[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[efc at disroot.org]

>       > Good points. Those are also cases of concern that various theories of personal
>       > identity contend with.
>
>       I liked the closest continuer idea. I tried to grasp at something similar when
>       talking about the natural paths the electrons take, within the contraint of the
>       laws of physics to try and distinguish the system in its natural state, vs
>       changes to the system from without in the form of teleporting.
> 
> The reason I dislike it is because it seems arbitrary and ad hoc. And
> moreover, what forbids the existence/creation of two or more equally-close
> continuers?

I've been studying the source, and in terms of splits, Nozick lists the options:

1. Neither are you. 
2. Both are you. 
3. There are two different people later; but unnoticed, there always were two
different people there, though this became evident only after the appearance of
the tied continuers.
4. One of Y and Z, and only one, is the continuation of the individual of
which X at t1 (time 1)  was a part. There is no further fact in virtue of which it is,
just the luck of the draw.

He continues:

"This does not seem possible, however, provided no other asymmetry is smuggled
in, unless it is a way of asserting there is some other feature that cannot be
duplicated or doubly exhibited, in virtue of which someone is you. But what is
that further feature? A soul? A spiritual pellet? Do we know that such things
cannot split into two tied, equally close continuers? I find the first of these
positions most plausible. I am neither Y nor Z, and I no longer exist. This is
not so very distressing in this case, for what I care about is that there
remains something that continues me closely enough to be me if it were my sole
continuer; and if there are two such, I care especially about the fate of the
closest continuer."

And then he goes into a discussion about degree of care and how it could be
related to degree of closeness.

He does seem to admit that it is vague, but a step on the way perhaps to
clarity.

"I make no attempt here to fill in the details; and not merely be- cause (though
it is true that) I have nothing especially illuminating to say about these
details. I do not believe that there are fixed details to be filled in; I do not
believe there is some one metric space in which to measure closeness for each of
our identities. The content of the measure of closeness, and so the content of a
person's identity through time, can vary (somewhat) from person to person. What
is special about people, about selves, is that what constitutes their identity
through time is partially determined by their own concep- tion of themselves, a
conception which may vary, perhaps appropri- ately does vary, from person to
person. We shall be in a better posi- tion later to say more about this. Note
that if the measure of closeness is partly up to the person himself, there is a
simple answer to the question of why his caring is proportional, at least, to
degree of closeness: he fixes the measure of closeness in accordance with how
much he cares.

If the details of personal identity have not yet been specified (though some
have been mentioned in passing), in what way has the topic, until now, been
personal identity, rather than simply the gen- eral notion of identity through
time? Thi~ general notion fits the clos- est continuer schema, but how does that
help us with the problems special to personal identity? It gives us a framework
in which to embed those problems, and perhaps that will help some. Still, it
must be granted that it does not focus especially upon personal iden- tity. It
does help us, however, with very many of the problems dis- cussed in the
literature under the rubric "personal identity", for these problems, though
phrased about persons, to a surprising extent tum out
to be general problems that apply to any kind of thing's identity through time.
Not only our discussion thus far but also, I claim, the existing literature
usually hasn't been concerned with the problems special to personal identity. To
distinguish and clear away the more general issues that infest the area is a
necessary first step. The spe- cial problems cannot be attacked without being
isolated first; I doubt they can be attacked fruitfully in isolation from the
correct general framework for identity, certainly not if an incorrect one is
presup- posed. In any case, the next part of this chapter is designed to illumi-
nate the special nature of the self."

> For example, if two simultaneous duplicates formed from a teletransporter each
> the same number of Planck units away from the original?
> 
> What should happen in that case?
> 
> Do we then have to introduce a priority for Left-Right or North-South into our
> definition of closest?

If we accept that after a split, neither is us, then that would solve the
problem.

>       > I'm not asking you to change the past. Only to consider what might have
>       > happened, had something in the past occurred differently.
>
>       This is true, but the fact remains that this is not possible, so basing our
>       reasoning on something which is impossible I thinks risks causing confusion and
>       leads to wrong conclusions, or perhaps, meaningless conclusions.
> 
> Some theory is required and must be assumed for the purposes of reasoning out
> the consequences. This is how we can develop/design tests that ultimately can
> refute ones theories. We evaluate what a theory predicts for a given starting
> conditions, then with luck we can test this and confirm or disconfirm that
> prediction.
> 
> If you have no theory under which to operate and make predictions, then
> counterfactual reasoning won't work. But you should be able to reason
> according to temporarily assuming one theory vs. another, and find, for
> example that one theory of personal identity predicts one thing while another
> theory predicts something else. Then you can test this situation to see which
> theorist right, or you can see if one theory leads to contradictions.

I think "what if" reasoning is fine as long as it is grounded in, or leads to,
empirical results. My point is that if I test my theory with an impossible
counterfactual, then I'd consider that a waste of time, and counter productive
to making progress. If the counterfactual test of the theory never leads to any
result in the real (TM) world, that I can verify or falsify, it's also not so
good.

>       >       For the sake of discussion, let's go with yes. I think I know where you will go
>       >       with this, but I am curious.
>       >
>       > In the field of personal identity, there is also an "easy game" and a "hard
>       > game".
>       >
>       > Closed individualism conditions your existence on being born as a specific
>       > individual having a specific material body and specific genetic make up.
>       > (Empty individualism goes even further, conditioning it on a specific state of
>       > mind). By placing such tight constraints on coming into existence, one must
>       > overcome incredible odds in order to exist.
>
>       I think there is another way to analyze this, and that is a descriptive way. I
>       was born, and as a result I have a body, brain and a unique identity.
> 
> That's all well and true, but there is something important missing from this
> description.
> 
> Namely, that *you* inhabit this particular brain and body. The experiences
> that happen to this brain and body are *yours*, and will be experienced by
> *you*.

I think that takes us into the subject/object divide, and can easily lead us
astray into needless speculation. I could say that this brain and body, a mass
of particles, is what is, and it reacts to the laws of physics.

> Now then, the real difference between closed and open individualism comes down
> to a single question: is this fact (that it is *you* who is in this particular
> body) conditioned on something or not?

What is "you"? How would you define it? My body is part of the chain of cause
and effect, going back as long as we can trace it. Do we need to say more?

>       There is not condition here, it is just an event along a long chain of causes
>       and effects. It is the same with reality. It happens to us, we have no choice. I
>       think this also shows us that probability is part of the language of math, that
>       is only meaningful for us as conscious human beings. Without human beings,
>       "speaking" the language of math and probability, the concept is meaningless.
> 
> If there is no condition that determines you being in some body, and not in
> others, then that is open individualism.

I don't see how that follows. We can trace a path of cause and effect that
resulted in me sitting in my chair. How does open individualism follow from
that?

>       So going back to our thread about the world, what can be infered and
>       what not, I think you are committing the same kind of mistake here.
>
>       Another favourite example of mine is Pascals wager that shows you the
>       mistakes and error you end up with when you do probability with ideas,
>       and especially when adding infinities, and start to "weigh"
>       probabilities.
> 
> Pascal's wager is valid logic, but it makes an implicit unstated and

Well, if you strip all premisses of meaning and substitute them for A, B, C and
so on, yes, but it also makes it meaningless. When I refer to Pascals wager I
refer to the entirety of the "proof" including purpose, premisses etc. drawing
conclusions from this world, to the other, that cannot be verified, and my
opinion is that when considered from this point of view, it is just pure
nonsense.

> unjustified assumption: that God would reward, rather than punish blind belief
> in him. If one factors in this possibility, and considers it equally likely as
> the god who punishes disbelief in him, then it is a wash.
> 
> Logic works, but this shows how important starting assumptions are for
> reaching correct conclusions.

Not only assumptions, premises, verification and falsification, and keeping the
results to what we can check.

>       > So accepting that one is justified (based on one's observation of having been
>       > awakened) in concluding it is almost certain that they played the easy game,
>       > rather than the hard game. Your task is this:
>       >
>       > To show why we are not similarly justified in concluding open individualism
>       > (the easy game) rather than closed individualism (the hard game).
>       >
>
>       That would be my arguemnt regarding counterfactuals. I think your intuition was
>       the right one here.
>
>       But if I look at the AI:s definition of open individualism vs closed
>       individualism:
> 
> These are terribly misleading and wrong definitions, as I will point out below.

This is a good point! I thought it was an established point of view, with one
definition. Maybe there are many nuances here?

>       "Closed individualism is a philosophical concept that posits that each person is
>       a distinct, separate individual with a unique identity that does not extend
>       beyond their own consciousness.
> 
> This is circular and meaningless since it doesn't define what a person is,
> (which is the entire crux of the problem.) Also, no entity "extends beyond
> their own consciousness," in any theory of personal identity. So this is
> another meaningless distinction.

What about:

"Closed individualism is considered to be the default view of personal identity,
which is that one's personal identity consists of a ray or line traveling
through time, and that one has a future self."

Another thing I noticed is that it seems like open, closed, empty are creations
of Daniel Kolak. Is that true? If so, perhaps there are more definitions and
constructions out there against which we can contrast them?

>       This perspective contrasts with open individualism, which suggests
>       that all individuals share a common identity or consciousness, implying a deeper
>       connection among all people." (GPT 4o mini)
> 
> There is no consciousness link, hive mind, nor collective consciousness as GPT
> seems to suggest here. This is a common accusation against open individualism,
> but it is not a suggestion made by any of its serious proponents.

It seems like open individualism is too subtle. It also does not seem to be very
popular, since, as you have pointed out, my goolging and GPT:ing seems to
produce only caricatures of the position.

Of course using that as a basis is a waste of time. So let's see if I understand
it better after your examples below.

> Open individualism is merely the idea that there are no further metaphysical
> facts binding particular experiences to partic bodily or mental continuations.
> It is subtle, and hard to see what it is that I am saying is not there, but
> perhaps it is best to work it out with an example:
> 
> ------------------------
> 
> Consider a deep space mission:
...
> extra vigilent in focusing on the mission and complete it successfully.
> 
> We can draw several conclusions from this thought experiment. The

Well, first of all, it is a thought experiment, so there is nothing that
guarantees that this will ever be possible. If, for the sake of conversation,
assume that we knew this was impossible, would it make sense regardless to
engage in the thought experiment?

But, you know me... ;) I will disregard that, and please disregard it too, since
we've covered that, and let us focus on the experiment, as is.

> functionalism  suggests that one's conscious state does not depend on the
> material identity of the atoms in one's brain.  Therefore, it is in principle

Yes...

> possible to survive teleportation.

Maybe. Would depend on how the thought-experiment teleporter is designed. If it
would be designed as a destructive, continuous upload/download, then I agree!

> If we analyze just one of the four duplicates NASA creates of you, we see that
> it is equivalent to teleportation. A scan of the original is made and a copy
> is reconstructed in a different location, while the original is destroyed.

Let me apply my formula of identity to this...

       Mind -----------> (1 = continuity of mind through time)
       OR
       Body -----------> (1 = continuity of body through time)
       XOR
       Copy (0 = unique, 1 = copy)
       = 1 (me) or 0 (not me)
(Note! I changed from unique in space to copy, since it maps nicer with
true/false 1/0.)

Since the original is destroyed, there is no continuity of mind or body, and
since we're talking about a unique copy (the original was destroyed) we get 
M(0) OR B(0) XOR C(0) = 0 (not me).

If, the original was not destroyed, but kept on ice, we'd get M(0) OR B(1) XOR
C(1) = 0 (not me).

> The twist here is that multiple replicas of you are created. Which one of them
> do you become? The only answer that appears to make sense is "all of them".

Or none of them, as per Nozick?

> Your survival does not depend on which of the five replicas is thawed, because
> you would live and survive as any of them.

If you believe all of them, then I agree.

> Therefore, if all five are thawed would you not live as each of them? In what
> way does it make sense to say you live as one but not the others?

For me, that would come down to continuity of mind, body, and uniqueness.

> ------------------------
> 
> Closed individualism (or some closest continuer theory) says that you die
> if/when copy #1 is destroyed, even if copy #2 survives. This is on account of
> this *metaphysical youness* being bound up with some collection of frozen
> atoms, and yet this property is not found within the exactly identical (except

Well, it depends on the theory I'd say. In my case, it would depend on the
continuity of body, mind and uniqueness. But I guess, at the end of the day, a
case could be made of my experience of "me" being forever beyond the reach of 
science, so that would also be a way to deal with it. Externally, we have the
descriptive way, bodies, electrons, etc. We also have a pragmatic view, in that
we treat each other as individuals, and "it works".

> for different spatial coordinates) collections of other frozen atoms in the
> same organization. Yet spacetime, rotational, and translational symmetry tell
> us the laws of physics don't care about time, location, or orientation. So how
> does this *metaphysical youness* matter to anything (or to anyone)? The copies
> of you, say #2 when he is awoken, feels exactly the same as #1 does. How is
> his conscious state. It yours? He feels just the same as you, is just as
> confident in being alive, conscious, and being a self, an "I" as you feel.
> 
> Consider what Thomas Nagel says about the absence of any physical facts that
> account for him being Thomas Nagel:

I disagree. From my perspective, I can point to Thomas Nagel and say "there he
is". Do we need anything else?

I can also ask Thomas Nagel if he is Thomas Nagel, and that is also good
evidence I think.

> So since there are no physical facts that could account for this, it either
> doesn't exist (there is no factor) or it must be added as an additional
> metaphysical property.
> 
> Closed individualism is the assumption/belief in the existence of this extra
> metaphysical property.
> 
> Open individualism is the denial that there are such additional metaphysical
> properties.
> 
> 
>
>       and
>
>       "Open individualism is a philosophical concept that suggests that all
>       individuals share a common identity or consciousness. In this view, the

I could see how a much stronger case could be made for identity, than
consciousness, since we do not quite know what consciousness is or how to define
it.

In terms of identity, we can always define. But the question is... would it be
useful in any way? I think if we provide some context of use, it would become
much more clear. First of all what we mean, and second of all, what situation
requires us to use it and for what result.

>       I would argue from the basis of our every day experience. Based on that, it
>       seems like closed individualism is what is the right view.
> 
> I would too if I believed these definitions. But these definitions are deeply
> flawed and misleading. There are no empirical differences between what it
> would feel like to be you whether closed or open individualism is true.

Then maybe that is the reason? Maybe the two positions are in that case
ultimately meaningless?

>       In addition, I would ask myself what experiment we could design to show that
>       thoughts and feeling and experiences are connected to those of others?
>       Empirically, I can only come up with scenarios that would confirm closed
>       individualism.
> 
> This is based on GPT's incorrect definition.

This is true. Thank you very much for correcting that!

>       We are born, we have bodies and brains, and unique identities, interviews seem
>       to confirm this. We have no evidence of telepathy.
> 
> There is no telepathy in open individualism, again this I blame GPT's terribly misleading definition.

Apologies, this I fully accept. Sorry to have wasted your time, but I learned
that apparently open individualism is not popular enough to have been included
in the training sets often enough to result in correct answers.

>       The only way to some kind of open individualism I see, is just the way of
>       definition or agreement, where we look at what we _do_ share. We share our DNA
>       to 99.9% (?), we are all links in the chain of causation, the electricity in our
>       brains and nervoussystem is the same electricity, so it could be said from that
>       point of view that the same "power" powers us all, and this power came from a
>       common source way down the tree of life. It could argued that we are also
>       shared components of the global ecosystems, so looking at the planet as a whole,
>       we could see that we are all components in that system.
> 
> As Arnold Zuboff explains, all experiences are mine because they are all
> experienced as I -- in an immediate, first-person way. Every experience is
> felt as if it is experienced immediately by a first-person "I", and this trait
> is common to all conscious experiences. All experiences are felt as if they
> are experienced by I.
> 
> You need not go any deeper than this.

Well, clearly he is wrong, given my experience of the world, and my experience
of you. I think I am too set in my "closed" way. Can you prove to me that your
experience answering me, is actually my experience? I'm sorry, but I cannot see
it.

> But you can, if you wish. For example, by considering statistical arguments,
> or cases that cause bodily or psychological continuity theories to break down,
> but this is all on top of the much more core notion of the "same I" being a
> common trait present in all experiences had by all conscious beings.

But how can we say that without having a complete knowledge and definition of I
and consciousness? I can see how a credible case can be made that every human
being has a neuron pattern that gives rise to an I. But that is a distinct
pattern, unique for every individual.

>       and it must also explain away the ilusion of
>       closed individualism.
> 
> This is explained by the simple fact that our nervous system aren't
> integrated. I don't have access to your memories and you don't have access to
> mine.

If there is no connection, then there can be no shared experience. I think this
is pretty trivial. Clearly, I'm starting to get the feeling that this is beyond
me. =(

>       Closed doesn't suffer from this, it perfectly explains our
>       every day ordinary experience.
> 
> The fact that we have separate brains is enough to explain this. Souls need
> not be pinned to bodies to ensure the only experiences you can remember having
> are those had by your particular brain. Having a particular brain is enough to
> explain this (in closed and in open individualism).

Would you say that open individualism better explains our "folk psychology" view
of our subjective experience?

>       > Closed individualism is intuitive, and it makes sense (evolutionarily
>       > speaking) that we should be programmed to believe it by default. But that
>       > something feels a certain way should not be considered sufficient grounds of
>       > proof. It feels like Earth isn't moving, for example.
>
>       True, but neither should it be disregarded. We do feel heat, and that is
>       definitely reason enough to move the hand away from the stove.
>
>       An argument could be made, just like when it comes to the material world, that
>       we don't need to do or think anything in order to "live" closed individualism,
>       and that what we should do is to come up with a way to falsify closed
>       individualism.
> 
> How do you explain split brains? What happens to ones personal identity when
> the two halves of the brain stop talking? Empirically we know the result is
> two independent consciousnesses, which hemisphere does closet continuer
> predict I will become when by brain is split? The right or the left?

Do I need to explain it more? Split brain is a medical condition, and therefore
we would be well justified in analyzing it on its own terms. Most human beings
do not have that, and I think someone having a split brain does not invalidate
the experience of most human beings.

> Open individualism says you remain present in both -- the apparent disunion is
> due only to a lack of integration between the hemispheres. Should they be
> connected in the future, they would become integrated, and again feel as one
> mind.
>
> What would closed individualism say would happen?

I think the question can be rephrased in terms of neuroscience and psychology.

>       True, but these are all thought experiments, and links to our previous
>       discussion.
> 
> Split brains are a real, and empirically studied phenomenon.

So maybe the right way is to led science study it? There is actually no need to
force a description or result, ahead of time. We can collect data and remain
perfectly agnostic.

>       > But *what is* this metaphysical thing pinned to some bundle of matter (a thing
>       > which can't be measured) which you maintain is necessary for the experiences
>       > to *be yours*?
>
>       A process of electrons in a brain? We do know to some extent where various
>       functions that are part of our identity or feed it reside in the brain.
> 
> But is this process not interrupted, in sleep, coma, concussions, anesthesia,
> etc. and later restarted in some other time and place (often with different
> electrons)?
> 
> If we survive such discontinuous interruptions then identity can't be strictly
> tied to the continuity of the process.

See my formula above + closest continuer of Nozick, oh, and the Nozick quote.

>       > Substrate independence is a concern of philosophy of mind. I don't see it as
>       > related to theories of personal identity.
>
>       I can see a cross over depending on the definition of identity. As for
>       philosophy of mind, substrate independence I hope is a question that might one
>       day take the leap from philosophy to science.
>
>       >       I think science might be able to answer, or at least give indications of this in
>       >       time.
>       >
>       >       I also think you can have closed individualism without soul-pinning as an
>       >       assumption.
>       >
>       > What would that look like?
>
>       Just like what is described in any text book on the body, the brain, coupled
>       with the empirical experience we all have. This is based on a kind of
>       behavioural definition of consciousness.
> 
> If there's nothing binding one's identity to a particular body/brain, then
> that is open individualism, for then you can survive via the continuation of
> any body or brain.

I think you had a good point in our private email thread where you say I am
straddling the fence between closed and open. Maybe one point of confusion here
is the term closed individualism? Just like I was completely wrong about open,
maybe I should spend some time trying to find a better definition or word for
closed? I'm not saying it is so, but it is a suspicion I'm starting to have.

>       > I think if one drops the notion of soul pinning from closed individualism,
>       > then are left with open individualism.
>
>       How come?
> 
> Because then there's nothing tying you to a particular group of atoms or
> collection of memories.

In my view, one key is the continuity between mediums. Can we phase in, or do
borrow your VM analosy, do "live migration" between mediums? That would keep
closed individualism.

>       >       >       The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications for
>       >       >       how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal
>       >       >       responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people accountable
>       >       >       for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more
>       >       >       abstract or psychological criteria.
>       >
>       >       This is interesting. From a pragmatic point of view, closed individualism works
>       >       well.
>       >
>       > It may work well, but I don't think pragmatism holds any weight when the
>       > concern is finding what is true rather than deciding how to organize society.
>
>       This is true, but can we? And given the fact that it does work well, wouldn't it
>       be interesting to see if it can be falsified empirically somehow?
> 
> I think is is falsified by way of statistical reasoning, and few things could
> be more important than learning the truth of open individualism.

I was not convinced by the statistical argument, but I am also not convinced by
the MWI. The reasons are closely linked.

>       >       Let's assume open individualism is true, how would you see that changing the way
>       >       society works in terms of crime and punishment?
>       >
>       > If more people believed open individualism, I think there would be more
>       > compassion, more charity, more concern for the future, and less harming and
>       > cheating of others.
>       >
>       > As far as crime and punishment, the goal should always be harm minimization
>       > never inflicting pain for the purpose of pain alone, though punishment may
>       > serve the purpose of reducing pain overall (via deterrence). It is a complex
>       > question.
>
>       True! Both are interesting questions, maybe better for a separate thread?
> 
> You can, though.I'm not sure I have much more than that I would have to contribute.

So this is the main motivation for you when it comes to open individualism? That
it would serve to promote empathy and loving kindness? Oh, and I agree, those
are important goals. I just wanted to restate, to make sure I understand why you
think it is so important.

>       >       My apologies! Yes, I should have told you that. =( My idea was to bring in some
>       >       starting points for discussion, and to discuss these myself (see comments
>       >       above), and then ask what you think. This was my mistake, sorry about that.
>       >
>       > No worries! I was pretty sure it wasn't written by you by how far off base it
>       > seemed with it's answers. AI is good for generating a lot of ideas, but at
>       > least here, not so good at judging the relevance of those ideas.
>
>       Thank you! Yes, it is kind of hit or miss. Sometimes I find that they give nice
>       summaries, and sometimes they are way off. That's why I do not use them for
>       work. The consequences are too important, so I have to proof read, and then I
>       can just write what I need myself regardless.
> 
> Have a great day!

Thank you Jason, and you too! =)

Best regards, 
Daniel