[ExI] VERY cool. Toward mind uploading?

[Brent Allsop]

I agree, this is a big step beyond the full emulation of C-elegense
<https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7801769/>, so thanks for sharing
Giulio,
And I agree this is falsifying evidence for quantum theories and such as "Orch
OR" <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/20-Orch-OR>  .

But you're going way too far by claiming this falsifies theories that
predict #2 Emulations of brains aren't conscious or #3 Emulation of brains
are differently conscious.

This may be convincing for you, who are not in those camps, the question
is, is it falsifying for any of the supporters of those camps?  I added
this argument to the "Orchestrated Object Reduction Falsifying Evidence"
<https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/75-Orch-OR-Falsifying-Evidence?is_tree_open=0&asof=review>
camp, but I don't see any evidence that it has convinced any supporters of
those camps.  some people have jumped camps for some evidences, but this
evidence hasn't yet convinced anyone I can see in those camps.


And you did nail it on the head when you said:

*"Next we need those with functionally equivalent neural prosthetics who
report no qualitative differences in their subjective qualia, which again
may come soon."*

but you must also include the possibility that it may be something like
glutamate being subjectively bound that is the only thing the subject
reports has a redness quality.

Much of the brain isn't conscious, or at least is subconscious (not
subjectively bound into consciousness). It is very likely that C. elegans
has no qualia, but the fruit fly may be using qualia.  But until we know
which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of
redness, we can't know if the fruit fly is using that, or is phenomenally
conscious likek that.


We simply need to discover which of all our descriptions of stuff in the
brain is a descripton of redness, before we know if anything is like
redness.

Which again may come soon.








On Sun, Mar 8, 2026 at 8:44 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Sun, Mar 8, 2026, 4:10 AM Giulio Prisco via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> Now, this seems VERY cool:
>>
>>
>> https://theinnermostloop.substack.com/p/the-first-multi-behavior-brain-upload
>
>
> Absolutely incredible!
>
> This removes from philosophy one of the three possible objections to
> functionalism:
>
> <s>1. Emulations of brains aren't possible</s>
> 2. Emulations of brains aren't conscious
> 3. Emulations of brains are differently conscious
>
> This result rules out #1. which includes a wide class of theories, such as
> those that claim non computable physics or other non-algorithmic processes
> or quantum weirdness is required for the brain to function as it does. E.g.
> the microtubule / quantum gravity theories, by Hameroff and Penrose, and
> perhaps some versions of panpsychism or intrinsicist physicalism that would
> deny the possibility of functional equivalence without actually employing
> real physical particles having special properties than manifest in
> behavioral differences.
>
> Perhaps the biggest piece of news relating to philosophy of mind in many
> decades.
>
> Next we need those with functionally equivalent neural prosthetics who
> report no qualitative differences in their subjective qualia, which again
> may come soon.
>
> Jason
>
>
>
>
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