[ExI] Uploads are self

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Mar 16, 2026, 4:26 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 16/03/2026 19:34, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> >     Ben wrote:
> >>     But the main thing that's required to actually believe (small 'b'
> version) this, is a materialistic mindset (as in, a complete rejection of
> dualism), and that's not very common so far.
> >
> >
> > I think that is part of it, but even many materialists hold that
> destruction of the body means death, and that any later instances are mere
> duplicates, who are not you.


>
> Then they are what I usually call 'crypto-dualists', not materialists.
> Completely dispensing with dualism is difficult, I struggled with it for a
> long time, but once you do, you realise that 'mere duplicates' are,
> necessarily, actually you, in every way that matters.
>

I agree but what was the mental process of realization you went through to
escape that? How would you argue with someone else that the specifics of a
body doesn't matter? What thought experiments or reasons would you offer to
show that the usual view doesn't hold?

What things do you be believe are necessary for one to survive? Would every
synaptic weight have to be determined exactly, or is there some factor of
"close enough" (say if it is as similar to how you were two weeks ago, that
is sufficient)?



>
>
> >>     This is more of an emotional issue than a logical one, so no amount
> of logical argument will persuade people who are determined not to believe
> it, that an upload of them would really 'be them'.
> >
> >
> > Yes I agree the resistance is largely emptional, which is why I included
> the section about the soul, and why the modern scientific view of
> functionalism, recovers a picture that is not so different from the
> popular, traditional ideas about the soul.
> >
> >
> >
> >>     That will only change once uploading is actually a thing, and can
> be seen to work, I think.
> >
> >
> > The unfortunate thing, as I point out in the section "The Limits of
> Empirical Science", is that there is no objective test that can show
> someone has subjectively survived such a procedure (rather than a mere
> clone).
>
> This is true, just as there is no objective test that can show that
> someone else is really conscious. It's the same 'problem' (I put this in
> quotes because it's not really a problem, we solve it all the time using
> the Duck test, and we will use the Duck test when uploads exist, and we'll
> conclude that they really are the person they are supposed to be, and
> really conscious. We don't go through life trying to prove that other
> people are conscious, we just assume that they are (provided they do
> actually pass the Duck test!), because that's the easiest and most sensible
> thing to do).
>

While there may be no empirical tests of another's conscious, or of the
preserved identity and survival of another's consciousness, I believe there
are rational arguments for both.



> People won't read essays to decide whether that upload of Uncle Bob is
> really Uncle Bob.


Most people might not bother, but thought leaders whose opinion other
people will turn to for guidance, will.

Uncle Bob's neuroprosthetic surgeon will read the literature, and comfort
Uncle Bob and his family that 95% of neuroprosthetic surgeons agree that
your consciousness survives a transfer to a new substrate. When Uncle Bob
asks how do we know, his surgeon can reference the substantial literature
of rational arguments on the subject.


They'll talk to him (assuming Bob decides to hang around long enough to
> talk back instead of zooming off at a million times human thinking speed
> and becoming basically incommunicable).
>

Such interactions will satisfy the majority of people. But those that think
a little more deeply on it will start to doubt whether it is really him or
a convincing clone. This is why rational arguments are needed. Not for
everyone, but for those who ask or doubt.

Jason
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