[ExI] Why do the language model and the vision model align?

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Feb 16, 2026, 1:33 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 16/02/2026 16:34, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > To advocate a bit for Platonism, I am wondering how you would class the
> existence of mathematical truths and objects. For example, assuming we
> agree that zero has infinite factors, that pi has infinite digits, and that
> there are infinite primes, and assuming we agree that these infinite
> factors, infinite digits, and infinite primes do not all exist in the
> physical universe, then where do they exist? They can't exist in human
> minds (as our minds can't hold infinite things) and we already agreed they
> don't exist physically. So we require some third manner of existence for
> such things as these. For this, I think "Platonic existence" is the perfect
> substitute for when neither physical, nor mental realms will do.
>
>
> These things come into existence when data-processing systems think about
> them.


But where do they exist? Or to ask another way: in what *sense* do they
exist?

I don't see that there's any need to posit that they exist independently of
> this.
>

The problem come comes in when we say there aren't infinite primes, or that
e^pi*i + 1 = 0. Our mathematics breaks if there is some largest prime or if
pi's digits don't go on forever.

But the infinite primes, and pi's infinite digits exist neither in our
heads, nor in the physical universe. Yet they must exist in some sense or
else we must abandon mathematics we know it.

When Godel (through his theorems) realized that mathematical truths cannot
be a human invention (since mathematical truth transcends any human created
axiomatic system), he came to the conclusion that objects in mathematics
must have some kind of objective or Platonic existence, as they could not
be our own creations.

For this reason, I think idealism, nominalism, etc. are inadequate when it
comes to accounting for the existence of mathematical truth and objects.


> Do the possible configurations of a Game of Life exist somewhere,
> independently of an actual instance of the Game of Life working through
> them?
>



If you agree that "2 + 2 = 4" is true independent of you, me, or the first
mathematician to scribe that pattern on a clay tablet, then from this fact
alone it can be shown that there exist more complex equations (universal
Diophantine equations) whose solutions represent the outputs of every
computable function.

Among these computable functions, include every possible Game of Life state
and it's full evolution.

Now you ask, is such a game "actual"?

Here we need to qualify what work the word "actual" is doing here. What
makes one computation (among the infinity of computations performed by this
universal Diophantine equation) actual and another not?

After all, what we consider our *actual physical universe* could itself be
just one of the many outputs resulting from all the computations performed
by such a platonically existing universal Diophantine equation.


> Does it make any sense to claim that the 49 trillionth digit of Pi exists,
> unless and until some system actually calculates it?
>

I think it makes no sense to say "Pi doesn't have an Nth digit because no
one has computed it yet."

I believe each of Pi's digits exists, whether or not some primate writes it
down in a chalk board and looks at it.

You believe there are more than 52 Mersenne primes, don't you?


> You could say that things like this exist in the same sense that gods or
> Santa Claus 'exist': as concepts in minds ('meta-existence'?).


The difference is there is objective truth and properties associated with
these objects. Mathematical objects can be studied rationally and their
properties agreed upon, even by cultures that never meet or interact.
Aliens on other worlds would discover the same digits of Pi as we discover.
That's the difference between mathematical objects and ideas like Santa.


The fact that any mind in any particular universe is going to come up with
> the same answers every time (at least for the maths examples) is not really
> significant, except to show that the physical rules of that universe are
> consistent.
>

In my view what makes something objective is being amenable to be studied,
investigated, and revealing properties that independent researchers can
agree on.

This is what makes physics an objective field, and it is what makes
mathematics an objective field.

Note that unlike in fiction, people aren't free to just "make up" a 53rd
Mersenne prime and claim prize money -- they must discover *an actual*
Mersenne prime, that is, they must *discover* a new number having all the
properties of a Mersenne prime.


> So I reckon that there is no need for 'Platonic existence', for things
> that don't actually exist in the physical realm, because they do exist in
> the mental realm, whenever they are needed. They appear there as a result
> of computation. Otherwise, they don't actually exist, or maybe you could
> say that they exist potentially, implicit in the laws of nature (or in the
> case of gods & Santa, implicit in human psychology).
>

There are different forms of existence.

There is existence defined by being mutually causally interactive (what we
normally think of as physical existence, or existing within this universe).

But then there is also existence for things which are acausal. For example,
two bubble universes in eternal inflation that will never interact, or two
decohered branches in many worlds, or even just other universes with
different laws, which we presume must exist to explain the fine tuning of
the laws of our own universe. In what sense do these other universes exist?

Are they still worth of the full "concrete physical existence" when we
can't see them and can't interact with them? Or should their existence be
demoted to inferred/abstract/theoretical?

If the latter, isn't that the same sort of existence that mathematical
object have? Other physical universes can be studied via simulation, we can
analyze their properties, what structures exist as a result of their
different laws, etc.

The abstract sort of existence that other possible universes have seems to
be, to be the same sort mathematical objects have.


Jason

P.S.

While this sounds like outlandish speculation, there is actually strong
empirical support for the theory that our universe is the result of a
greater ontology in which all computations play out in all possible ways.
For references see:
https://loc.closertotruth.com/theory/resch-s-platonic-functionalism

>
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