[ExI] Uploads are self

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Mar 16, 2026 at 12:58 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 16/03/2026 10:35, Jason Resch wrote:
> > I recently met one of the leading researchers involved in the fruit fly
> brain scanning effort. He, and others mentioned two common objections
> people have to the idea of brain preservation (with the eventual goal of
> uploading):
> >
> >     The first is the idea that silicon computers can't host human
> consciousness.
> >     The second is the idea that even if my upload were conscious, "it
> wouldn't be me."
> >
> >
> > I told him I would prepare a brief essay that uses the latest
> philosophical arguments to serve as a counter to these objections (written
> to be understandable to laypersons).
> >
> > So if there are people in your life who resist your choice to pursue
> brain/cryro preservation, this document can help them understand the
> various reasons for we can expect uploads not only to be conscious, but
> also capable of extending one's very own subjective self and identity.
> >
> > Here is the document:
> >
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/103wDTRC7-AA6mHVzRj1JptqeulBRXinzvIdfC1Z50t8/edit?usp=sharing
>
>
> Not a good idea, I reckon, to sneak in your 'Open Individualism' idea as a
> proof of the validity of uploading. That's likely to backfire.
>

The conclusion does not depend on open individualism. See the table "How
Theories of Personal Identity answer the Survival Question" on page 25.

That said, open individualism it is the only definsible position of
personal identity, when the evidence is considered, and some theory of
personal identity must be assumed, if one is ever to answer the question of
"are uploads still me"? If you reject open individualism, you can still
consider yoursself to survive as an upload, as long as you don't subscribe
to empty individualism, or closed individualism that favors bodily
continuitiy (and the upload process is discontinuous).


>
> But in any case, there's no need to resort to abstruse philosophical
> nonsense to establish that a sufficiently high-fidelity upload would be the
> person that was scanned. All that's required is some information (most of
> which you supply in the first part of your article, before it gets weird),


I think you are ignoring the beliefs other people commonly hold, e.g.
regarding their presumed importance on the continuation of identity through
a body or through a soul. This document is written for most people, and I
would guess a majority of the world's population subscribes to such an idea
of personal identity. Even the majority of philosophers don't think they
surivive a teletransporter (which is equivalent to denying personal
survival for the case of a destructive mind upload).


> and simple logic.
>

You are correct that logic is what gets us to an answer to the question.
And that logic says that neither perfect bodidily continurity, nor perfect
psychological identity are required for one to survive. When neither of
these criteria is necessary to survival, the logical result that follows
from abandoning those criteria is open individualism. You may not like this
conclusion, but it is what the logic suggests.


>
> But the main thing that's required to actually believe (small 'b' version)
> this, is a materialistic mindset (as in, a complete rejection of dualism),
> and that's not very common so far.


I think that is part of it, but even many materialists hold that
destruction of the body means death, and that any later instances are mere
duplicates, who are not you.


> This is more of an emotional issue than a logical one, so no amount of
> logical argument will persuade people who are determined not to believe it,
> that an upload of them would really 'be them'.
>

Yes I agree the resistance is largely emptional, which is why I included
the section about the soul, and why the modern scientific view of
functionalism, recovers a picture that is not so different from the
popular, traditional ideas about the soul.


>
> That will only change once uploading is actually a thing, and can be seen
> to work, I think.
>

The unfortunate thing, as I point out in the section "The Limits of
Empirical Science", is that there is no objective test that can show
someone has subjectively survived such a procedure (rather than a mere
clone).

Jason
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