[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[efc at disroot.org]

On Wed, 26 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:

>       I've been studying the source, and in terms of splits, Nozick lists the options:
>
>       1. Neither are you.
>       2. Both are you.
>       3. There are two different people later; but unnoticed, there always were two
>       different people there, though this became evident only after the appearance of
>       the tied continuers.
>       4. One of Y and Z, and only one, is the continuation of the individual of
>       which X at t1 (time 1)  was a part. There is no further fact in virtue of which it is,
>       just the luck of the draw.
> 
> Thanks for tracking down the original source on this. It is very useful.
> 
> As to what Nozick says here, my comment is that a well-formed theory ought to
> offer firm answers to these questions. Otherwise, what does the theory add if
> it leaves open all these possibilities?  

You're welcome! Yes, I've skimmed the book and it is more of an exploration and
clarification at times, than an attempt to come up with definite answers. This
is my impression based on a very shallow and quick read.

>       > For example, if two simultaneous duplicates formed from a teletransporter each
>       > the same number of Planck units away from the original?
>       >
>       > What should happen in that case?
>       >
>       > Do we then have to introduce a priority for Left-Right or North-South into our
>       > definition of closest?
>
>       If we accept that after a split, neither is us, then that would solve the
>       problem.
> 
> Such thinking makes no sense to me. If one accepts their personal survival in
> the case one person steps out of a teleporter, why should they conclude
> personal death in the case someone else like them steps out of some other
> teleporter elsewhere?

Well, because of the split scenario. It is one proposed solution, and it depends
on how the teleporter works. I consider splits to be impossible, so for me it is
not a case I need to consider. But for the sake of our discussion, assuming the
MWI, it is definitely a case that needs to be handled. I agree there.

>       > If you have no theory under which to operate and make predictions, then
>       > counterfactual reasoning won't work. But you should be able to reason
>       > according to temporarily assuming one theory vs. another, and find, for
>       > example that one theory of personal identity predicts one thing while another
>       > theory predicts something else. Then you can test this situation to see which
>       > theorist right, or you can see if one theory leads to contradictions.
>
>       I think "what if" reasoning is fine as long as it is grounded in, or leads to,
>       empirical results. My point is that if I test my theory with an impossible
>       counterfactual, then I'd consider that a waste of time, and counter productive
>       to making progress. If the counterfactual test of the theory never leads to any
>       result in the real (TM) world, that I can verify or falsify, it's also not so
>       good.
> 
> If a theory fails for hypothetical situations it ought to handle, I think we
> can discount it as a failed theory without even having to do the experiment.

True, but that comes down to the point of view of what a theory ought to handle
vs what it does not need to handle. Since I'm not an MWI:er for instance, my
theory of identity would never have to deal with splits. But for an MWI:er, it
would have to, since I think that would be the case constantly happening
everywhere and for everyone if I understand it correctly.

> For example, consider Einstein's proposed EPR experiment involving sending
> entangled particle pairs across space (an experiment well beyond the
> technology of his day), yet it highlighted the fact that Copenhagen
> Interpretation implied faster-than-light influences, in clear contradiction to
> his relativity. And some 50 years later, when we did have the technology to
> perform such experiments, they confirmed Einstein's point, the effect was
> observed, and one cannot accept CI and believe that nothing can travel faster
> than c.

Ah, but observation was key here. And as long as observation is possible for us,
I have no quarrel with theories, explorations and so on. 
 
>       > Namely, that *you* inhabit this particular brain and body. The experiences
>       > that happen to this brain and body are *yours*, and will be experienced by
>       > *you*.
>
>       I think that takes us into the subject/object divide, and can easily lead us
>       astray into needless speculation. I could say that this brain and body, a mass
>       of particles, is what is, and it reacts to the laws of physics.
> 
> You think that you are Daniel, and no one else. What objective physical fact
> makes this so? Must we not consider the subjective aspect of reality when we
> deal with areas such as consciousness and personal subjective survival?

I don't think we can. The subjective is per definition directly inaccessible to
us, and therefore, unless it can be verified, the question should be dropped. In
terms of physical facts, what makes me, me, is a combination of my mind and body
and uniqueness in space, as per my formula.

Also note that from a pragmatic point of view, our legal definitions and
processes for proving that I am I work perfectly fine, so that is another way to
discuss it based on an external point of view.

But subjectively understanding it, is impossible from a scientific perspective,
and I advocate for dropping the question until new experiments are devised.

>       > Now then, the real difference between closed and open individualism comes down
>       > to a single question: is this fact (that it is *you* who is in this particular
>       > body) conditioned on something or not?
>
>       What is "you"? How would you define it? My body is part of the chain of cause
>       and effect, going back as long as we can trace it. Do we need to say more?
>
>       >       There is not condition here, it is just an event along a long chain of causes
>       >       and effects. It is the same with reality. It happens to us, we have no choice. I
>       >       think this also shows us that probability is part of the language of math, that
>       >       is only meaningful for us as conscious human beings. Without human beings,
>       >       "speaking" the language of math and probability, the concept is meaningless.
>       >
>       > If there is no condition that determines you being in some body, and not in
>       > others, then that is open individualism.
>
>       I don't see how that follows. We can trace a path of cause and effect that
>       resulted in me sitting in my chair. How does open individualism follow from
>       that?
> 
> Because similar cause effect paths lead to all other persons. What makes yours special?

I don't think the question is meaningful. What do you mean with "special"? We
can trace cause and effect from my parents (or their parents) to me. That is a
fact. I don't see why anything else need to be said about it?

>       > Logic works, but this shows how important starting assumptions are for
>       > reaching correct conclusions.
>
>       Not only assumptions, premises, verification and falsification, and keeping the
>       results to what we can check.
> 
> This must be another point of fundamental disagreement between us. I believe
> that logic/rational works and can provide meaningful results absent empirical
> verification.

Yes, this is correct. I think we established that in the previous thread. This
flows from our view of science and the sources of truth.

>       >       That would be my arguemnt regarding counterfactuals. I think your intuition was
>       >       the right one here.
>       >
>       >       But if I look at the AI:s definition of open individualism vs closed
>       >       individualism:
>       >
>       > These are terribly misleading and wrong definitions, as I will point out below.
>
>       This is a good point! I thought it was an established point of view, with one
>       definition. Maybe there are many nuances here?
> 
> I think it stems from the poorly written wikipedia article. Wikipedia is
> heavily weighted in most AI training sets, so one bad article will cause
> most AIs to give bad answers.

True. Let me check what you say below.

>       >       "Closed individualism is a philosophical concept that posits that each person is
>       >       a distinct, separate individual with a unique identity that does not extend
>       >       beyond their own consciousness.
>       >
>       > This is circular and meaningless since it doesn't define what a person is,
>       > (which is the entire crux of the problem.) Also, no entity "extends beyond
>       > their own consciousness," in any theory of personal identity. So this is
>       > another meaningless distinction.
>
>       What about:
>
>       "Closed individualism is considered to be the default view of personal identity,
>       which is that one's personal identity consists of a ray or line traveling
>       through time, and that one has a future self."
> 
> I think ray and line are a bit ambiguous.

I think that would be "cause and effect" or in my late night "inspiration" a
directional, acyclic graph describing your "journey" through time.

>       Another thing I noticed is that it seems like open, closed, empty are creations
>       of Daniel Kolak. Is that true? If so, perhaps there are more definitions and
>       constructions out there against which we can contrast them?
> 
> These definitions come from Kolak, but I think they mostly capture the three
> classes of views of personal identity that have been expressed.
> 
> Personal Identity is a fairly small subfield of philosophy, there has not been
> much written on it compared to, say, philosophy of mind, ethics, or ontology.

Ahhh.... that would explain a lot of the bad quality stuff that I have found,
and some of the confusion here. I'll have a look at what you suggest further
down.

>       >       This perspective contrasts with open individualism, which suggests
>       >       that all individuals share a common identity or consciousness, implying a deeper
>       >       connection among all people." (GPT 4o mini)
>       >
>       > There is no consciousness link, hive mind, nor collective consciousness as GPT
>       > seems to suggest here. This is a common accusation against open individualism,
>       > but it is not a suggestion made by any of its serious proponents.
>
>       It seems like open individualism is too subtle. It also does not seem to be very
>       popular, since, as you have pointed out, my goolging and GPT:ing seems to
>       produce only caricatures of the position.
> 
> I would start with the original sources:
> One self (1990): https://philarchive.org/rec/ZUBOST
> And Kolak's I Am You (2004): https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-1-4020-3014-7
> Perhaps the briefest introduction would be this 7 minute video by
> Zuboff: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTLHoWuEM5s

Thank you!

>       Well, first of all, it is a thought experiment, so there is nothing that
>       guarantees that this will ever be possible. If, for the sake of conversation,
>       assume that we knew this was impossible, would it make sense regardless to
>       engage in the thought experiment?
>
>       But, you know me... ;) I will disregard that, and please disregard it too, since
>       we've covered that, and let us focus on the experiment, as is.
> 
> :-)
> 
> Let's, alternatively, try reasoning assuming it is possible, and see where the
> various supposed theories take us. If any theory struggles to provide
> consistent answers, then we can look to identify what it is that is creating
> the difficulty, confusion, ambiguity, or inconsistency in that theory.

Or impossibility? But yes... just shooting down from the start will make for a
very short conversation. ;)

>       > functionalism  suggests that one's conscious state does not depend on the
>       > material identity of the atoms in one's brain.  Therefore, it is in principle
>
>       Yes...
>
>       > possible to survive teleportation.
>
>       Maybe. Would depend on how the thought-experiment teleporter is designed. If it
>       would be designed as a destructive, continuous upload/download, then I agree!
> 
> Rather than say "you will survive the teleportation" which I admit is
> ambiguous, let us say "awakening the frozen duplicate will result in a living
> conscious being" This, I think you will agree with, as will anyone who accepts

Agreed!

> epiphenomenalism, physicalism or functionalism. The only people who might
> disagree are the dualists who say that a soul needs to be injected into the
> reanimated body, and without this the person will not function or live.

Yes, sounds reasonable enough. Just as a side note, I think the dualist could
continue being a dualist, but he would then have to devise a parallell theory
for souls, when it comes to splits, copies etc, and of course, how those souls
are "attached" to the body, but let's leave that.

>       > If we analyze just one of the four duplicates NASA creates of you, we see that
>       > it is equivalent to teleportation. A scan of the original is made and a copy
>       > is reconstructed in a different location, while the original is destroyed.
>
>       Let me apply my formula of identity to this...
>
>              Mind -----------> (1 = continuity of mind through time)
>              OR
>              Body -----------> (1 = continuity of body through time)
>              XOR
>              Copy (0 = unique, 1 = copy)
>              = 1 (me) or 0 (not me)
>       (Note! I changed from unique in space to copy, since it maps nicer with
>       true/false 1/0.)
> 
> That is a good change.
>
>       Since the original is destroyed, there is no continuity of mind or body, and
>       since we're talking about a unique copy (the original was destroyed) we get
>       M(0) OR B(0) XOR C(0) = 0 (not me).
> 
> What if we presume that the frozen duplicate was formed via a continuous copying process?

What do you mean with continuous copy process? Is it that it is "synced" live
with the original copy? Or that it is created while the original is alive?

>       If, the original was not destroyed, but kept on ice, we'd get M(0) OR B(1) XOR
>       C(1) = 0 (not me).
> 
> What if all the frozen copies were formed from the same living copy in an
> identical and simultaneous way, such that no frozen instance had a greater
> claim to being called "the original" than any other?

I don't see how that would make a difference. There is still one living
original, and regardless of how the copies are made, they are still copies.

>       > The twist here is that multiple replicas of you are created. Which one of them
>       > do you become? The only answer that appears to make sense is "all of them".
>
>       Or none of them, as per Nozick?
> 
> Well in my example, only one is awakened at any one time. Can we not ignore
> the frozen atoms? Or does their presence in the universe somehow make it
> impossible for you to survive being thawed?  

I'm no Nozick expert, but I'd say, based on my reading of the text that none of
them would be you. The fact that one of them is frozen, could perhaps be equated
to one being awake and 4 being asleep?

>       > Your survival does not depend on which of the five replicas is thawed, because
>       > you would live and survive as any of them.
>
>       If you believe all of them, then I agree.
> 
> Hmm could you clarify what you are agreeing to here?

Sorry, I think I agree with either being none or all. But being a subset of one
of them I do not think makes any sense, if I step away from my formula and try
to look at it from your point of view?

>       > Therefore, if all five are thawed would you not live as each of them? In what
>       > way does it make sense to say you live as one but not the others?
>
>       For me, that would come down to continuity of mind, body, and uniqueness.
> 
> We can reframe (I think) the experiment such that the copies are formed via a
> continuous process, and further, if only one is thawed at a time, does that
> not imply uniqueness?

No, I think, the bodies are still there and "in sync", so would therefore be not me.

>       > Consider what Thomas Nagel says about the absence of any physical facts that
>       > account for him being Thomas Nagel:
>
>       I disagree. From my perspective, I can point to Thomas Nagel and say "there he
>       is". Do we need anything else?
>
>       I can also ask Thomas Nagel if he is Thomas Nagel, and that is also good
>       evidence I think.
> 
> I think you may be missing Nagel's point, which is, if I have this complete
> highly detailed objective description of everything in the universe, what
> objective physical fact accounts for the fact that his identity, and his
> perspective, happens to be bound up with this particular set of atoms (in the
> objective physical description of the universe)? I admit this is a highly
> subtle point which is difficult for the English language to express, but I
> think if you carefully read Nagel's original text on this you will see what he
> is getting at. Note that you cannot point and say "there he is," because he
> explicitly ruled out using any kind of indexical language, like pointing, or
> using words like this, I, here, etc.

Maybe I can express it like this:

Nagel's emphasis on the subjectivity of consciousness is due to the limitations
of every day language, which is unable to fully capture the complexity of conscious
experience. This means that the apparent subjectivity of consciousness is an
artifact of our linguistic and cognitive limitations, rather than a fundamental
feature of reality itself.

So basically, our language is deceiving us. If we reformulated the question
based on the findings of neuroscience, that is basically the answer.

>       >       I would argue from the basis of our every day experience. Based on that, it
>       >       seems like closed individualism is what is the right view.
>       >
>       > I would too if I believed these definitions. But these definitions are deeply
>       > flawed and misleading. There are no empirical differences between what it
>       > would feel like to be you whether closed or open individualism is true.
>
>       Then maybe that is the reason? Maybe the two positions are in that case
>       ultimately meaningless?
> 
> The theories differ in the kinds of questions they can answer. Consider the
> question: "Why were you born as Daniel, at this point in time, on this planet,
> and in this universe?" Empty and Closed Individualism cannot offer any answer
> to that question, but open individualism can.

I think the question is not meaningful. I can answer that I was born due to my
parents, etc. etc. More than that is not meaningful to say from the point of
view of science. For instance, I can ask the question, "why was a granola bar
made as that specific granola bar in my kitchen a few hours ago, on this planet?"

The answer is that my wife wanted something with our tea tonight when we're
watching Severance. But the question why was that granola bar created as that
specific granola bra, is a meaningless question. I think, in the best
Wittgensteinian tradition, that our language sometimes deceives us, and if we
are not alert to that fact, we can, at worst, end up wasting thousands of years
debating something, which is really, at the end of the day, a "bug" in our
language.

>       Apologies, this I fully accept. Sorry to have wasted your time,
> 
> No worries, it is the fault of wikipedia here, not you.

Thank you! I have certainly learned about the limits of both wikipedia and
LLM:s! Usually I am in the habit of taking them at face value, when the topic is
not super important (just reading for fun), but I brought that bad habit with me
here, and it is not a good habit when it comes to discussing things. I should
keep my "work" mindset here, where I do not trust an LLM as far as I can throw
it. ;)

>       >       The only way to some kind of open individualism I see, is just the way of
>       >       definition or agreement, where we look at what we _do_ share. We share our DNA
>       >       to 99.9% (?), we are all links in the chain of causation, the electricity in our
>       >       brains and nervoussystem is the same electricity, so it could be said from that
>       >       point of view that the same "power" powers us all, and this power came from a
>       >       common source way down the tree of life. It could argued that we are also
>       >       shared components of the global ecosystems, so looking at the planet as a whole,
>       >       we could see that we are all components in that system.
>       >
>       > As Arnold Zuboff explains, all experiences are mine because they are all
>       > experienced as I -- in an immediate, first-person way. Every experience is
>       > felt as if it is experienced immediately by a first-person "I", and this trait
>       > is common to all conscious experiences. All experiences are felt as if they
>       > are experienced by I.
>       >
>       > You need not go any deeper than this.
>
>       Well, clearly he is wrong, given my experience of the world, and my experience
>       of you. I think I am too set in my "closed" way. Can you prove to me that your
>       experience answering me, is actually my experience? I'm sorry, but I cannot see
>       it.
> 
> Consider that you have experienced many things in the life of Daniel which you
> no longer remember. Your 247th day of grade school, your 1,879th day of life,
> your 126th car ride, etc. Who had these experiences? Clearly you did, and yet
> yet the you (in your current vantage point right here and now) don't remember
> having those experiences. Whether you remember having had a particular
> experience or not, then, is not determinative of whether or not you had that
> experience.

Ok, so let me try and rephrase this, and see if I get it. Z says that all
experiences are experienced by an "I". An I could, just to give me something
tangible to wrap my mind around, be the neural process generating the experience
of being myself.

So, is he saying, that we are all the same, because he identifies us, not with
continuity of mind and body, over time, but with the neural process that gives
rise to the I? And since he assumes, this process or function, is the same, and
since this function is the "nexus" or focus of experience, we are all the same
I?

Is that closer?

To me, it seems like saying something similar to, we all consist of the same
elements, therefore we are all the same. Trivial from one point of view, true
from one point of view, but also not true, from the point of view of other
definitions, starting points, and our pragmatic every day experience.

>       > But you can, if you wish. For example, by considering statistical arguments,
>       > or cases that cause bodily or psychological continuity theories to break down,
>       > but this is all on top of the much more core notion of the "same I" being a
>       > common trait present in all experiences had by all conscious beings.
>
>       But how can we say that without having a complete knowledge and definition of I
>       and consciousness?
> 
> Here is a definition of conscious from Dennett and Hofstadeter:
> 
> "In philosophical literature, many phrases have been
> used to try to evoke the right flavors for what being
> sentient really is (“being sentient” is one of them).
> Two old terms are “soul” and “anima.” These days,
> an “in” word is “intentionality.” There is the old
> standby, “consciousness.” Then there is “being a
> subject,” “having an inner life,” “having experience,”
> “having a point of view,” having “perceptual
> aboutness” or “personhood” or a “self” or “free will.”
> In some people’s eyes, “having a mind,” “being
> intelligent,” and just plain old “thinking” have the
> right flavors."
> — Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett in “The Mind’sI”
> (1981)
> 
> Note that a common element, to any sensible definition of consciousness, is
> "having a point of view" "having an experience". In other words, there is
> something it is like to be that particular conscious thing. All conscious
> states, being conscious of something, will have some collection of
> immediately-felt first-hand knowledge (of that something that happens to
> be conscious of).

I think for the purpose of descriptions, theories and science, that first-person
thing, has to go, as per my argument against Nagel above.

> This is true regardless of what philosophy of mind one ascribes to.
> 
> This immediate, first-person character, of experience is common to all
> conscious beings.

I can rephrase that as persons experience things, and act, as if, they have
first-person experiences. Better than that I do not think we can do. For
ordinary day to day purposes, I do of course talk about my inner experiences,
but that does not mean that that is the best way to actually describe them or do
research them.

>       I can see how a credible case can be made that every human
>       being has a neuron pattern that gives rise to an I. But that is a distinct
>       pattern, unique for every individual.
> 
> There's a distinct neural pattern not only for each individual, but for each
> individual in each moment in time. If "you" persist across variations in that
> neural pattern across moments of your life, what is the essential

True, we can go with that, or mind/body for instance.

> nature/character of the pattern that must exist for you to be there in them?
> If it is nothing other than the sense of being an I, being a conscious living
> person, having an experience of some kind, then you exist in all neural
> patterns of all conscious beings.

I think that is too simplistic. I includes mind and body, continuous through
time, which also fits perfectly well with our ordinary experience. I think
reducing the definition of the I to having neural pattern, basically says
nothing. Different neural patterns correspond with different experiences, so I
think there is strong proof for the I being more than a general pattern existing
in all human beings. I can of course define I as electrical activity in the
brain, and thus we are all I, but that doesn't really say much.

So far, it seems to me, either to be just a matter of trivial definition to
which we agree, or wrong.

Another thing to keep in mind is the pragmatic angle, we all act perfectly well
based on a closed kind, it works well, it is the "naive" first impression, and
at the end of the day, there seems to be no empirical evidence for anything else
being true, _apart_ from the way of definition.

But even if we agree to define open as electrons or functions, across all human
beings, we still act, as if, we're closed.

So an argument could be made, as per Occam, that closed is actually the simplest
explanation because it perfectly fits our experience, and everyone, regardless of
definition, acts as if closed was true, thus confirming it by behaviour.
Reactions to pain seems to fit perfectly well with closed as well.

On the other hand... in the time honored tradition of arguing against my point,
I can see a touch of the empirical when it comes to exploring open. I have a
colleague who has experimented a bit with some kind of mushroom, and he had the
experience of becoming connected with all living things on one of his trips.

Coming out of the trip, the feeling of an immense respect and kinship with all
life persisted for up to 2 weeks after the trip and gradually wore off.

So as I wrote in our private thread about an option where open and closed are
both true, the idea is that it just depends on where we attach our
ID-gravitational focus. Theoretically and speculatively, a mushroom trip,
meditation or what not, for a time, attaches it to the "open", while as you
suggested, evolution has attached it to the closed version, for survival
advantage.

I find the evolutionary argument interesting. Imagine flower-power hippies on
the savannah, identifying and enormously respecting and loving the lions and
other predators, and they won't remain alive for long.

Evolution being smart, said... hold it! let's make sure the guys care about
themselves, and thus evolved the closed "view" and it became the default, since
it generated humans with barriers, afraid for their own lives, thus highly
motivated to run away from lions.

But I guess we then run into the language barrier. We have a test, where
participants get to trip, and after the trip they also describe something
sounding like open, but does that feeling and experience prove anything? At most
it proves that due to the trip, they become more loving and passionate, it also
seems to indicate, that their own subjective experience would align, for the
duration of the trip, with something closer to open, than closed. But then they
revert.

Are expert meditators and buddhas permanently in "open" mode? Did they in fact
"deactivate" the closed switch?

Another thing came to mind as well, and that was Schopenhauer. I mentioned it to
you, but his starting point is the will to live. The "life force" and he argues
that the "spark" or life force is the same in all living things, we are after
all, linked by cause and effect, and through the tree of life, back to our very
first ancestor.

If you then define our unique "core" as this spark, that has been passed on for
aeons, you can then by definition argue that all life is related and the same,
it's the same spark.

Yes, this borders on the mumbo jumbo, and I apologize to the public readers who
do not enjoy that, but since it does connect with this conversation, and the
idea that open and closed are just two sides of the same coin, I think it is
relevant to bring it up.

Ok, so there you have it Jason. One set of arguments against open, and another
set, for the two being two sides of the same coin.

You take it from here! ;)

>       > This is explained by the simple fact that our nervous system aren't
>       > integrated. I don't have access to your memories and you don't have access to
>       > mine.
>
>       If there is no connection, then there can be no shared experience. I think this
>       is pretty trivial. Clearly, I'm starting to get the feeling that this is beyond
>       me. =(
> 
> Perhaps this might help. I wrote this some time ago, so the writing is not the
> best, but I introduce various thought experiments that highlight the various
> problems with other theories of personal identity:
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/16ktQX-HdxUk-z0xwmnqqeF4zjAu8xQjy/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=109779696990142678208&rtpof=true&sd=true
> (all the thought experiments are covered in the first 20 pages).

Thank you, will have a look!

>       >       Closed doesn't suffer from this, it perfectly explains our
>       >       every day ordinary experience.
>       >
>       > The fact that we have separate brains is enough to explain this. Souls need
>       > not be pinned to bodies to ensure the only experiences you can remember having
>       > are those had by your particular brain. Having a particular brain is enough to
>       > explain this (in closed and in open individualism).
>
>       Would you say that open individualism better explains our "folk psychology" view
>       of our subjective experience?
> 
> It explains it as well, while assuming less. It also is capable of explaining
> more. So by Occam it is preferred.

Ah, so you don't buy "my" version of Occam above? ;)

>       > How do you explain split brains? What happens to ones personal identity when
>       > the two halves of the brain stop talking? Empirically we know the result is
>       > two independent consciousnesses, which hemisphere does closet continuer
>       > predict I will become when by brain is split? The right or the left?
>
>       Do I need to explain it more? Split brain is a medical condition, and therefore
>       we would be well justified in analyzing it on its own terms. Most human beings
>       do not have that, and I think someone having a split brain does not invalidate
>       the experience of most human beings.
> 
> A theory of personal identity shouldn't shy away from problems just because
> they are rare, or edge cases.

True, but is brain damage an edge case? It's like having a theory for a machine,
and then complain that the theory doesn't work when the machine is broken, isn't
it?

>       > Open individualism says you remain present in both -- the apparent disunion is
>       > due only to a lack of integration between the hemispheres. Should they be
>       > connected in the future, they would become integrated, and again feel as one
>       > mind.
>       >
>       > What would closed individualism say would happen?
>
>       I think the question can be rephrased in terms of neuroscience and psychology.
> 
> Neither of those subjects deal with personal identity though.

Depends on how it is defined, and in what language it is defined. Maybe that is
the best we can do?

>       >       True, but these are all thought experiments, and links to our previous
>       >       discussion.
>       >
>       > Split brains are a real, and empirically studied phenomenon.
>
>       So maybe the right way is to led science study it? There is actually no need to
>       force a description or result, ahead of time. We can collect data and remain
>       perfectly agnostic.
> 
> Are you switching your position on personal identity from a belief in closed
> individualism to agnosticism? If so, I would see this as progress. :-)

Haha, maybe. ;) I could also adopt the approach of sticking with closed, until
empirical evidence of any other version, or theory presents itself. Would that
be agnosticism? Or actually, maybe that would be the agnostic physicalism, or
the physicalist agnosticism from before? ;)

>       >       > What would that look like?
>       >
>       >       Just like what is described in any text book on the body, the brain, coupled
>       >       with the empirical experience we all have. This is based on a kind of
>       >       behavioural definition of consciousness.
>       >
>       > If there's nothing binding one's identity to a particular body/brain, then
>       > that is open individualism, for then you can survive via the continuation of
>       > any body or brain.
>
>       I think you had a good point in our private email thread where you say I am
>       straddling the fence between closed and open. Maybe one point of confusion here
>       is the term closed individualism? Just like I was completely wrong about open,
>       maybe I should spend some time trying to find a better definition or word for
>       closed? I'm not saying it is so, but it is a suspicion I'm starting to have.
> 
> Here is where Kolak defines terms:
> 
> https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-1-4020-3014-7/page/n19/mode/2up?q=%22To+distinguish+it+from+the+traditional%22
> AND
> https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-1-4020-3014-7/page/n25/mode/2up?q=%22CLOSED+INDIVIDUALISM%2C+EMPTY+INDIVIDUALISM%2C
> +AND+OPEN+INDIVIDUALISM%3A+THE+THREE+VIEWS+OF+PERSONAL%22

Thank you!

>       >       True! Both are interesting questions, maybe better for a separate thread?
>       >
>       > You can, though.I'm not sure I have much more than that I would have to contribute.
>
>       So this is the main motivation for you when it comes to open individualism? That
>       it would serve to promote empathy and loving kindness? Oh, and I agree, those
>       are important goals. I just wanted to restate, to make sure I understand why you
>       think it is so important.
> 
> That is one of its practical advantages. In the same way capitalism converts
> self-interest to a societal benefit, open individualism

It would be a great "addon" or complementary principle, I do agree with that!
Many people who have not thought a lot about capitalism, beyond the parody
presented in the popular press, become very surprised when I tell them about the
take on it, that it is in fact, the only system we have devised that transforms
our innate egoism into benefits for everyone. I think it is quite a beautiful
creation, or emergent phenomenon!

> converts self interest into an interest in helping and in reducing harm for
> all others. It could help end war, starvation, abuse, etc. as many have noted.
> In effect, open individualism makes the idea of "karma" / "the golden rule"
> vividly real.

Well, I don't know if I agree about karma, but I do agree with the golden rule.

> Take care!

And you too! And let me also wish you a great weekend!

Best regards, 
Daniel