[ExI] Red

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Jul 8, 2026, 7:26 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Monday, 6 July 2026 at 23:57, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> Yes, Yes!
> >> Except I'd call it Steven Lehar's theory, as he pretty much taught me
> all I know
>
>
> Ok, I'm glad that you think I've understood.
>
> Note that I'm not agreeing with it, in fact I think it's about as wrong as
> could be, but stating clearly what something is, is necessary before you
> can properly critique it, and in the past I hadn't much of a clue as to
> what you were actually claiming.
>
> I have some suspicions about your understanding of Lehar's theory, but
> haven't yet read enough of his stuff to be sure (it does make sense, as far
> as I've got). When I get round to it, I'll return to that.
>

>From having corresponded and conversed with Brent on his ideas and way of
approaching the problems of consciousness for many years I think I can shed
some light on his theories.

Though he often describes things in his own terms, Brent's thinking on this
is not as uncommon as you might think. I would say it was even a dominant
theory not too long ago.

It would compare Brent's theory to type-physicalism, a.k.a. mind-brain
identity theory, which is a sort of reductionist physicalism/materialism.

This is in contrast to emergetist physicalism, which admits a degree of
multiple realizability (the idea that the same conscious state can be
physically realized in multiple ways). Embracing multiple realizability is
what led to functionalism and computationalism, which say it's not *what* a
brain is made of, but *how* the brain works, that determines its
consciousness.

Type physicalism is less popular than it used to be, but it still has its
proponents, and there are many modern variations:

1. Panpsychism which holds that different fundamental particles have
different conscious properties that bind together to yield a complex
conscious state.

2. Biological naturalism, which says only living cells and living neurons
have the "right stuff" to be conscious.

3. Sydney Shoemaker, and others who defend the logical possibility of an
"inverted spectrum" -- where two functionally identical brains experience
colors differently on account of being made of different substrates.


Essentially, anyone who rejects the core tenets of functionalism (multiple
realizability, the indifference of substrate, the primacy of causal
organization, etc.) and remains logically consistent, will end up with a
theory like Brent's.

So I commend Brent for his logical rigor and biting the bullet that comes
with rejecting functionalism. So even if I don't follow him in his
rejection of functionalism, I think he is at least consistent in the
resulting set of ideas he arrives at.


Jason
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