn't define what a
> person is,
> >       > (which is the entire crux of the problem.) Also, no entity
> "extends beyond
> >       > their own consciousness," in any theory of personal identity. So
> this is
> >       > another meaningless distinction.
> >
> >       What about:
> >
> >       "Closed individualism is considered to be the default view of
> personal identity,
> >       which is that one's personal identity consists of a ray or line
> traveling
> >       through time, and that one has a future self."
> >
> > I think ray and line are a bit ambiguous.
>
> I think that would be "cause and effect" or in my late night "inspiration"
> a
> directional, acyclic graph describing your "journey" through time.
>
> >       Another thing I noticed is that it seems like open, closed, empty
> are creations
> >       of Daniel Kolak. Is that true? If so, perhaps there are more
> definitions and
> >       constructions out there against which we can contrast them?
> >
> > These definitions come from Kolak, but I think they mostly capture the
> three
> > classes of views of personal identity that have been expressed.
> >
> > Personal Identity is a fairly small subfield of philosophy, there has
> not been
> > much written on it compared to, say, philosophy of mind, ethics, or
> ontology.
>
> Ahhh.... that would explain a lot of the bad quality stuff that I have
> found,
> and some of the confusion here. I'll have a look at what you suggest
> further
> down.
>
> >       >       This perspective contrasts with open individualism, which
> suggests
> >       >       that all individuals share a common identity or
> consciousness, implying a deeper
> >       >       connection among all people." (GPT 4o mini)
> >       >
> >       > There is no consciousness link, hive mind, nor collective
> consciousness as GPT
> >       > seems to suggest here. This is a common accusation against open
> individualism,
> >       > but it is not a suggestion made by any of its serious proponents.
> >
> >       It seems like open individualism is too subtle. It also does not
> seem to be very
> >       popular, since, as you have pointed out, my goolging and GPT:ing
> seems to
> >       produce only caricatures of the position.
> >
> > I would start with the original sources:
> > One self (1990): https://philarchive.org/rec/ZUBOST
> > And Kolak's I Am You (2004):
> https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-1-4020-3014-7
> > Perhaps the briefest introduction would be this 7 minute video by
> > Zuboff: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTLHoWuEM5s
>
> Thank you!
>
> >       Well, first of all, it is a thought experiment, so there is
> nothing that
> >       guarantees that this will ever be possible. If, for the sake of
> conversation,
> >       assume that we knew this was impossible, would it make sense
> regardless to
> >       engage in the thought experiment?
> >
> >       But, you know me... ;) I will disregard that, and please disregard
> it too, since
> >       we've covered that, and let us focus on the experiment, as is.
> >
> > :-)
> >
> > Let's, alternatively, try reasoning assuming it is possible, and see
> where the
> > various supposed theories take us. If any theory struggles to provide
> > consistent answers, then we can look to identify what it is that is
> creating
> > the difficulty, confusion, ambiguity, or inconsistency in that theory.
>
> Or impossibility? But yes... just shooting down from the start will make
> for a
> very short conversation. ;)
>
> >       > functionalism  suggests that one's conscious state does not
> depend on the
> >       > material identity of the atoms in one's brain.  Therefore, it is
> in principle
> >
> >       Yes...
> >
> >       > possible to survive teleportation.
> >
> >       Maybe. Would depend on how the thought-experiment teleporter is
> designed. If it
> >       would be designed as a destructive, continuous upload/download,
> then I agree!
> >
> > Rather than say "you will survive the teleportation" which I admit is
> > ambiguous, let us say "awakening the frozen duplicate will result in a
> living
> > conscious being" This, I think you will agree with, as will anyone who
> accepts
>
> Agreed!
>
> > epiphenomenalism, physicalism or functionalism. The only people who might
> > disagree are the dualists who say that a soul needs to be injected into
> the
> > reanimated body, and without this the person will not function or live.
>
> Yes, sounds reasonable enough. Just as a side note, I think the dualist
> could
> continue being a dualist, but he would then have to devise a parallell
> theory
> for souls, when it comes to splits, copies etc, and of course, how those
> souls
> are "attached" to the body, but let's leave that.
>
> >       > If we analyze just one of the four duplicates NASA creates of
> you, we see that
> >       > it is equivalent to teleportation. A scan of the original is
> made and a copy
> >       > is reconstructed in a different location, while the original is
> destroyed.
> >
> >       Let me apply my formula of identity to this...
> >
> >              Mind -----------> (1 = continuity of mind through time)
> >              OR
> >              Body -----------> (1 = continuity of body through time)
> >              XOR
> >              Copy (0 = unique, 1 = copy)
> >              = 1 (me) or 0 (not me)
> >       (Note! I changed from unique in space to copy, since it maps nicer
> with
> >       true/false 1/0.)
> >
> > That is a good change.
> >
> >       Since the original is destroyed, there is no continuity of mind or
> body, and
> >       since we're talking about a unique copy (the original was
> destroyed) we get
> >       M(0) OR B(0) XOR C(0) = 0 (not me).
> >
> > What if we presume that the frozen duplicate was formed via a continuous
> copying process?
>
> What do you mean with continuous copy process? Is it that it is "synced"
> live
> with the original copy? Or that it is created while the original is alive?
>

For example, we inject nano bots into the blood stream which gradually
replace, one by one, each neuron in the brain with a synthetic equivalent.

Then at time T, the synthetic neurons each divide in two, while continuing
to operate and function in parallel. They then switch from using direct
conduction to radio transmissions, with their two sets of neurons running
on different radio frequencies.

The result is two independently functioning brains created via a continuous
process from the original, each having an equal claim to being the original.




> >       If, the original was not destroyed, but kept on ice, we'd get M(0)
> OR B(1) XOR
> >       C(1) = 0 (not me).
> >
> > What if all the frozen copies were formed from the same living copy in an
> > identical and simultaneous way, such that no frozen instance had a
> greater
> > claim to being called "the original" than any other?
>
> I don't see how that would make a difference. There is still one living
> original, and regardless of how the copies are made, they are still copies.
>

Consider of they were created via a process like I described above.


> >       > The twist here is that multiple replicas of you are created.
> Which one of them
> >       > do you become? The only answer that appears to make sense is
> "all of them".
> >
> >       Or none of them, as per Nozick?
> >
> > Well in my example, only one is awakened at any one time. Can we not
> ignore
> > the frozen atoms? Or does their presence in the universe somehow make it
> > impossible for you to survive being thawed?
>
> I'm no Nozick expert, but I'd say, based on my reading of the text that
> none of
> them would be you. The fact that one of them is frozen, could perhaps be
> equated
> to one being awake and 4 being asleep?
>
> >       > Your survival does not depend on which of the five replicas is
> thawed, because
> >       > you would live and survive as any of them.
> >
> >       If you believe all of them, then I agree.
> >
> > Hmm could you clarify what you are agreeing to here?
>
> Sorry, I think I agree with either being none or all. But being a subset
> of one
> of them I do not think makes any sense, if I step away from my formula and
> try
> to look at it from your point of view?


Okay. ��

I am of the opinion that you survive as any/all of them.

I think seeing this is perhaps one of the first steps necessary to seeing
how open individualism could be true. For you are in a situation where the
same person is in all the bodies, yet each is only aware of the experiences
and memories tied to the particular brain they think they are only in.


> >       > Therefore, if all five are thawed would you not live as each of
> them? In what
> >       > way does it make sense to say you live as one but not the others?
> >
> >       For me, that would come down to continuity of mind, body, and
> uniqueness.
> >
> > We can reframe (I think) the experiment such that the copies are formed
> via a
> > continuous process, and further, if only one is thawed at a time, does
> that
> > not imply uniqueness?
>
> No, I think, the bodies are still there and "in sync", so would therefore
> be not me.
>
> >       > Consider what Thomas Nagel says about the absence of any
> physical facts that
> >       > account for him being Thomas Nagel:
> >
> >       I disagree. From my perspective, I can point to Thomas Nagel and
> say "there he
> >       is". Do we need anything else?
> >
> >       I can also ask Thomas Nagel if he is Thomas Nagel, and that is
> also good
> >       evidence I think.
> >
> > I think you may be missing Nagel's point, which is, if I have this
> complete
> > highly detailed objective description of everything in the universe, what
> > objective physical fact accounts for the fact that his identity, and his
> > perspective, happens to be bound up with this particular set of atoms
> (in the
> > objective physical description of the universe)? I admit this is a highly
> > subtle point which is difficult for the English language to express, but
> I
> > think if you carefully read Nagel's original text on this you will see
> what he
> > is getting at. Note that you cannot point and say "there he is," because
> he
> > explicitly ruled out using any kind of indexical language, like
> pointing, or
> > using words like this, I, here, etc.
>
> Maybe I can express it like this:
>
> Nagel's emphasis on the subjectivity of consciousness is due to the
> limitations
> of every day language, which is unable to fully capture the complexity of
> conscious
> experience. This means that the apparent subjectivity of consciousness is
> an
> artifact of our linguistic and cognitive limitations, rather than a
> fundamental
> feature of reality itself.
>


I agree that the idea of subjectivity being tied to one and only one
particular body, is a subjective illusion and not really part of reality.
Along with this subjective illusion (of only being one neurology), is the
illusion of presentism (only being in one point in time), and the illusion
of Copenhagen collapse (of only being in one branch). I call these
egocentric, or indexical illusions. None of them are real objectively.



> So basically, our language is deceiving us. If we reformulated the question
> based on the findings of neuroscience, that is basically the answer.
>

As I see it, it is the limited access of any particular conscious state,
that leads to the wrong, but "common sense" impressions that only one time
is real, only one branch is real, and only one neurology is mine.



> >       >       I would argue from the basis of our every day experience.
> Based on that, it
> >       >       seems like closed individualism is what is the right view.
> >       >
> >       > I would too if I believed these definitions. But these
> definitions are deeply
> >       > flawed and misleading. There are no empirical differences
> between what it
> >       > would feel like to be you whether closed or open individualism
> is true.
> >
> >       Then maybe that is the reason? Maybe the two positions are in that
> case
> >       ultimately meaningless?
> >
> > The theories differ in the kinds of questions they can answer. Consider
> the
> > question: "Why were you born as Daniel, at this point in time, on this
> planet,
> > and in this universe?" Empty and Closed Individualism cannot offer any
> answer
> > to that question, but open individualism can.
>
> I think the question is not meaningful. I can answer that I was born due
> to my
> parents, etc. etc. More than that is not meaningful to say from the point
> of
> view of science. For instance, I can ask the question, "why was a granola
> bar
> made as that specific granola bar in my kitchen a few hours ago, on this
> planet?"
>

If you found yourself to be a particular granola bar, then you would be
justified in asking "why am I this granola bar, and not some other granola
bar?" Especially if you see millions of other granola bars in the world. If
you are only one particular granola bar, "why *this* one?"



> The answer is that my wife wanted something with our tea tonight when we're
> watching Severance. But the question why was that granola bar created as
> that
> specific granola bra, is a meaningless question.


It's meaningless when described from a third person objective viewpoint.
(Note that this is a viewpoint that doesn't actually exist in reality).


I think, in the best
> Wittgensteinian tradition, that our language sometimes deceives us, and if
> we
> are not alert to that fact, we can, at worst, end up wasting thousands of
> years
> debating something, which is really, at the end of the day, a "bug" in our
> language.
>

I think it is the models that are deceiving us here, if we take the models
so seriously that we deny the parts of reality which the models can't
accommodate.



> >       Apologies, this I fully accept. Sorry to have wasted your time,
> >
> > No worries, it is the fault of wikipedia here, not you.
>
> Thank you! I have certainly learned about the limits of both wikipedia and
> LLM:s! Usually I am in the habit of taking them at face value, when the
> topic is
> not super important (just reading for fun), but I brought that bad habit
> with me
> here, and it is not a good habit when it comes to discussing things. I
> should
> keep my "work" mindset here, where I do not trust an LLM as far as I can
> throw
> it. ;)
>

In these cases it can be helpful to paste in a large source, such as the
text of Arnold Zuboff or Daniel Kolak, and then ask it to explain the paper
to you as if GPT (or whichever) were the author of this piece, and to
answer questions about it as if they were written by the author. Providing
the source text to the LLM when asking will help as even if these materials
were used in training, very little of it is likely to survive in the model
itself which is thousands of times smaller than the training materials.
This is partly why we see LLMs make things up, they can't remember
everything correctly (it is information-theoretically impossible) given the
compression ratios involved.



> >       >       The only way to some kind of open individualism I see, is
> just the way of
> >       >       definition or agreement, where we look at what we _do_
> share. We share our DNA
> >       >       to 99.9% (?), we are all links in the chain of causation,
> the electricity in our
> >       >       brains and nervoussystem is the same electricity, so it
> could be said from that
> >       >       point of view that the same "power" powers us all, and
> this power came from a
> >       >       common source way down the tree of life. It could argued
> that we are also
> >       >       shared components of the global ecosystems, so looking at
> the planet as a whole,
> >       >       we could see that we are all components in that system.
> >       >
> >       > As Arnold Zuboff explains, all experiences are mine because they
> are all
> >       > experienced as I -- in an immediate, first-person way. Every
> experience is
> >       > felt as if it is experienced immediately by a first-person "I",
> and this trait
> >       > is common to all conscious experiences. All experiences are felt
> as if they
> >       > are experienced by I.
> >       >
> >       > You need not go any deeper than this.
> >
> >       Well, clearly he is wrong, given my experience of the world, and
> my experience
> >       of you. I think I am too set in my "closed" way. Can you prove to
> me that your
> >       experience answering me, is actually my experience? I'm sorry, but
> I cannot see
> >       it.
> >
> > Consider that you have experienced many things in the life of Daniel
> which you
> > no longer remember. Your 247th day of grade school, your 1,879th day of
> life,
> > your 126th car ride, etc. Who had these experiences? Clearly you did,
> and yet
> > yet the you (in your current vantage point right here and now) don't
> remember
> > having those experiences. Whether you remember having had a particular
> > experience or not, then, is not determinative of whether or not you had
> that
> > experience.
>
> Ok, so let me try and rephrase this, and see if I get it. Z says that all
> experiences are experienced by an "I". An I could, just to give me
> something
> tangible to wrap my mind around, be the neural process generating the
> experience
> of being myself.
>
> So, is he saying, that we are all the same, because he identifies us, not
> with
> continuity of mind and body, over time, but with the neural process that
> gives
> rise to the I? And since he assumes, this process or function, is the
> same, and
> since this function is the "nexus" or focus of experience, we are all the
> same
> I?
>
> Is that closer?
>

It's closer. But I don't think he would put it that way. He would say
simply that all experiences are experienced in a way that is immediate and
first-person in character, and that this is the only thing that's required
for an experience to be mine. (I.e., it will feel like it's mine, no matter
in what brain it appears).


> To me, it seems like saying something similar to, we all consist of the
> same
> elements, therefore we are all the same.


That line of thinking has led some to open individualism, but I don't
personally find the "one universe" argument particularly convincing.


Trivial from one point of view, true
> from one point of view, but also not true, from the point of view of other
> definitions, starting points, and our pragmatic every day experience.
>
> >       > But you can, if you wish. For example, by considering
> statistical arguments,
> >       > or cases that cause bodily or psychological continuity theories
> to break down,
> >       > but this is all on top of the much more core notion of the "same
> I" being a
> >       > common trait present in all experiences had by all conscious
> beings.
> >
> >       But how can we say that without having a complete knowledge and
> definition of I
> >       and consciousness?
> >
> > Here is a definition of conscious from Dennett and Hofstadeter:
> >
> > "In philosophical literature, many phrases have been
> > used to try to evoke the right flavors for what being
> > sentient really is (“being sentient” is one of them).
> > Two old terms are “soul” and “anima.” These days,
> > an “in” word is “intentionality.” There is the old
> > standby, “consciousness.” Then there is “being a
> > subject,” “having an inner life,” “having experience,”
> > “having a point of view,” having “perceptual
> > aboutness” or “personhood” or a “self” or “free will.”
> > In some people’s eyes, “having a mind,” “being
> > intelligent,” and just plain old “thinking” have the
> > right flavors."
> > — Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett in “The Mind’sI”
> > (1981)
> >
> > Note that a common element, to any sensible definition of consciousness,
> is
> > "having a point of view" "having an experience". In other words, there is
> > something it is like to be that particular conscious thing. All conscious
> > states, being conscious of something, will have some collection of
> > immediately-felt first-hand knowledge (of that something that happens to
> > be conscious of).
>
> I think for the purpose of descriptions, theories and science, that
> first-person
> thing, has to go, as per my argument against Nagel above.
>

Are you excising the first-person from reality, or merely from your
third-person models of reality? I think that is an important distinction to
clarify.



> > This is true regardless of what philosophy of mind one ascribes to.
> >
> > This immediate, first-person character, of experience is common to all
> > conscious beings.
>
> I can rephrase that as persons experience things, and act, as if, they have
> first-person experiences. Better than that I do not think we can do. For
> ordinary day to day purposes, I do of course talk about my inner
> experiences,
> but that does not mean that that is the best way to actually describe them
> or do
> research them.
>
> >       I can see how a credible case can be made that every human
> >       being has a neuron pattern that gives rise to an I. But that is a
> distinct
> >       pattern, unique for every individual.
> >
> > There's a distinct neural pattern not only for each individual, but for
> each
> > individual in each moment in time. If "you" persist across variations in
> that
> > neural pattern across moments of your life, what is the essential
>
> True, we can go with that, or mind/body for instance.
>

But where important is that once we enable identification of multiple
distinct conscious states with the "same person" the door is opened. What
is it about any neural pattern that makes it mine vs. someone else's? Is it
based on any intrinsic properties of the experience itself, or only
extrinsic properties of the history or atoms etc. that happens to be
involved in creating the experience? If you start to think about the
problem from the perspective of only the intrinsic properties, then that
tends to lead to open individualism. On the other hand, if you go with
assuming the relevance of extrinsic properties, this leads to all kinds of
trouble with handling various scenarios and thought experiments (fission,
fusion, split brains, teleporters, duplication machines, black box closets,
healing and restoring devices, mind uploads and backups, etc.).



> > nature/character of the pattern that must exist for you to be there in
> them?
> > If it is nothing other than the sense of being an I, being a conscious
> living
> > person, having an experience of some kind, then you exist in all neural
> > patterns of all conscious beings.
>
> I think that is too simplistic. I includes mind and body, continuous
> through
> time, which also fits perfectly well with our ordinary experience. I think
> reducing the definition of the I to having neural pattern, basically says
> nothing. Different neural patterns correspond with different experiences,
> so I
> think there is strong proof for the I being more than a general pattern
> existing
> in all human beings. I can of course define I as electrical activity in the
> brain, and thus we are all I, but that doesn't really say much.
>
> So far, it seems to me, either to be just a matter of trivial definition to
> which we agree, or wrong.
>

Theories of personal identity are largely definitional theories, but we are
seeking a definition that is robust and consistent, and makes sense, and
ideally can answer questions that are relevant and important to us, like
which experiences wio I have, why are we here, and why am I me?


> Another thing to keep in mind is the pragmatic angle, we all act perfectly
> well
> based on a closed kind, it works well, it is the "naive" first impression,
> and
> at the end of the day, there seems to be no empirical evidence for
> anything else
> being true, _apart_ from the way of definition.
>

Closed has many problems. It requires overcoming impossible odds for it to
be true, it has conceptual difficulties with many real-world as well as
imaginable scenarios, it requires additional unnecesssry metaphysical
assumptions, and it is unable to give answers for certain questions, and it
also can't handle the anthropic principle in explaining the fine tuning of
the universe. Like Newtonian physics, it largely works for most day to day
things, but we know it has weaknesses once we stray beyond those.


> But even if we agree to define open as electrons or functions, across all
> human
> beings, we still act, as if, we're closed.
>
> So an argument could be made, as per Occam, that closed is actually the
> simplest
> explanation because it perfectly fits our experience, and everyone,
> regardless of
> definition, acts as if closed was true, thus confirming it by behaviour.
> Reactions to pain seems to fit perfectly well with closed as well.
>
> On the other hand... in the time honored tradition of arguing against my
> point,
> I can see a touch of the empirical when it comes to exploring open. I have
> a
> colleague who has experimented a bit with some kind of mushroom, and he
> had the
> experience of becoming connected with all living things on one of his
> trips.
>
> Coming out of the trip, the feeling of an immense respect and kinship with
> all
> life persisted for up to 2 weeks after the trip and gradually wore off.
>
> So as I wrote in our private thread about an option where open and closed
> are
> both true, the idea is that it just depends on where we attach our
> ID-gravitational focus. Theoretically and speculatively, a mushroom trip,
> meditation or what not, for a time, attaches it to the "open", while as you
> suggested, evolution has attached it to the closed version, for survival
> advantage.
>
> I find the evolutionary argument interesting. Imagine flower-power hippies
> on
> the savannah, identifying and enormously respecting and loving the lions
> and
> other predators, and they won't remain alive for long.
>

Right. ��



> Evolution being smart, said... hold it! let's make sure the guys care about
> themselves, and thus evolved the closed "view" and it became the default,
> since
> it generated humans with barriers, afraid for their own lives, thus highly
> motivated to run away from lions.
>
> But I guess we then run into the language barrier. We have a test, where
> participants get to trip, and after the trip they also describe something
> sounding like open, but does that feeling and experience prove anything?
> At most
> it proves that due to the trip, they become more loving and passionate, it
> also
> seems to indicate, that their own subjective experience would align, for
> the
> duration of the trip, with something closer to open, than closed. But then
> they
> revert.
>

Some revert. For others it has a lasting or permanent effect.

That they cannot articulate the experience to others nor justify the logic
of their realization is why theories of personal identity are important if
we are to ever objectively establish the truth of their experience.


> Are expert meditators and buddhas permanently in "open" mode? Did they in
> fact
> "deactivate" the closed switch?
>

I think that is the state that enlightenment / moksha / nirvana all
describe. It is described as a realization in which one transcends the
convenrional conception of self and recognizing a oneness with all other
beings.



> Another thing came to mind as well, and that was Schopenhauer. I mentioned
> it to
> you, but his starting point is the will to live. The "life force" and he
> argues
> that the "spark" or life force is the same in all living things, we are
> after
> all, linked by cause and effect, and through the tree of life, back to our
> very
> first ancestor.
>
> If you then define our unique "core" as this spark, that has been passed
> on for
> aeons, you can then by definition argue that all life is related and the
> same,
> it's the same spark.
>

That may be true, but it's not the primary point made by open
individualism, which is that I am literally seeing the world through
Daniel's eyes as I am seeing the world through Jason's eyes.


> Yes, this borders on the mumbo jumbo, and I apologize to the public
> readers who
> do not enjoy that, but since it does connect with this conversation, and
> the
> idea that open and closed are just two sides of the same coin, I think it
> is
> relevant to bring it up.
>
> Ok, so there you have it Jason. One set of arguments against open, and
> another
> set, for the two being two sides of the same coin.
>
> You take it from here! ;)
>

Will do!


> >       > This is explained by the simple fact that our nervous system
> aren't
> >       > integrated. I don't have access to your memories and you don't
> have access to
> >       > mine.
> >
> >       If there is no connection, then there can be no shared experience.
> I think this
> >       is pretty trivial. Clearly, I'm starting to get the feeling that
> this is beyond
> >       me. =(
> >
> > Perhaps this might help. I wrote this some time ago, so the writing is
> not the
> > best, but I introduce various thought experiments that highlight the
> various
> > problems with other theories of personal identity:
> >
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/16ktQX-HdxUk-z0xwmnqqeF4zjAu8xQjy/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=109779696990142678208&rtpof=true&sd=true
> > (all the thought experiments are covered in the first 20 pages).
>
> Thank you, will have a look!
>

Thank you!



> >       >       Closed doesn't suffer from this, it perfectly explains our
> >       >       every day ordinary experience.
> >       >
> >       > The fact that we have separate brains is enough to explain this.
> Souls need
> >       > not be pinned to bodies to ensure the only experiences you can
> remember having
> >       > are those had by your particular brain. Having a particular
> brain is enough to
> >       > explain this (in closed and in open individualism).
> >
> >       Would you say that open individualism better explains our "folk
> psychology" view
> >       of our subjective experience?
> >
> > It explains it as well, while assuming less. It also is capable of
> explaining
> > more. So by Occam it is preferred.
>
> Ah, so you don't buy "my" version of Occam above? ;)
>

No, sadly. ;-)



> >       > How do you explain split brains? What happens to ones personal
> identity when
> >       > the two halves of the brain stop talking? Empirically we know
> the result is
> >       > two independent consciousnesses, which hemisphere does closet
> continuer
> >       > predict I will become when by brain is split? The right or the
> left?
> >
> >       Do I need to explain it more? Split brain is a medical condition,
> and therefore
> >       we would be well justified in analyzing it on its own terms. Most
> human beings
> >       do not have that, and I think someone having a split brain does
> not invalidate
> >       the experience of most human beings.
> >
> > A theory of personal identity shouldn't shy away from problems just
> because
> > they are rare, or edge cases.
>
> True, but is brain damage an edge case? It's like having a theory for a
> machine,
> and then complain that the theory doesn't work when the machine is broken,
> isn't
> it?
>

I see it more like having Newtonian mechanics and finding it works pretty
well for most things, then finding it fails for situations with very strong
gravity or at relativistic speeds.

Split brains are the "relativistic speeds" for the conventional view of
personal identity.



> >       > Open individualism says you remain present in both -- the
> apparent disunion is
> >       > due only to a lack of integration between the hemispheres.
> Should they be
> >       > connected in the future, they would become integrated, and again
> feel as one
> >       > mind.
> >       >
> >       > What would closed individualism say would happen?
> >
> >       I think the question can be rephrased in terms of neuroscience and
> psychology.
> >
> > Neither of those subjects deal with personal identity though.
>
> Depends on how it is defined, and in what language it is defined. Maybe
> that is
> the best we can do?
>

I don't think neuroscience or psychology are traditionally much interested
in questions involving teletransporters or mind uploading, etc. But perhaps
that will change at some point, and one of those fields will try to answer
questions of personal identity.


> >       >       True, but these are all thought experiments, and links to
> our previous
> >       >       discussion.
> >       >
> >       > Split brains are a real, and empirically studied phenomenon.
> >
> >       So maybe the right way is to led science study it? There is
> actually no need to
> >       force a description or result, ahead of time. We can collect data
> and remain
> >       perfectly agnostic.
> >
> > Are you switching your position on personal identity from a belief in
> closed
> > individualism to agnosticism? If so, I would see this as progress. :-)
>
> Haha, maybe. ;) I could also adopt the approach of sticking with closed,
> until
> empirical evidence of any other version, or theory presents itself. Would
> that
> be agnosticism? Or actually, maybe that would be the agnostic physicalism,
> or
> the physicalist agnosticism from before? ;)
>


Not sure.


> >       >       > What would that look like?
> >       >
> >       >       Just like what is described in any text book on the body,
> the brain, coupled
> >       >       with the empirical experience we all have. This is based
> on a kind of
> >       >       behavioural definition of consciousness.
> >       >
> >       > If there's nothing binding one's identity to a particular
> body/brain, then
> >       > that is open individualism, for then you can survive via the
> continuation of
> >       > any body or brain.
> >
> >       I think you had a good point in our private email thread where you
> say I am
> >       straddling the fence between closed and open. Maybe one point of
> confusion here
> >       is the term closed individualism? Just like I was completely wrong
> about open,
> >       maybe I should spend some time trying to find a better definition
> or word for
> >       closed? I'm not saying it is so, but it is a suspicion I'm
> starting to have.
> >
> > Here is where Kolak defines terms:
> >
> >
> https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-1-4020-3014-7/page/n19/mode/2up?q=%22To+distinguish+it+from+the+traditional%22
> > AND
> >
> https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-1-4020-3014-7/page/n25/mode/2up?q=%22CLOSED+INDIVIDUALISM%2C+EMPTY+INDIVIDUALISM%2C
> > +AND+OPEN+INDIVIDUALISM%3A+THE+THREE+VIEWS+OF+PERSONAL%22
>
> Thank you!
>


You're welcome!


> >       >       True! Both are interesting questions, maybe better for a
> separate thread?
> >       >
> >       > You can, though.I'm not sure I have much more than that I would
> have to contribute.
> >
> >       So this is the main motivation for you when it comes to open
> individualism? That
> >       it would serve to promote empathy and loving kindness? Oh, and I
> agree, those
> >       are important goals. I just wanted to restate, to make sure I
> understand why you
> >       think it is so important.
> >
> > That is one of its practical advantages. In the same way capitalism
> converts
> > self-interest to a societal benefit, open individualism
>
> It would be a great "addon" or complementary principle, I do agree with
> that!
> Many people who have not thought a lot about capitalism, beyond the parody
> presented in the popular press, become very surprised when I tell them
> about the
> take on it, that it is in fact, the only system we have devised that
> transforms
> our innate egoism into benefits for everyone. I think it is quite a
> beautiful
> creation, or emergent phenomenon!
>
> > converts self interest into an interest in helping and in reducing harm
> for
> > all others. It could help end war, starvation, abuse, etc. as many have
> noted.
> > In effect, open individualism makes the idea of "karma" / "the golden
> rule"
> > vividly real.
>
> Well, I don't know if I agree about karma, but I do agree with the golden
> rule.
>

Karma in the sense that all the good you do for others comes back to you,
and all the harm you cause others comes back to you. This is trivially true
under open individualism, for you are all those other people you do good
for or harm.


> > Take care!
>
> And you too! And let me also wish you a great weekend!
>

You as well!

Jason
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