[ExI] Red

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Jul 10, 2026, 6:03 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> Hi Jason,
>
> Thanks for your always cool head, brilliant and educational responses.
>

Thank you Brent!


> On Wed, Jul 8, 2026 at 7:45 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Jul 8, 2026, 7:26 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On Monday, 6 July 2026 at 23:57, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> Yes, Yes!
>>> >> Except I'd call it Steven Lehar's theory, as he pretty much taught me
>>> all I know
>>>
>>>
>>> Ok, I'm glad that you think I've understood.
>>>
>>> Note that I'm not agreeing with it, in fact I think it's about as wrong
>>> as could be, but stating clearly what something is, is necessary before you
>>> can properly critique it, and in the past I hadn't much of a clue as to
>>> what you were actually claiming.
>>>
>>> I have some suspicions about your understanding of Lehar's theory, but
>>> haven't yet read enough of his stuff to be sure (it does make sense, as far
>>> as I've got). When I get round to it, I'll return to that.
>>>
>>
>> From having corresponded and conversed with Brent on his ideas and way of
>> approaching the problems of consciousness for many years I think I can shed
>> some light on his theories.
>>
>> Though he often describes things in his own terms, Brent's thinking on
>> this is not as uncommon as you might think. I would say it was even a
>> dominant theory not too long ago.
>>
>> It would compare Brent's theory to type-physicalism, a.k.a. mind-brain
>> identity theory, which is a sort of reductionist physicalism/materialism.
>>
>> This is in contrast to emergetist physicalism, which admits a degree of
>> multiple realizability (the idea that the same conscious state can be
>> physically realized in multiple ways). Embracing multiple realizability is
>> what led to functionalism and computationalism, which say it's not *what* a
>> brain is made of, but *how* the brain works, that determines its
>> consciousness.
>>
>
> I'm not sure I completely understand what you mean by "multiple
> realizability".  As I believe it is very likely that there are multiple
> things that have the same quality, just like there are multiple things that
> reflect light in the same way.
>

I see. This was perhaps something I did not realize. If there are multiple
molecules that possess the property of redness, then can the dictionary you
propose ever be complete? Or will it always remain open-ended, where there
might be an ever growing list of molecules that have this property, and we
would never know whether or not we have identified all of them?


But that is very different from the "substrate independence" engineered
> into today's computers, where you can have any physical property (like red
> or green properties) represent a 1, of course depending on how your
> required dictionary is wired.  Is "functionalism" merely multiple
> realizability, or is it more than that?
>

I would say mind-brain identity theory is falsified by multiple
realizability, since it can't be an *identity* relationship between
physical state A and conscious state C, if physical state B also yields
conscious state C, but A =/= B.

I think you raise a good point that multiple realizability itself isn't
enough to force functionalism, though it's compatible with functionalism.

Substrate indifference, however is a much stronger than multiple
realizability, and I think it implies, or at least it strongly suggests,
functionalism.

Jason


>
>
>>
>> Type physicalism is less popular than it used to be, but it still has its
>> proponents, and there are many modern variations:
>>
>> 1. Panpsychism which holds that different fundamental particles have
>> different conscious properties that bind together to yield a complex
>> conscious state.
>>
>> 2. Biological naturalism, which says only living cells and living neurons
>> have the "right stuff" to be conscious.
>>
>> 3. Sydney Shoemaker, and others who defend the logical possibility of an
>> "inverted spectrum" -- where two functionally identical brains experience
>> colors differently on account of being made of different substrates.
>>
>>
>> Essentially, anyone who rejects the core tenets of functionalism
>> (multiple realizability, the indifference of substrate, the primacy of
>> causal organization, etc.) and remains logically consistent, will end up
>> with a theory like Brent's.
>>
>> So I commend Brent for his logical rigor and biting the bullet that comes
>> with rejecting functionalism. So even if I don't follow him in his
>> rejection of functionalism, I think he is at least consistent in the
>> resulting set of ideas he arrives at.
>>
>>
>> Jason
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