[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Mar 26, 2025 at 1:29 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> >       > Good points. Those are also cases of concern that various
> theories of personal
> >       > identity contend with.
> >
> >       I liked the closest continuer idea. I tried to grasp at something
> similar when
> >       talking about the natural paths the electrons take, within the
> contraint of the
> >       laws of physics to try and distinguish the system in its natural
> state, vs
> >       changes to the system from without in the form of teleporting.
> >
> > The reason I dislike it is because it seems arbitrary and ad hoc. And
> > moreover, what forbids the existence/creation of two or more
> equally-close
> > continuers?
>
> I've been studying the source, and in terms of splits, Nozick lists the
> options:
>
> 1. Neither are you.
> 2. Both are you.
> 3. There are two different people later; but unnoticed, there always were
> two
> different people there, though this became evident only after the
> appearance of
> the tied continuers.
> 4. One of Y and Z, and only one, is the continuation of the individual of
> which X at t1 (time 1)  was a part. There is no further fact in virtue of
> which it is,
> just the luck of the draw.
>

Thanks for tracking down the original source on this. It is very useful.

As to what Nozick says here, my comment is that a well-formed theory ought
to offer firm answers to these questions. Otherwise, what does the theory
add if it leaves open all these possibilities?


>
> He continues:
>
> "This does not seem possible, however, provided no other asymmetry is
> smuggled
> in, unless it is a way of asserting there is some other feature that
> cannot be
> duplicated or doubly exhibited, in virtue of which someone is you. But
> what is
> that further feature? A soul? A spiritual pellet? Do we know that such
> things
> cannot split into two tied, equally close continuers? I find the first of
> these
> positions most plausible. I am neither Y nor Z, and I no longer exist.
> This is
> not so very distressing in this case, for what I care about is that there
> remains something that continues me closely enough to be me if it were my
> sole
> continuer; and if there are two such, I care especially about the fate of
> the
> closest continuer."
>
> And then he goes into a discussion about degree of care and how it could be
> related to degree of closeness.
>
> He does seem to admit that it is vague, but a step on the way perhaps to
> clarity.
>
> "I make no attempt here to fill in the details; and not merely be- cause
> (though
> it is true that) I have nothing especially illuminating to say about these
> details. I do not believe that there are fixed details to be filled in; I
> do not
> believe there is some one metric space in which to measure closeness for
> each of
> our identities. The content of the measure of closeness, and so the
> content of a
> person's identity through time, can vary (somewhat) from person to person.
> What
> is special about people, about selves, is that what constitutes their
> identity
> through time is partially determined by their own concep- tion of
> themselves, a
> conception which may vary, perhaps appropri- ately does vary, from person
> to
> person. We shall be in a better posi- tion later to say more about this.
> Note
> that if the measure of closeness is partly up to the person himself, there
> is a
> simple answer to the question of why his caring is proportional, at least,
> to
> degree of closeness: he fixes the measure of closeness in accordance with
> how
> much he cares.
>
> If the details of personal identity have not yet been specified (though
> some
> have been mentioned in passing), in what way has the topic, until now, been
> personal identity, rather than simply the gen- eral notion of identity
> through
> time? Thi~ general notion fits the clos- est continuer schema, but how
> does that
> help us with the problems special to personal identity? It gives us a
> framework
> in which to embed those problems, and perhaps that will help some. Still,
> it
> must be granted that it does not focus especially upon personal iden-
> tity. It
> does help us, however, with very many of the problems dis- cussed in the
> literature under the rubric "personal identity", for these problems, though
> phrased about persons, to a surprising extent tum out
> to be general problems that apply to any kind of thing's identity through
> time.
> Not only our discussion thus far but also, I claim, the existing literature
> usually hasn't been concerned with the problems special to personal
> identity. To
> distinguish and clear away the more general issues that infest the area is
> a
> necessary first step. The spe- cial problems cannot be attacked without
> being
> isolated first; I doubt they can be attacked fruitfully in isolation from
> the
> correct general framework for identity, certainly not if an incorrect one
> is
> presup- posed. In any case, the next part of this chapter is designed to
> illumi-
> nate the special nature of the self."
>
> > For example, if two simultaneous duplicates formed from a
> teletransporter each
> > the same number of Planck units away from the original?
> >
> > What should happen in that case?
> >
> > Do we then have to introduce a priority for Left-Right or North-South
> into our
> > definition of closest?
>
> If we accept that after a split, neither is us, then that would solve the
> problem.
>

Such thinking makes no sense to me. If one accepts their personal survival
in the case one person steps out of a teleporter, why should they conclude
personal death in the case someone else like them steps out of some other
teleporter elsewhere?


>
> >       > I'm not asking you to change the past. Only to consider what
> might have
> >       > happened, had something in the past occurred differently.
> >
> >       This is true, but the fact remains that this is not possible, so
> basing our
> >       reasoning on something which is impossible I thinks risks causing
> confusion and
> >       leads to wrong conclusions, or perhaps, meaningless conclusions.
> >
> > Some theory is required and must be assumed for the purposes of
> reasoning out
> > the consequences. This is how we can develop/design tests that
> ultimately can
> > refute ones theories. We evaluate what a theory predicts for a given
> starting
> > conditions, then with luck we can test this and confirm or disconfirm
> that
> > prediction.
> >
> > If you have no theory under which to operate and make predictions, then
> > counterfactual reasoning won't work. But you should be able to reason
> > according to temporarily assuming one theory vs. another, and find, for
> > example that one theory of personal identity predicts one thing while
> another
> > theory predicts something else. Then you can test this situation to see
> which
> > theorist right, or you can see if one theory leads to contradictions.
>
> I think "what if" reasoning is fine as long as it is grounded in, or leads
> to,
> empirical results. My point is that if I test my theory with an impossible
> counterfactual, then I'd consider that a waste of time, and counter
> productive
> to making progress. If the counterfactual test of the theory never leads
> to any
> result in the real (TM) world, that I can verify or falsify, it's also not
> so
> good.
>

If a theory fails for hypothetical situations it ought to handle, I think
we can discount it as a failed theory without even having to do the
experiment.

For example, consider Einstein's proposed EPR experiment involving sending
entangled particle pairs across space (an experiment well beyond the
technology of his day), yet it highlighted the fact that Copenhagen
Interpretation implied faster-than-light influences, in clear contradiction
to his relativity. And some 50 years later, when we did have the technology
to perform such experiments, they confirmed Einstein's point, the effect
was observed, and one cannot accept CI and believe that nothing can travel
faster than c.


>
>
> >
> > Namely, that *you* inhabit this particular brain and body. The
> experiences
> > that happen to this brain and body are *yours*, and will be experienced
> by
> > *you*.
>
> I think that takes us into the subject/object divide, and can easily lead
> us
> astray into needless speculation. I could say that this brain and body, a
> mass
> of particles, is what is, and it reacts to the laws of physics.
>

You think that you are Daniel, and no one else. What objective physical
fact makes this so? Must we not consider the subjective aspect of reality
when we deal with areas such as consciousness and personal subjective
survival?


>
> > Now then, the real difference between closed and open individualism
> comes down
> > to a single question: is this fact (that it is *you* who is in this
> particular
> > body) conditioned on something or not?
>
> What is "you"? How would you define it? My body is part of the chain of
> cause
> and effect, going back as long as we can trace it. Do we need to say more?
>
> >       There is not condition here, it is just an event along a long
> chain of causes
> >       and effects. It is the same with reality. It happens to us, we
> have no choice. I
> >       think this also shows us that probability is part of the language
> of math, that
> >       is only meaningful for us as conscious human beings. Without human
> beings,
> >       "speaking" the language of math and probability, the concept is
> meaningless.
> >
> > If there is no condition that determines you being in some body, and not
> in
> > others, then that is open individualism.
>
> I don't see how that follows. We can trace a path of cause and effect that
> resulted in me sitting in my chair. How does open individualism follow from
> that?
>

Because similar cause effect paths lead to all other persons. What makes
yours special?


>
> >       So going back to our thread about the world, what can be infered
> and
> >       what not, I think you are committing the same kind of mistake here.
> >
> >       Another favourite example of mine is Pascals wager that shows you
> the
> >       mistakes and error you end up with when you do probability with
> ideas,
> >       and especially when adding infinities, and start to "weigh"
> >       probabilities.
> >
> > Pascal's wager is valid logic, but it makes an implicit unstated and
>
> Well, if you strip all premisses of meaning and substitute them for A, B,
> C and
> so on, yes, but it also makes it meaningless. When I refer to Pascals
> wager I
> refer to the entirety of the "proof" including purpose, premisses etc.
> drawing
> conclusions from this world, to the other, that cannot be verified, and my
> opinion is that when considered from this point of view, it is just pure
> nonsense.
>
> > unjustified assumption: that God would reward, rather than punish blind
> belief
> > in him. If one factors in this possibility, and considers it equally
> likely as
> > the god who punishes disbelief in him, then it is a wash.
> >
> > Logic works, but this shows how important starting assumptions are for
> > reaching correct conclusions.
>
> Not only assumptions, premises, verification and falsification, and
> keeping the
> results to what we can check.
>

This must be another point of fundamental disagreement between us. I
believe that logic/rational works and can provide meaningful results absent
empirical verification.

For example, one might reason by logic that nothing can travel faster than
the speed of light, because to do so would create all kinds of time travel
paradoxes. Note that one arrived at this conclusion without empirical
observation: one would have to know everything in the universe and all
potential technologies developed by all past, current, and future alien
civilizations to "empirically verify" the non-existence of FTL devices. Or,
you could reason by logic that FTL devices are impossible, as their
existence would lead to impossible violations of causality.

Most physicists are comfortable in saying they believe FTL technology to be
impossible, despite not having empirically verified this to be so by
surveying the whole universe to look for counterexamples.


>
> >       > So accepting that one is justified (based on one's observation
> of having been
> >       > awakened) in concluding it is almost certain that they played
> the easy game,
> >       > rather than the hard game. Your task is this:
> >       >
> >       > To show why we are not similarly justified in concluding open
> individualism
> >       > (the easy game) rather than closed individualism (the hard game).
> >       >
> >
> >       That would be my arguemnt regarding counterfactuals. I think your
> intuition was
> >       the right one here.
> >
> >       But if I look at the AI:s definition of open individualism vs
> closed
> >       individualism:
> >
> > These are terribly misleading and wrong definitions, as I will point out
> below.
>
> This is a good point! I thought it was an established point of view, with
> one
> definition. Maybe there are many nuances here?
>

I think it stems from the poorly written wikipedia article. Wikipedia is
heavily weighted in most AI training sets, so one bad article will cause
most AIs to give bad answers.


>
> >       "Closed individualism is a philosophical concept that posits that
> each person is
> >       a distinct, separate individual with a unique identity that does
> not extend
> >       beyond their own consciousness.
> >
> > This is circular and meaningless since it doesn't define what a person
> is,
> > (which is the entire crux of the problem.) Also, no entity "extends
> beyond
> > their own consciousness," in any theory of personal identity. So this is
> > another meaningless distinction.
>
> What about:
>
> "Closed individualism is considered to be the default view of personal
> identity,
> which is that one's personal identity consists of a ray or line traveling
> through time, and that one has a future self."
>

I think ray and line are a bit ambiguous.


>
> Another thing I noticed is that it seems like open, closed, empty are
> creations
> of Daniel Kolak. Is that true? If so, perhaps there are more definitions
> and
> constructions out there against which we can contrast them?
>

These definitions come from Kolak, but I think they mostly capture the
three classes of views of personal identity that have been expressed.

Personal Identity is a fairly small subfield of philosophy, there has not
been much written on it compared to, say, philosophy of mind, ethics, or
ontology.


>
> >       This perspective contrasts with open individualism, which suggests
> >       that all individuals share a common identity or consciousness,
> implying a deeper
> >       connection among all people." (GPT 4o mini)
> >
> > There is no consciousness link, hive mind, nor collective consciousness
> as GPT
> > seems to suggest here. This is a common accusation against open
> individualism,
> > but it is not a suggestion made by any of its serious proponents.
>
> It seems like open individualism is too subtle. It also does not seem to
> be very
> popular, since, as you have pointed out, my goolging and GPT:ing seems to
> produce only caricatures of the position.
>

I would start with the original sources:
One self (1990): https://philarchive.org/rec/ZUBOST
And Kolak's I Am You (2004):
https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-1-4020-3014-7
Perhaps the briefest introduction would be this 7 minute video by Zuboff:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTLHoWuEM5s


>
> Of course using that as a basis is a waste of time. So let's see if I
> understand
> it better after your examples below.
>
> > Open individualism is merely the idea that there are no further
> metaphysical
> > facts binding particular experiences to partic bodily or mental
> continuations.
> > It is subtle, and hard to see what it is that I am saying is not there,
> but
> > perhaps it is best to work it out with an example:
> >
> > ------------------------
> >
> > Consider a deep space mission:
> ...
> > extra vigilent in focusing on the mission and complete it successfully.
> >
> > We can draw several conclusions from this thought experiment. The
>
> Well, first of all, it is a thought experiment, so there is nothing that
> guarantees that this will ever be possible. If, for the sake of
> conversation,
> assume that we knew this was impossible, would it make sense regardless to
> engage in the thought experiment?
>
> But, you know me... ;) I will disregard that, and please disregard it too,
> since
> we've covered that, and let us focus on the experiment, as is.
>

:-)

Let's, alternatively, try reasoning assuming it is possible, and see where
the various supposed theories take us. If any theory struggles to provide
consistent answers, then we can look to identify what it is that is
creating the difficulty, confusion, ambiguity, or inconsistency in that
theory.


>
> > functionalism  suggests that one's conscious state does not depend on the
> > material identity of the atoms in one's brain.  Therefore, it is in
> principle
>
> Yes...
>
> > possible to survive teleportation.
>
> Maybe. Would depend on how the thought-experiment teleporter is designed.
> If it
> would be designed as a destructive, continuous upload/download, then I
> agree!
>

Rather than say "you will survive the teleportation" which I admit is
ambiguous, let us say "awakening the frozen duplicate will result in a
living conscious being"
This, I think you will agree with, as will anyone who accepts
epiphenomenalism, physicalism or functionalism. The only people who might
disagree are the dualists who say that a soul needs to be injected into the
reanimated body, and without this the person will not function or live.


>
> > If we analyze just one of the four duplicates NASA creates of you, we
> see that
> > it is equivalent to teleportation. A scan of the original is made and a
> copy
> > is reconstructed in a different location, while the original is
> destroyed.
>
> Let me apply my formula of identity to this...
>
>        Mind -----------> (1 = continuity of mind through time)
>        OR
>        Body -----------> (1 = continuity of body through time)
>        XOR
>        Copy (0 = unique, 1 = copy)
>        = 1 (me) or 0 (not me)
> (Note! I changed from unique in space to copy, since it maps nicer with
> true/false 1/0.)
>

That is a good change.


>
> Since the original is destroyed, there is no continuity of mind or body,
> and
> since we're talking about a unique copy (the original was destroyed) we
> get
> M(0) OR B(0) XOR C(0) = 0 (not me).
>

What if we presume that the frozen duplicate was formed via a continuous
copying process?


>
> If, the original was not destroyed, but kept on ice, we'd get M(0) OR B(1)
> XOR
> C(1) = 0 (not me).
>

What if all the frozen copies were formed from the same living copy in an
identical and simultaneous way, such that no frozen instance had a greater
claim to being called "the original" than any other?


>
> > The twist here is that multiple replicas of you are created. Which one
> of them
> > do you become? The only answer that appears to make sense is "all of
> them".
>
> Or none of them, as per Nozick?
>

Well in my example, only one is awakened at any one time. Can we not ignore
the frozen atoms? Or does their presence in the universe somehow make it
impossible for you to survive being thawed?


>
> > Your survival does not depend on which of the five replicas is thawed,
> because
> > you would live and survive as any of them.
>
> If you believe all of them, then I agree.
>

Hmm could you clarify what you are agreeing to here?


>
> > Therefore, if all five are thawed would you not live as each of them? In
> what
> > way does it make sense to say you live as one but not the others?
>
> For me, that would come down to continuity of mind, body, and uniqueness.
>

We can reframe (I think) the experiment such that the copies are formed via
a continuous process, and further, if only one is thawed at a time, does
that not imply uniqueness?


>
> > ------------------------
> >
> > Closed individualism (or some closest continuer theory) says that you die
> > if/when copy #1 is destroyed, even if copy #2 survives. This is on
> account of
> > this *metaphysical youness* being bound up with some collection of frozen
> > atoms, and yet this property is not found within the exactly identical
> (except
>
> Well, it depends on the theory I'd say. In my case, it would depend on the
> continuity of body, mind and uniqueness. But I guess, at the end of the
> day, a
> case could be made of my experience of "me" being forever beyond the reach
> of
> science, so that would also be a way to deal with it. Externally, we have
> the
> descriptive way, bodies, electrons, etc. We also have a pragmatic view, in
> that
> we treat each other as individuals, and "it works".
>
> > for different spatial coordinates) collections of other frozen atoms in
> the
> > same organization. Yet spacetime, rotational, and translational symmetry
> tell
> > us the laws of physics don't care about time, location, or orientation.
> So how
> > does this *metaphysical youness* matter to anything (or to anyone)? The
> copies
> > of you, say #2 when he is awoken, feels exactly the same as #1 does. How
> is
> > his conscious state. It yours? He feels just the same as you, is just as
> > confident in being alive, conscious, and being a self, an "I" as you
> feel.
> >
> > Consider what Thomas Nagel says about the absence of any physical facts
> that
> > account for him being Thomas Nagel:
>
> I disagree. From my perspective, I can point to Thomas Nagel and say
> "there he
> is". Do we need anything else?
>
> I can also ask Thomas Nagel if he is Thomas Nagel, and that is also good
> evidence I think.
>

I think you may be missing Nagel's point, which is, if I have this complete
highly detailed objective description of everything in the universe, what
objective physical fact accounts for the fact that his identity, and his
perspective, happens to be bound up with this particular set of atoms (in
the objective physical description of the universe)? I admit this is a
highly subtle point which is difficult for the English language to express,
but I think if you carefully read Nagel's original text on this you will
see what he is getting at. Note that you cannot point and say "there he
is," because he explicitly ruled out using any kind of indexical language,
like pointing, or using words like this, I, here, etc.


>
> > So since there are no physical facts that could account for this, it
> either
> > doesn't exist (there is no factor) or it must be added as an additional
> > metaphysical property.
> >
> > Closed individualism is the assumption/belief in the existence of this
> extra
> > metaphysical property.
> >
> > Open individualism is the denial that there are such additional
> metaphysical
> > properties.
> >
> >
> >
> >       and
> >
> >       "Open individualism is a philosophical concept that suggests that
> all
> >       individuals share a common identity or consciousness. In this
> view, the
>
> I could see how a much stronger case could be made for identity, than
> consciousness, since we do not quite know what consciousness is or how to
> define
> it.
>
> In terms of identity, we can always define. But the question is... would
> it be
> useful in any way? I think if we provide some context of use, it would
> become
> much more clear. First of all what we mean, and second of all, what
> situation
> requires us to use it and for what result.
>
> >       I would argue from the basis of our every day experience. Based on
> that, it
> >       seems like closed individualism is what is the right view.
> >
> > I would too if I believed these definitions. But these definitions are
> deeply
> > flawed and misleading. There are no empirical differences between what it
> > would feel like to be you whether closed or open individualism is true.
>
> Then maybe that is the reason? Maybe the two positions are in that case
> ultimately meaningless?
>

The theories differ in the kinds of questions they can answer. Consider the
question: "Why were you born as Daniel, at this point in time, on this
planet, and in this universe?"
Empty and Closed Individualism cannot offer any answer to that question,
but open individualism can.


>
> >       In addition, I would ask myself what experiment we could design to
> show that
> >       thoughts and feeling and experiences are connected to those of
> others?
> >       Empirically, I can only come up with scenarios that would confirm
> closed
> >       individualism.
> >
> > This is based on GPT's incorrect definition.
>
> This is true. Thank you very much for correcting that!
>
> >       We are born, we have bodies and brains, and unique identities,
> interviews seem
> >       to confirm this. We have no evidence of telepathy.
> >
> > There is no telepathy in open individualism, again this I blame GPT's
> terribly misleading definition.
>
> Apologies, this I fully accept. Sorry to have wasted your time,


No worries, it is the fault of wikipedia here, not you.


> but I learned
> that apparently open individualism is not popular enough to have been
> included
> in the training sets often enough to result in correct answers.
>

Personal identity theories are fairly esoteric to begin with, and
universalism/open individualism as a theory are only a few decades old. If
the wikipedia article were better written I don't think the AI would have
provided you such a confused description of it.


>
> >       The only way to some kind of open individualism I see, is just the
> way of
> >       definition or agreement, where we look at what we _do_ share. We
> share our DNA
> >       to 99.9% (?), we are all links in the chain of causation, the
> electricity in our
> >       brains and nervoussystem is the same electricity, so it could be
> said from that
> >       point of view that the same "power" powers us all, and this power
> came from a
> >       common source way down the tree of life. It could argued that we
> are also
> >       shared components of the global ecosystems, so looking at the
> planet as a whole,
> >       we could see that we are all components in that system.
> >
> > As Arnold Zuboff explains, all experiences are mine because they are all
> > experienced as I -- in an immediate, first-person way. Every experience
> is
> > felt as if it is experienced immediately by a first-person "I", and this
> trait
> > is common to all conscious experiences. All experiences are felt as if
> they
> > are experienced by I.
> >
> > You need not go any deeper than this.
>
> Well, clearly he is wrong, given my experience of the world, and my
> experience
> of you. I think I am too set in my "closed" way. Can you prove to me that
> your
> experience answering me, is actually my experience? I'm sorry, but I
> cannot see
> it.
>

Consider that you have experienced many things in the life of Daniel which
you no longer remember. Your 247th day of grade school, your 1,879th day of
life, your 126th car ride, etc.
Who had these experiences? Clearly *you* did, and yet yet the you (in your
current vantage point right here and now) don't remember having those
experiences.
Whether you remember having had a particular experience or not, then, is
not determinative of whether or not you had that experience.


>
> > But you can, if you wish. For example, by considering statistical
> arguments,
> > or cases that cause bodily or psychological continuity theories to break
> down,
> > but this is all on top of the much more core notion of the "same I"
> being a
> > common trait present in all experiences had by all conscious beings.
>
> But how can we say that without having a complete knowledge and definition
> of I
> and consciousness?


Here is a definition of conscious from Dennett and Hofstadeter:

"In philosophical literature, many phrases have been
used to try to evoke the right flavors for what being
sentient really is (“being sentient” is one of them).
Two old terms are “soul” and “anima.” These days,
an “in” word is “intentionality.” There is the old
standby, “consciousness.” Then there is “being a
subject,” “having an inner life,” “having experience,”
“having a point of view,” having “perceptual
aboutness” or “personhood” or a “self” or “free will.”
In some people’s eyes, “having a mind,” “being
intelligent,” and just plain old “thinking” have the
right flavors."
— Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett in “The Mind’sI”
(1981)

Note that a common element, to any sensible definition of consciousness, is
"having a point of view" "having an experience". In other words, there is
something it is like to be that particular conscious thing.
All conscious states, being conscious of *something*, will have some
collection of immediately-felt first-hand knowledge (of that *something*
that happens to be conscious of).

This is true regardless of what philosophy of mind one ascribes to.

This immediate, first-person character, of experience is common to all
conscious beings.



> I can see how a credible case can be made that every human
> being has a neuron pattern that gives rise to an I. But that is a distinct
> pattern, unique for every individual.
>

There's a distinct neural pattern not only for each individual, but for
each individual in each moment in time. If "you" persist across variations
in that neural pattern across moments of your life, what is the essential
nature/character of the pattern that must exist for you to be there in
them? If it is nothing other than the sense of being an I, being a
conscious living person, having an experience of some kind, then you exist
in all neural patterns of all conscious beings.


>
> >       and it must also explain away the ilusion of
> >       closed individualism.
> >
> > This is explained by the simple fact that our nervous system aren't
> > integrated. I don't have access to your memories and you don't have
> access to
> > mine.
>
> If there is no connection, then there can be no shared experience. I think
> this
> is pretty trivial. Clearly, I'm starting to get the feeling that this is
> beyond
> me. =(
>

Perhaps this might help. I wrote this some time ago, so the writing is not
the best, but I introduce various thought experiments that highlight the
various problems with other theories of personal identity:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/16ktQX-HdxUk-z0xwmnqqeF4zjAu8xQjy/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=109779696990142678208&rtpof=true&sd=true
(all the thought experiments are covered in the first 20 pages).


>
> >       Closed doesn't suffer from this, it perfectly explains our
> >       every day ordinary experience.
> >
> > The fact that we have separate brains is enough to explain this. Souls
> need
> > not be pinned to bodies to ensure the only experiences you can remember
> having
> > are those had by your particular brain. Having a particular brain is
> enough to
> > explain this (in closed and in open individualism).
>
> Would you say that open individualism better explains our "folk
> psychology" view
> of our subjective experience?
>

It explains it as well, while assuming less. It also is capable of
explaining more. So by Occam it is preferred.


>
> >       > Closed individualism is intuitive, and it makes sense
> (evolutionarily
> >       > speaking) that we should be programmed to believe it by default.
> But that
> >       > something feels a certain way should not be considered
> sufficient grounds of
> >       > proof. It feels like Earth isn't moving, for example.
> >
> >       True, but neither should it be disregarded. We do feel heat, and
> that is
> >       definitely reason enough to move the hand away from the stove.
> >
> >       An argument could be made, just like when it comes to the material
> world, that
> >       we don't need to do or think anything in order to "live" closed
> individualism,
> >       and that what we should do is to come up with a way to falsify
> closed
> >       individualism.
> >
> > How do you explain split brains? What happens to ones personal identity
> when
> > the two halves of the brain stop talking? Empirically we know the result
> is
> > two independent consciousnesses, which hemisphere does closet continuer
> > predict I will become when by brain is split? The right or the left?
>
> Do I need to explain it more? Split brain is a medical condition, and
> therefore
> we would be well justified in analyzing it on its own terms. Most human
> beings
> do not have that, and I think someone having a split brain does not
> invalidate
> the experience of most human beings.
>

A theory of personal identity shouldn't shy away from problems just because
they are rare, or edge cases.


>
> > Open individualism says you remain present in both -- the apparent
> disunion is
> > due only to a lack of integration between the hemispheres. Should they be
> > connected in the future, they would become integrated, and again feel as
> one
> > mind.
> >
> > What would closed individualism say would happen?
>
> I think the question can be rephrased in terms of neuroscience and
> psychology.
>

Neither of those subjects deal with personal identity though.


>
> >       True, but these are all thought experiments, and links to our
> previous
> >       discussion.
> >
> > Split brains are a real, and empirically studied phenomenon.
>
> So maybe the right way is to led science study it? There is actually no
> need to
> force a description or result, ahead of time. We can collect data and
> remain
> perfectly agnostic.
>

Are you switching your position on personal identity from a belief in
closed individualism to agnosticism?
If so, I would see this as progress. :-)


>
> >       > But *what is* this metaphysical thing pinned to some bundle of
> matter (a thing
> >       > which can't be measured) which you maintain is necessary for the
> experiences
> >       > to *be yours*?
> >
> >       A process of electrons in a brain? We do know to some extent where
> various
> >       functions that are part of our identity or feed it reside in the
> brain.
> >
> > But is this process not interrupted, in sleep, coma, concussions,
> anesthesia,
> > etc. and later restarted in some other time and place (often with
> different
> > electrons)?
> >
> > If we survive such discontinuous interruptions then identity can't be
> strictly
> > tied to the continuity of the process.
>
> See my formula above + closest continuer of Nozick, oh, and the Nozick
> quote.
>
> >       > Substrate independence is a concern of philosophy of mind. I
> don't see it as
> >       > related to theories of personal identity.
> >
> >       I can see a cross over depending on the definition of identity. As
> for
> >       philosophy of mind, substrate independence I hope is a question
> that might one
> >       day take the leap from philosophy to science.
> >
> >       >       I think science might be able to answer, or at least give
> indications of this in
> >       >       time.
> >       >
> >       >       I also think you can have closed individualism without
> soul-pinning as an
> >       >       assumption.
> >       >
> >       > What would that look like?
> >
> >       Just like what is described in any text book on the body, the
> brain, coupled
> >       with the empirical experience we all have. This is based on a kind
> of
> >       behavioural definition of consciousness.
> >
> > If there's nothing binding one's identity to a particular body/brain,
> then
> > that is open individualism, for then you can survive via the
> continuation of
> > any body or brain.
>
> I think you had a good point in our private email thread where you say I am
> straddling the fence between closed and open. Maybe one point of confusion
> here
> is the term closed individualism? Just like I was completely wrong about
> open,
> maybe I should spend some time trying to find a better definition or word
> for
> closed? I'm not saying it is so, but it is a suspicion I'm starting to
> have.
>

Here is where Kolak defines terms:

https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-1-4020-3014-7/page/n19/mode/2up?q=%22To+distinguish+it+from+the+traditional%22
AND
https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-1-4020-3014-7/page/n25/mode/2up?q=%22CLOSED+INDIVIDUALISM%2C+EMPTY+INDIVIDUALISM%2C+AND+OPEN+INDIVIDUALISM%3A+THE+THREE+VIEWS+OF+PERSONAL%22


>
> >       > I think if one drops the notion of soul pinning from closed
> individualism,
> >       > then are left with open individualism.
> >
> >       How come?
> >
> > Because then there's nothing tying you to a particular group of atoms or
> > collection of memories.
>
> In my view, one key is the continuity between mediums. Can we phase in, or
> do
> borrow your VM analosy, do "live migration" between mediums? That would
> keep
> closed individualism.
>
> >       >       >       The practicality argument: Closed individualism
> has practical implications for
> >       >       >       how we think about personal identity and its
> relation to moral and legal
> >       >       >       responsibility. For example, it suggests that we
> should hold people accountable
> >       >       >       for their actions based on their biological
> continuity, rather than on more
> >       >       >       abstract or psychological criteria.
> >       >
> >       >       This is interesting. From a pragmatic point of view,
> closed individualism works
> >       >       well.
> >       >
> >       > It may work well, but I don't think pragmatism holds any weight
> when the
> >       > concern is finding what is true rather than deciding how to
> organize society.
> >
> >       This is true, but can we? And given the fact that it does work
> well, wouldn't it
> >       be interesting to see if it can be falsified empirically somehow?
> >
> > I think is is falsified by way of statistical reasoning, and few things
> could
> > be more important than learning the truth of open individualism.
>
> I was not convinced by the statistical argument, but I am also not
> convinced by
> the MWI. The reasons are closely linked.
>
> >       >       Let's assume open individualism is true, how would you see
> that changing the way
> >       >       society works in terms of crime and punishment?
> >       >
> >       > If more people believed open individualism, I think there would
> be more
> >       > compassion, more charity, more concern for the future, and less
> harming and
> >       > cheating of others.
> >       >
> >       > As far as crime and punishment, the goal should always be harm
> minimization
> >       > never inflicting pain for the purpose of pain alone, though
> punishment may
> >       > serve the purpose of reducing pain overall (via deterrence). It
> is a complex
> >       > question.
> >
> >       True! Both are interesting questions, maybe better for a separate
> thread?
> >
> > You can, though.I'm not sure I have much more than that I would have to
> contribute.
>
> So this is the main motivation for you when it comes to open
> individualism? That
> it would serve to promote empathy and loving kindness? Oh, and I agree,
> those
> are important goals. I just wanted to restate, to make sure I understand
> why you
> think it is so important.
>

That is one of its practical advantages. In the same way capitalism
converts self-interest to a societal benefit, open individualism
converts self interest into an interest in helping and in reducing harm for
all others.
It could help end war, starvation, abuse, etc. as many have noted. In
effect, open individualism makes the idea of "karma" / "the golden rule"
vividly real.

"There is only one of us. We are all the same person. I am you and I am
Winston Churchill and Hitler and Gandhi and everybody. There is no problem
of injustice because your sufferings are also mine. There will be no
problem of war as soon as you understand that in killing me you are only
killing yourself."
-- Freeman Dyson in “Disturbing The Universe” (1979)

"Perhaps the spread of this knowledge among the intelligent beings that are
you can help you to stop yourself from hurting yourself because you mistake
yourself for another."
-- Arnold Zuboff in "One self: the logic of experience" (1990)


>
> >       >       My apologies! Yes, I should have told you that. =( My idea
> was to bring in some
> >       >       starting points for discussion, and to discuss these
> myself (see comments
> >       >       above), and then ask what you think. This was my mistake,
> sorry about that.
> >       >
> >       > No worries! I was pretty sure it wasn't written by you by how
> far off base it
> >       > seemed with it's answers. AI is good for generating a lot of
> ideas, but at
> >       > least here, not so good at judging the relevance of those ideas.
> >
> >       Thank you! Yes, it is kind of hit or miss. Sometimes I find that
> they give nice
> >       summaries, and sometimes they are way off. That's why I do not use
> them for
> >       work. The consequences are too important, so I have to proof read,
> and then I
> >       can just write what I need myself regardless.
> >
> > Have a great day!
>
> Thank you Jason, and you too! =)
>
> Take care!

Jason
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