[ExI] Red

[Brent Allsop]

Hi Ben,

On Tue, Jun 30, 2026 at 3:05 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 30/06/2026 20:08, Brent Allsop wrote:
> > Thanks for talking about qualities like this, as I think it is the key
> to understanding what phenomenal consciousness is like, and how a more
> powerful computational model works.
> >
> > Frist off we've got to stop talking ambiguously so we can know what
> people are talking about.  By default, the term 'red' is ambiguous.  You
> can't tell if you are talking about the physical properties of the surface
> of the strawberry, the light, any of the other states in any perception
> chain, and ultimately the physical properties of our subjective knowledge
> of red things, as rendered into our consciousness by our perception system.
> >
> > We're building and tracking consensus around a better way to define
> these physical terms in the consensus representational qualia theory camp.
> They define the terms as follows:
> >
> >      “red” The intrinsic property of objects that are the target of our
> observation, the initial cause of the perception process (i.e. when the
> strawberry reflects 650 nm (red) light). A label for Anything that reflects
> or emits ‘red’ light.
> >      “redNESS” The different intrinsic subjective property of our
> knowledge of red things, the final result of our perception of red.
> >
> >
> > So, given that, can you guys ask your questions so I can understand what
> everyone is talking about?
> >
>
> OK.
>
> My understanding is that the word for any colour ("Red", Blue", etc.) can
> refer to:
>
> 1) The wavelength, or a range of wavelengths, of light reflected by a
> surface and received by our eyes. You could call this "the colour of light".
>
> 2) The propensity of a substance to absorb/reflect various wavelengths of
> light. You could call this "the intrinsic colour of a thing or substance".
>
> 3) The subjective experience (the quale) of 'seeing a colour'. You could
> call this "the perceived colour".
>
> The first two are physical phenomena that can be measured. The third is
> not, and can only be experienced by a mind, specifically the mind that
> creates it.
>

Why do you say the 3rd is not a physical phenomena that can be measured?
We can already objecdtively measure knowledge of what we see, and produce
videos close to what we experience.  The only problem is we ground
everything in the wavelength of light, and a blind to the real qualities we
might be observing, which could be different for different people (mapped
to the same red light).  Surely you would agree that we can observe
everything important about what is being subjectively experienced, even if
that is maybe a bit beyond the complexity of what we can make out in our
objective observations?


>
> The third definition is what I first think of when the word is used, and,
> importantly, does not necessarily correlate exactly with the other two
> definitions (as illustrated by Magenta). This is the important and
> seemingly contentious one. Neuroscience tells us that it's one of the many
> subjective experiences created by our brains as a result of the processing
> of sensory signals from our eyes via our visual cortex, combined with
> information from various other parts of our brains (memories, expectations,
> emotions, etc.). While the other two are physical phenomena, this one is a
> pattern of information in a mind that, while it could theoretically be
> measured and recorded, can only be /experienced/ by the mind that is
> creating it.
>
> I suspect that, in Brent's terminology, the first two could be called
> 'red', etc., and the third, 'redness', etc.
>

yes.

>
> In the particular case of Magenta, there is only 'magentaness', because
> 'magenta' doesn't actually exist (as a wavelength of light), it's an
> 'invented' colour that can only be experienced.
>

Good point there is no magenta, just magentaness in this new terminology.

>
> That's as clear and unambiguous as I can make it.
>
> What is unclear to me, is what "the physical properties of our subjective
> knowledge of red things" means. This seems to be a contradictory phrase, as
> subjective things, by definition, cannot have physical (and therefore
> measurable) properties. A phenomenon is either objective or subjective, it
> can't be both.
>

Let's assume glutamate behaves the way it does in synapses, because of it's
redness quality. (you can replace glutamate in a synapse with any other
objective description of something in the brain)  We are objectively
observingn everything about that behavior, the only problem is, we don't
know that the description of that behavior is a description of the behavior
of subjecdtive redness.  Any description of behavior tells you nothing of
what it is like.  You need to take glutamate, and subjectiverly bind it
into your subjective experience, so you can then say: oh THAT is why
glutamate behavaes the way it does in a synapse.

That is why the neurosubstitution argument is such a fallacy.  Because it
assumes the system lacks the ability to detect, or more accurately stated,
directly apprehend qualities.



> Unless it refers to the physical patterns of neural activation that embody
> the information that forms the subjective experience. If so, fair enough,


Yes, this is my working hypothesis.


> but it's not much use. We can't distinguish which patterns of neural
> activity embody which subjective experiences,


I have more faith in our abilities than this.  Currently they can make
cortical neural prostheses that directly stimulate the brain, but they only
can currently make white 'sprites' that are like stars.  Now, most of the
work is going into making colored stars, and they are getting very close to
making colored stars.  I think this field is where the greatest discovery
of all time will be made, the discovery you doubt can happen here.  And it
will be the discovery of the true physical qualities of at least something
in the brain.  And this kind of subjective binding will be a revolutionary
more powerful way of doing computation.


> and even if we could in one individual, there's no guarantee that the same
> pattern would invoke the same experience in another brain. In fact I'd be
> extremely surprised if it would, as everyone's brain is different in the
> fine details of the wiring.
>

There are at least 3 ways to eff the ineffable
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JKwACeT3b1bta1M78wZ3H2vWkjGxwZ46OHSySYRWATs/edit?tab=t.0>
.


> Maybe one day, after uploading has been perfected and we can go into much
> finer detail on how minds work, we will be able to study this kind of
> thing, but I'm still doubtful that we'll ever be able to say "This pattern
> of activation results in this specific subjective experience" in a general
> way that applies to all minds.
>

Yes, that is the prediction.

>
> Of course, it would be brilliant if we could, because it would open up a
> lot of things such as merging minds together, transferring memories and
> skills between individuals, etc. Time will tell, I suppose.
>
> Not to mention knowing the true color qualities of physical reality,
instead of the false 'seeming' qualities (mapping everything to just light)
and no more 'hard problems' or 'explanatory gaps' and falsification of all
competing theories of conscoiusness, but whatever one is prediceting the
corect nature of qualia....
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