[ExI] VERY cool. Toward mind uploading?

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Mar 8, 2026, 3:13 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> I agree, this is a big step beyond the full emulation of C-elegense
> <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7801769/>, so thanks for
> sharing Giulio,
> And I agree this is falsifying evidence for quantum theories and such as "Orch
> OR" <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/20-Orch-OR>
> .
>
> But you're going way too far by claiming this falsifies theories that
> predict #2 Emulations of brains aren't conscious or #3 Emulation of brains
> are differently conscious.
>


I am sorry if I was unclear. I did not claim #2 or #3 were falsified. Only
that one of the three standard objections to functionalism (#1) has been
falsified.


> This may be convincing for you, who are not in those camps, the question
> is, is it falsifying for any of the supporters of those camps?  I added
> this argument to the "Orchestrated Object Reduction Falsifying Evidence"
> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/75-Orch-OR-Falsifying-Evidence?is_tree_open=0&asof=review>
> camp, but I don't see any evidence that it has convinced any supporters of
> those camps.  some people have jumped camps for some evidences, but this
> evidence hasn't yet convinced anyone I can see in those camps.
>
>
> And you did nail it on the head when you said:
>
> *"Next we need those with functionally equivalent neural prosthetics who
> report no qualitative differences in their subjective qualia, which again
> may come soon."*
>
> but you must also include the possibility that it may be something like
> glutamate being subjectively bound that is the only thing the subject
> reports has a redness quality.
>

Yes, it could go the other way. But the strange thing is, the person
wouldn't be able to report the change (assuming it was a
functionally-equivalent substitution). Their behavior would have to be just
the same as it would have been without the substitution, and so we should
expect them to report no qualitative changes in their experience. Now, is
it possible they could have such a qualitative change and be unable to
report it, or even think about it (as thinking a different thought would
involve alternate neural circuits being activated)? It seems strange to
think of a change you couldn't think about or notice. At that point is it
really a change?


> Much of the brain isn't conscious, or at least is subconscious (not
> subjectively bound into consciousness). It is very likely that C. elegans
> has no qualia, but the fruit fly may be using qualia.  But until we know
> which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of
> redness, we can't know if the fruit fly is using that, or is phenomenally
> conscious likek that.
>

It is also possible that what we consider to be unconscious is just a
separate consciousness not integrated in the main sphere. Much like how to
a split brain patient, each hemisphere considers the other hemisphere to be
unconscious (when in actuality, both hemispheres are conscious)


>
> We simply need to discover which of all our descriptions of stuff in the
> brain is a descripton of redness, before we know if anything is like
> redness.
>
> Which again may come soon.
>

Yes human uploaded brains open a new possibility space of experimentation.
We could tweak, deactivate, take out, modify, disconnect any part of a
brain.

Jason


>
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>
> On Sun, Mar 8, 2026 at 8:44 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Mar 8, 2026, 4:10 AM Giulio Prisco via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Now, this seems VERY cool:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://theinnermostloop.substack.com/p/the-first-multi-behavior-brain-upload
>>
>>
>> Absolutely incredible!
>>
>> This removes from philosophy one of the three possible objections to
>> functionalism:
>>
>> <s>1. Emulations of brains aren't possible</s>
>> 2. Emulations of brains aren't conscious
>> 3. Emulations of brains are differently conscious
>>
>> This result rules out #1. which includes a wide class of theories, such
>> as those that claim non computable physics or other non-algorithmic
>> processes or quantum weirdness is required for the brain to function as it
>> does. E.g. the microtubule / quantum gravity theories, by Hameroff and
>> Penrose, and perhaps some versions of panpsychism or intrinsicist
>> physicalism that would deny the possibility of functional equivalence
>> without actually employing real physical particles having special
>> properties than manifest in behavioral differences.
>>
>> Perhaps the biggest piece of news relating to philosophy of mind in many
>> decades.
>>
>> Next we need those with functionally equivalent neural prosthetics who
>> report no qualitative differences in their subjective qualia, which again
>> may come soon.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>
>>
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