[ExI] Why do the language model and the vision model align?

[Ben Zaiboc]

On 16/02/2026 16:34, Jason Resch wrote:

> To advocate a bit for Platonism, I am wondering how you would class the existence of mathematical truths and objects. For example, assuming we agree that zero has infinite factors, that pi has infinite digits, and that there are infinite primes, and assuming we agree that these infinite factors, infinite digits, and infinite primes do not all exist in the physical universe, then where do they exist? They can't exist in human minds (as our minds can't hold infinite things) and we already agreed they don't exist physically. So we require some third manner of existence for such things as these. For this, I think "Platonic existence" is the perfect substitute for when neither physical, nor mental realms will do.


These things come into existence when data-processing systems think about them. I don't see that there's any need to posit that they exist independently of this.

Do the possible configurations of a Game of Life exist somewhere, independently of an actual instance of the Game of Life working through them?

Does it make any sense to claim that the 49 trillionth digit of Pi exists, unless and until some system actually calculates it?

You could say that things like this exist in the same sense that gods or Santa Claus 'exist': as concepts in minds ('meta-existence'?). The fact that any mind in any particular universe is going to come up with the same answers every time (at least for the maths examples) is not really significant, except to show that the physical rules of that universe are consistent.

So I reckon that there is no need for 'Platonic existence', for things that don't actually exist in the physical realm, because they do exist in the mental realm, whenever they are needed. They appear there as a result of computation. Otherwise, they don't actually exist, or maybe you could say that they exist potentially, implicit in the laws of nature (or in the case of gods & Santa, implicit in human psychology).

-- 
Ben