[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Mar 11, 2025, 1:27 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> >       > Can we:
> >       >  *  Can we change the clothes you are wearing? ✅
> >       >  *  Change elements in your experience? ✅
> >       >  *  Can we change atoms in your body? ✅ (had you eaten some
> other food
> >       >  yesterday, you would still be here, having some experience)
> >       >  *  Can we change atoms in your brain? ✅ (likewise, had you
> drank something
> >       >  different, these different water molecules would now be in your
> brain)
> >       >  *  Can we change which neurons are active? ✅ (depending on what
> random word
> >       >  I wrote, different neurons are now active in your brain)
> >       >  *  Can we change how neurons are wired? ✅ (since I gave you a
> particular
> >       >  random word, and not the other, different patterns and memories
> being laid
> >       >  down as altered neural connections)
> >       >  *  Can we change your genes?
> >       >  *  Can we change who your parents were?
> >       > Very quickly, we get to questions that have less and less
> obvious answers (short of having a theory of personal
> >       identity).
> >
> >       True. I would add to that, the rate of change, and the eternally
> slippery amount
> >       of change, and how that change is made (that is, a thought
> experiment, or a
> >       change aligned and consistent with our laws of physics).
> >
> > Good points. Those are also cases of concern that various theories of
> personal
> > identity contend with.
>
> I liked the closest continuer idea. I tried to grasp at something similar
> when
> talking about the natural paths the electrons take, within the contraint
> of the
> laws of physics to try and distinguish the system in its natural state, vs
> changes to the system from without in the form of teleporting.
>


The reason I dislike it is because it seems arbitrary and ad hoc. And
moreover, what forbids the existence/creation of two or more equally-close
continuers?

For example, if two simultaneous duplicates formed from a teletransporter
each the same number of Planck units away from the original?

What should happen in that case?

Do we then have to introduce a priority for Left-Right or North-South into
our definition of closest?


> >       > Are you able to consider counterfactual situations? If not then
> this
> >       > conversation is going to be very difficult, if not impossible.
> >
> >       Sorry, what do you mean? Could you please give an example?
> >
> > I interpreted your "See above." As referring to when you wrote:
> >
> > "If you mean, what would have happened  _if_ I did this earlier this
> morning,
> > the question makes little sense, since this is impossible."
> >
> > A counterfactual situation is one that concerns something which didn't
> happen.
> > For example if someone asks "How hungry would you feel right now, if you
> > didn't eat breakfast this morning?" And the person says "Well I did eat
> > breakfast this morning." And if that person does not, or refuses to
> consider
> > or address that hypothetical question because it concerns something that
> > didn't actually happen, then that person isn't able to handle
> counterfactuals.
> >
> > It is possible I misinterpreted your meaning of "since this is
> impossible" or
> > what you meant by "see above."
> >
> > But if I did interpret your answer correctly, then not being able to
> answer or
> > consider questions involving alternative possible pasts (counterfactual
> > events), imposes a severe limitation on the situations we can consider
> and
> > which are especially important to developing theories of personal
> identity.
>
> Ahhh... got it! Thank you for the explanation. This did send me down a
> rabbithole. I like the fact that through you, and our discussions, I get
> exposed
> to new questions. What I do not like, is the demand on my time to do you
> and
> your arguments justice, and to form a somewhat informed opinion on the
> matter.
> ;)
>
> When it comes to empirical evidence for hypotheses, I am not a fan of
> counterfactuals, since they deal with potential, historical events we
> cannot
> change. Therefore they do seen like pointless speculation to me, for the
> purpose
> of getting some kind of empirical evidence for various ideas.
>
> If it comes to counterfactuals I do think they have a valid place when it
> comes
> to testing theories, when we can in fact test and change variables to see
> how
> our theories are affected, as long as we can then _actually_ perform those
> experiments and verify that what we see matches our speculation.
>
> When it comes to questions such as what I ate this morning it might have
> its
> place in trying to track down if I have a kind of allergy, since I can then
> change my diet, but note that this again means that the variable I reason
> with
> is something I am able to change in the real world and measure the result
> of. So
> I could start with some counterfactual reasoning, am I allergic to
> substance a,
> b, c, and then I proceed by just changing that variable in my diet, and
> then
> track how I feel.
>
> If we talk counter factuals such as if the Nazis would have won ww2, then
> we'd
> see Dicks stories come to life I do not find useful when it comes to
> finding
> truth, since we can never do that, so just like the principle of deductive
> closure, while valid when doing logic puzzles, might lead us astray if we
> cannot
> test the end result and verify, I think counterfactual reasoning that
> depends on
> assumptions outside time and space equally lead us astray.
>


Well I do see counterfactuals as closely tied to deductive reasoning, as
they require starting from alternative premises and working out from there
what should happen.


> >       >       > All these questions probe at personal identity. What,
> and how much can be
> >       >       > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum
> that would have had to
> >       >       > have changed before you were born to make sure you would
> never live?
> >       >
> >       >       I think perhaps this is an example of where thought
> experiments lead us astray,
> >       >       since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the
> past, these types of
> >       >       questions are difficult to answer. That does however,
> _not_ exclude various
> >       >       experiments when it comes to the future.
> >
> > I'm not asking you to change the past. Only to consider what might have
> > happened, had something in the past occurred differently.
>
> This is true, but the fact remains that this is not possible, so basing our
> reasoning on something which is impossible I thinks risks causing
> confusion and
> leads to wrong conclusions, or perhaps, meaningless conclusions.
>


Some theory is required and must be assumed for the purposes of reasoning
out the consequences. This is how we can develop/design tests that
ultimately can refute ones theories. We evaluate what a theory predicts for
a given starting conditions, then with luck we can test this and confirm or
disconfirm that prediction.

If you have no theory under which to operate and make predictions, then
counterfactual reasoning won't work. But you should be able to reason
according to temporarily assuming one theory vs. another, and find, for
example that one theory of personal identity predicts one thing while
another theory predicts something else. Then you can test this situation to
see which theorist right, or you can see if one theory leads to
contradictions.



> >       > Okay, I would like to reframe this entirely as an equivalent
> thought
> >       > experiment concerning the future. I hope you will oblige and
> consider this
> >       > question thoroughly to give an answer. Here is the scenario:
> ...
> >       > If you can answer this question (noteL it is not a trick
> question, but one
> >       > meant to be straight-forward and one that nearly everyone can
> agree on) then
> >       > we can proceed.
> >
> >       For the sake of discussion, let's go with yes. I think I know
> where you will go
> >       with this, but I am curious.
> >
> > In the field of personal identity, there is also an "easy game" and a
> "hard
> > game".
> >
> > Closed individualism conditions your existence on being born as a
> specific
> > individual having a specific material body and specific genetic make up.
> > (Empty individualism goes even further, conditioning it on a specific
> state of
> > mind). By placing such tight constraints on coming into existence, one
> must
> > overcome incredible odds in order to exist.
>
> I think there is another way to analyze this, and that is a descriptive
> way. I
> was born, and as a result I have a body, brain and a unique identity.
>

That's all well and true, but there is something important missing from
this description.


Namely, that *you* inhabit this particular brain and body. The experiences
that happen to this brain and body are *yours*, and will be experienced by
*you*.


Now then, the real difference between closed and open individualism comes
down to a single question: is this fact (that it is *you* who is in this
particular body) conditioned on something or not?





> There is not condition here, it is just an event along a long chain of
> causes
> and effects. It is the same with reality. It happens to us, we have no
> choice. I
> think this also shows us that probability is part of the language of math,
> that
> is only meaningful for us as conscious human beings. Without human beings,
> "speaking" the language of math and probability, the concept is
> meaningless.
>


If there is no condition that determines you being in some body, and not in
others, then that is open individualism.


> So going back to our thread about the world, what can be infered and what
> not, I
> think you are committing the same kind of mistake here.
>
> Another favourite example of mine is Pascals wager that shows you the
> mistakes
> and error you end up with when you do probability with ideas, and
> especially
> when adding infinities, and start to "weigh" probabilities.
>

Pascal's wager is valid logic, but it makes an implicit unstated and
unjustified assumption: that God would reward, rather than punish blind
belief in him. If one factors in this possibility, and considers it equally
likely as the god who punishes disbelief in him, then it is a wash.

Logic works, but this shows how important starting assumptions are for
reaching correct conclusions.


> That is why I think that grounding calculations in empirically verifiable
> experiments is very valuable. Without that grounding, they tend to lead us
> astray and distracts us from what we actually can find out.
>
> With that in mind, as we have already established, with my strict criterias
> there is a greater risk that I will miss things, or dismiss things, which
> you
> are not susecptible to, and that is a good thing.
>
> > Closed individualism is therefore (I argue) equivalent to the "hard game"
> > described above, where "being awakened" requires a stroke of incredible
> luck.
> > The difference is that winning in closed individualism requires winning a
> > series of ancestral "sperm cell lotteries" rather than winning a series
> of
> > coin tosses.) -- Note that the 1 in 2^1000 is reached and exceeded after
> > considering 37 ancestor conceptions, which is just 5 prior generations.
> >
> > Open individualism, is the equivalent of the easy game. No luck is
> required,
> > no special circumstances were needed, you would always be born
> (awakened), no
> > matter what.
> >
> > So accepting that one is justified (based on one's observation of having
> been
> > awakened) in concluding it is almost certain that they played the easy
> game,
> > rather than the hard game. Your task is this:
> >
> > To show why we are not similarly justified in concluding open
> individualism
> > (the easy game) rather than closed individualism (the hard game).
> >
>
> That would be my arguemnt regarding counterfactuals. I think your
> intuition was
> the right one here.
>
> But if I look at the AI:s definition of open individualism vs closed
> individualism:
>


These are terribly misleading and wrong definitions, as I will point out
below.



> "Closed individualism is a philosophical concept that posits that each
> person is
> a distinct, separate individual with a unique identity that does not extend
> beyond their own consciousness.


This is circular and meaningless since it doesn't define what a person is,
(which is the entire crux of the problem.) Also, no entity "extends beyond
their own consciousness," in any theory of personal identity. So this is
another meaningless distinction.


In this view, individuals are seen as isolated
> entities, and their experiences, thoughts, and identities are confined to
> themselves.


This is true for empty and open individualism as well.


This perspective contrasts with open individualism, which suggests
> that all individuals share a common identity or consciousness, implying a
> deeper
> connection among all people." (GPT 4o mini)
>

There is no consciousness link, hive mind, nor collective consciousness as
GPT seems to suggest here. This is a common accusation against open
individualism, but it is not a suggestion made by any of its serious
proponents.

Open individualism is merely the idea that there are no further
metaphysical facts binding particular experiences to partic bodily or
mental continuations. It is subtle, and hard to see what it is that I am
saying is not there, but perhaps it is best to work it out with an example:

------------------------

Consider a deep space mission:

INASA has selected you for your unique skill set for a 50 year voyage to
the outer planets of the solar system. Given this extended time period, you
and the rest of the crew will be placed into a state of suspended animation
until you arrive at your destination: one of the moons of Saturn.

However, due to high cost of the mission and the high the risk of
micro-meteoroids impacting the hull and possibly puncturing crew members'
bodies, NASA decides to create five duplicates of each crew member and
place them in different areas of the ship.

Thus, there exists redundancy for each crew member. If one is hit by a
micro-meteoroid, other intact copies remain. NASA informs you that when the
ship arrives at its destination, one of your duplicates will be thawed to
conduct your mission.

Later that night, as you consider NASA's plan you begin to worry. Will NASA
default to
waking the original me or will they pick one of the five duplicates
randomly? Does it even matter?

The next day you ask the mission planners about this and they tell you not
to worry, all duplicates are the same down to the last molecule, and the
continuity of matter is irrelevant to preserving your identity because
atoms in your body are replaced all the time.

You ask that assuming the original copy of you reaches the destination
unscathed, that they awaken the original instead of the duplicate. The
chief mission planner sighs, but agrees to do so if it will put your mind
at ease.

Fifty years later, your space ship reaches its destination. You emerge
well-rested from your
cryo-chamber, but are initially shocked to see "Cryo-chamber #2" inscribed
on it when you last remembered entering "Cryo-chamber #1". As you walk over
towards Cryo-chamber #1 you see a crack in the glass, and as you move
closer you find the point where a micro-meteroid passed through the
self-sealing hull of the ship, shot through the glass and buried itself in
the neck of your original copy.

When NASA contacts you they apologize for not being able to revive the
original copy as you had requested, and say that the first year into the
mission while passing the asteroid
belt, your original copy suffered a fatal injury.

You nod and admit it was silly to have worried, as afterall, I am here and
I seem to have survived just fine.

While wating your first meal in 50 years, a sudden chill comes over you as
you realize that you could have become any of your copies. If #1 and #2 had
both been destroyed, I would be #3, and #3 instead of #2 would be here
right now eating these dehydrated frosted flakes.

If you have the potential to become any of the duplicates that are thawed,
what does that mean if all the surviving duplicates were thawed? These
questions so preoccupy your mind that the next day while working on the
ships electronics, you fail to pay sufficient attention to what you are
doing. You
touch a live capacitor which shocks you and stops your heart. When the
other crew members find you it is too late to do anything.

They decide to thaw #3. Informed of how your predecesssor met his end, you
are extra vigilent in focusing on the mission and complete it successfully.

We can draw several conclusions from this thought experiment. The
functionalism
suggests that one's conscious state does not depend on the material
identity of the atoms in one's brain.  Therefore, it is in principle
possible to survive teleportation.

If we analyze just one of the four duplicates NASA creates of you, we see
that it is equivalent to teleportation. A scan of the original is made and
a copy is reconstructed in a different location, while the original is
destroyed.

The twist here is that multiple replicas of you are created. Which one of
them do you become? The only answer that appears to make sense is "all of
them". Your survival does not depend on which of the five replicas
is thawed, because you would live and survive as any of them.

Therefore, if all five are thawed would you not live as each of them? In
what way does it make sense to say you live as one but not the others?

------------------------

Closed individualism (or some closest continuer theory) says that you die
if/when copy #1 is destroyed, even if copy #2 survives. This is on account
of this *metaphysical youness* being bound up with some collection of
frozen atoms, and yet this property is not found within the exactly
identical (except for different spatial coordinates) collections of other
frozen atoms in the same organization. Yet spacetime, rotational, and
translational symmetry tell us the laws of physics don't care about time,
location, or orientation. So how does this *metaphysical youness* matter to
anything (or to anyone)? The copies of you, say #2 when he is awoken, feels
exactly the same as #1 does. How is his conscious state. It yours? He feels
just the same as you, is just as confident in being alive, conscious, and
being a self, an "I" as you feel.

Consider what Thomas Nagel says about the absence of any physical facts
that account for him being Thomas Nagel:


"consider everything that can be said about the world without employing any
token reflexive
expressions. This will include the description of all its physical contents
and their states, activities and attributes. It will also include a
description of all the persons in the world and their histories, memories,
thoughts, sensations, perceptions, intentions, and so forth. I can thus
describe without token-reflexives the entire world and everything that is
happening in it–and this will include a description of Thomas Nagel and
what he is thinking and feeling. But there seems to remain one thing which
I cannot say in this fashion–namely, which of the various persons in the
world I am.
Even when everything that can be said in the specified manner has been
said, and the world has in a sense been completely described, there seems
to remain one fact which has not been expressed, and that is the fact that
I am Thomas Nagel. This is not, of course, the fact ordinarily conveyed by
those words, when they are used to inform someone else who the speaker
is–for that could easily be expressed otherwise. It is rather the fact that
I am the subject of these experiences; this body is my
body; the subject or center of my world is this person,"

So since there are no physical facts that could account for this, it either
doesn't exist (there is no factor) or it must be added as an additional
metaphysical property.

Closed individualism is the assumption/belief in the existence of this
extra metaphysical property.

Open individualism is the denial that there are such additional
metaphysical properties.



> and
>
> "Open individualism is a philosophical concept that suggests that all
> individuals share a common identity or consciousness. In this view, the
> distinction between different people is seen as superficial, and at a
> deeper
> level, everyone is considered to be the same self or consciousness
> experiencing
> life through different perspectives. This perspective implies that the
> experiences, thoughts, and feelings of one person are fundamentally
> connected to
> those of others."
>

It starts off okay in saying there is a common identity, or single self. It
goes wrong when it talks about there being some connection between the
thoughts and feelings.



> I would argue from the basis of our every day experience. Based on that, it
> seems like closed individualism is what is the right view.
>

I would too if I believed these definitions. But these definitions are
deeply flawed and misleading. There are no empirical differences between
what it would feel like to be you whether closed or open individualism is
true.


> In addition, I would ask myself what experiment we could design to show
> that
> thoughts and feeling and experiences are connected to those of others?
> Empirically, I can only come up with scenarios that would confirm closed
> individualism.
>

This is based on GPT's incorrect definition.


> We are born, we have bodies and brains, and unique identities, interviews
> seem
> to confirm this. We have no evidence of telepathy.
>


There is no telepathy in open individualism, again this I blame GPT's
terribly misleading definition.


> The only way to some kind of open individualism I see, is just the way of
> definition or agreement, where we look at what we _do_ share. We share our
> DNA
> to 99.9% (?), we are all links in the chain of causation, the electricity
> in our
> brains and nervoussystem is the same electricity, so it could be said from
> that
> point of view that the same "power" powers us all, and this power came
> from a
> common source way down the tree of life. It could argued that we are also
> shared components of the global ecosystems, so looking at the planet as a
> whole,
> we could see that we are all components in that system.
>


As Arnold Zuboff explains, all experiences are mine because they are all
experienced as I -- in an immediate, first-person way. Every experience is
felt as if it is experienced immediately by a first-person "I", and this
trait is common to all conscious experiences. All experiences are felt as
if they are experienced by I.

You need not go any deeper than this.

But you can, if you wish. For example, by considering statistical
arguments, or cases that cause bodily or psychological continuity theories
to break down, but this is all on top of the much more core notion of the
"same I" being a common trait present in all experiences had by all
conscious beings.



> I think from a definition point of view, I'd try to go that route to
> establish a
> concept of open individualism.
>


Okay perhaps what I say above helps from the definitional perspective.


> > (The first instinct many people have when confronted with this argument
> is to
> > say "Well someone had to win" but note this doesn't make it one bit more
> > likely that *you* should be a winner. Even if *someone* wins the lottery
> on
> > every drawing, it remains unlikely that *you* should be the one who
> wins.)
>
> True, but this is an after interpretation expressed after the fact in the
> language of mathematics (see above).
>
> >       Why not? Closed individualism is easy to prove.
> >
> >       I'm an individual, I have
> >       continuity of mind and body, and so do other healthy people.
> >
> > This is a fact all theories of personal identity agree with. No theory of
> > personal identity rejects the idea that bodies, brains, memories, etc.
> exist
> > and are generally experienced as if they occur continuously, and are
> generally
> > limited to the memories accessable to a single nervous system.
> >
> > But none of this esteblishes closed individualism as true.
>
> See above. I got a bit ahead of myself here. I'll add that to me, closed
> individualism seems to be the simpler definition here.
>
> >       They can be
> >       interviewed, queried about memories, they act every day as if they
> were
> >       individuals, completely aligned with closed individualism.
> >
> > This is equally aligned with open individualism (and empty individualism
> too, for that matter).
>
> Open individualism, as per the definition above, must account for the
> sharing,
>

There is sharing.

and how boundaries are drawn,


In open individualism, no boundaries need be drawn. See my three diagrams
in the Google slides from my first message.

and it must also explain away the ilusion of
> closed individualism.


This is explained by the simple fact that our nervous system aren't
integrated. I don't have access to your memories and you don't have access
to mine.


Closed doesn't suffer from this, it perfectly explains our
> every day ordinary experience.
>


The fact that we have separate brains is enough to explain this. Souls need
not be pinned to bodies to ensure the only experiences you can remember
having are those had by your particular brain. Having a particular brain is
enough to explain this (in closed and in open individualism).



> >       I think those are all good arguments for closed individualism, in
> addition to my
> >       intuition of course, which aligns well with closed individualism.
> >
> > Closed individualism is intuitive, and it makes sense (evolutionarily
> > speaking) that we should be programmed to believe it by default. But that
> > something feels a certain way should not be considered sufficient
> grounds of
> > proof. It feels like Earth isn't moving, for example.
>
> True, but neither should it be disregarded. We do feel heat, and that is
> definitely reason enough to move the hand away from the stove.
>
> An argument could be made, just like when it comes to the material world,
> that
> we don't need to do or think anything in order to "live" closed
> individualism,
> and that what we should do is to come up with a way to falsify closed
> individualism.
>

How do you explain split brains? What happens to ones personal identity
when the two halves of the brain stop talking? Empirically we know the
result is two independent consciousnesses, which hemisphere does closet
continuer predict I will become when by brain is split? The right or the
left?

Open individualism says you remain present in both -- the apparent disunion
is due only to a lack of integration between the hemispheres. Should they
be connected in the future, they would become integrated, and again feel as
one mind.

What would closed individualism say would happen?


> > Also consider that the intuitive nature of closed individualism breaks
> down as
> > soon as one strays away from ordinary situations of common experience.
> When
> > you consider transporters, duplication machines, fission or fusion of
> minds or
> > bodies, memory erasures and implantations, etc. Then closed individualism
> > begins to seem ill-equipped to provide intuitive answers.
>
> True, but these are all thought experiments, and links to our previous
> discussion.
>

Split brains are a real, and empirically studied phenomenon.




> >       So with that in mind, how would you empirically prove open
> individualism?
> >
> > Using the argument I outlined above. We can take the empirical
> observation
> > that somehow one has awakened into existence.
>
> Do you have any other way that does not depend on statistics and
> counterfactuals?
>


Yes split brains I think for the bill.


> >       > Closed individualism makes the further (unnecessary and
> unwarranted)
> >       > assumption of "soul pinning". This assumption should be
> discarded, if
> >       > simplicity is what you are after.
> >
> >       I don't think it does. In my opinion all it says, is that today,
> what you see is
> >       what you get.
> >
> > I think "soul pinning" is a metaphysical assumption implicit in closed
> > individualism.
> >
> > It is the idea that *your experiences* are locked into being only the
> > experiences that happen to some particular bundle of matter (your body)
> and
> > it's continuous transformations.
>
> But based on neurology and researched into memories, they are stored in our
> brain. This is empirically proven.


Yes and it applies equally to both closed and open individualism.


We have no evidence for that they are stored
> in some collective substrate or leak across people.
>

Again this stems from GPT's bad definition. Open individualism makes no
such claims.


> > But if you make a copy, or if one collection is destroyed and another
> remade
> > with different materials, you say those experiences aren't yours,
> because this
> > metaphysical thing (that you say is tied to this one bundle of matter)
> isn't
> > there, present in that other copied or reformed bundle of matter.
>
> Hmm, I think maybe we should fold our offlist email discussion into this
> thread?
> We started to discuss this in the email I think.
>

You could bring some of that in.



> > But *what is* this metaphysical thing pinned to some bundle of matter (a
> thing
> > which can't be measured) which you maintain is necessary for the
> experiences
> > to *be yours*?
>
> A process of electrons in a brain? We do know to some extent where various
> functions that are part of our identity or feed it reside in the brain.
>

But is this process not interrupted, in sleep, coma, concussions,
anesthesia, etc. and later restarted in some other time and place (often
with different electrons)?

If we survive such discontinuous interruptions then identity can't be
strictly tied to the continuity of the process.



> >       Who knows? There might be some kind of uploading able to preserve
> >       continuity in a way that conclusively proves that our
> consciousness and identity
> >       are subtrate independent, but we have no evidence of this yet.
> >
> > Substrate independence is a concern of philosophy of mind. I don't see
> it as
> > related to theories of personal identity.
>
> I can see a cross over depending on the definition of identity. As for
> philosophy of mind, substrate independence I hope is a question that might
> one
> day take the leap from philosophy to science.
>
> >       I think science might be able to answer, or at least give
> indications of this in
> >       time.
> >
> >       I also think you can have closed individualism without
> soul-pinning as an
> >       assumption.
> >
> > What would that look like?
>
> Just like what is described in any text book on the body, the brain,
> coupled
> with the empirical experience we all have. This is based on a kind of
> behavioural definition of consciousness.
>

If there's nothing binding one's identity to a particular body/brain, then
that is open individualism, for then you can survive via the continuation
of any body or brain.


> > I think if one drops the notion of soul pinning from closed
> individualism,
> > then are left with open individualism.
>
> How come?
>

Because then there's nothing tying you to a particular group of atoms or
collection of memories.



> >       >       The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often
> associated with animalism,
> >       >       the view that human beings are animals and that our
> identity is determined by
> >       >       our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the
> importance of our
> >       >       embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies
> play in shaping our
> >       >       experiences and identities.
> >
> >       I think this is a weak argument for closed invidiualism. I like
> simplicity and
> >       how it confirms intuition much better.
> >
> > I thought it was pretty nonsensical to mention animalism as an argument.
> You
> > can argue it is simpler and more intuitive, but as I see it, open
> > individualism makes fewer assumptions about what is required to be you,
> and it
> > provides more intuitive answers than closed individualism when it comes
> to
> > less than ordinary situations.
>
> When it comes to less ordinary situations, if I think back to what you
> wrote
> above, some of them are just thought experiments, some might be
> impossible, and
> some we might get closer to answering scientifically. Don't you think?
>

I think thought experiments are a necessary tool for finding the truth,
especially in the domain of personal identity (moreso even than in
philosophy of mind).


> >       >       The practicality argument: Closed individualism has
> practical implications for
> >       >       how we think about personal identity and its relation to
> moral and legal
> >       >       responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should
> hold people accountable
> >       >       for their actions based on their biological continuity,
> rather than on more
> >       >       abstract or psychological criteria.
> >
> >       This is interesting. From a pragmatic point of view, closed
> individualism works
> >       well.
> >
> > It may work well, but I don't think pragmatism holds any weight when the
> > concern is finding what is true rather than deciding how to organize
> society.
>
> This is true, but can we? And given the fact that it does work well,
> wouldn't it
> be interesting to see if it can be falsified empirically somehow?
>

I think is is falsified by way of statistical reasoning, and few things
could be more important than learning the truth of open individualism.


> >       Let's assume open individualism is true, how would you see that
> changing the way
> >       society works in terms of crime and punishment?
> >
> > If more people believed open individualism, I think there would be more
> > compassion, more charity, more concern for the future, and less harming
> and
> > cheating of others.
> >
> > As far as crime and punishment, the goal should always be harm
> minimization
> > never inflicting pain for the purpose of pain alone, though punishment
> may
> > serve the purpose of reducing pain overall (via deterrence). It is a
> complex
> > question.
>
> True! Both are interesting questions, maybe better for a separate thread?
>

You can, though.I'm not sure I have much more than that I would have to
contribute.


> >       >       The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often
> seen as the most
> >       >       intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as
> it aligns with our
> >       >       everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous
> biological entities.
> >       >       This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and
> relatable theory than
> >       >       more esoteric alternatives.
> >
> >       This I'd lump in under simplicity.
> >
> > I would also note that most of the great breakthroughs of science came
> about
> > by demonstrating common sense was wrong.
>
> This is true! We must always be ready to update our mental
> models in the face of new evidence.
>
> >       >       The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often
> associated with a
> >       >       naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of
> understanding human
> >       >       beings as part of the natural world. This perspective
> suggests that our identity
> >       >       is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather
> than by supernatural or
> >       >       non-physical factors.
> >
> >       This is nonsense.
> >
> >       > Did AI help write this? The verbosity and lack of coherence
> seems unlike your
> >       > usual style.
> >
> >       My apologies! Yes, I should have told you that. =( My idea was to
> bring in some
> >       starting points for discussion, and to discuss these myself (see
> comments
> >       above), and then ask what you think. This was my mistake, sorry
> about that.
> >
> > No worries! I was pretty sure it wasn't written by you by how far off
> base it
> > seemed with it's answers. AI is good for generating a lot of ideas, but
> at
> > least here, not so good at judging the relevance of those ideas.
>
> Thank you! Yes, it is kind of hit or miss. Sometimes I find that they give
> nice
> summaries, and sometimes they are way off. That's why I do not use them for
> work. The consequences are too important, so I have to proof read, and
> then I
> can just write what I need myself regardless.
>

Have a great day!

Jason
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