[ExI] Uploads are self

[Ben Zaiboc]

On 16/03/2026 10:35, Jason Resch wrote:
> I recently met one of the leading researchers involved in the fruit fly brain scanning effort. He, and others mentioned two common objections people have to the idea of brain preservation (with the eventual goal of uploading):
>
>     The first is the idea that silicon computers can't host human consciousness.
>     The second is the idea that even if my upload were conscious, "it wouldn't be me."
>
>
> I told him I would prepare a brief essay that uses the latest philosophical arguments to serve as a counter to these objections (written to be understandable to laypersons).
>
> So if there are people in your life who resist your choice to pursue brain/cryro preservation, this document can help them understand the various reasons for we can expect uploads not only to be conscious, but also capable of extending one's very own subjective self and identity.
>
> Here is the document:
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/103wDTRC7-AA6mHVzRj1JptqeulBRXinzvIdfC1Z50t8/edit?usp=sharing


Not a good idea, I reckon, to sneak in your 'Open Individualism' idea as a proof of the validity of uploading. That's likely to backfire.

But in any case, there's no need to resort to abstruse philosophical nonsense to establish that a sufficiently high-fidelity upload would be the person that was scanned. All that's required is some information (most of which you supply in the first part of your article, before it gets weird), and simple logic.

But the main thing that's required to actually believe (small 'b' version) this, is a materialistic mindset (as in, a complete rejection of dualism), and that's not very common so far. This is more of an emotional issue than a logical one, so no amount of logical argument will persuade people who are determined not to believe it, that an upload of them would really 'be them'.

That will only change once uploading is actually a thing, and can be seen to work, I think.

-- 
Ben