[ExI] Uploads are self

[Ben Zaiboc]

On 21/03/2026 21:19, Jason Resch wrote:
> Functionalism is a theory in the philosophy of mind. If one accepts functionalism, then that is enough to establish the uploaded mind will be conscious.
>
> But functionalism is silent on the question of which experiences instantiated in which places are experience[s] you can expect to be yours.
> This question falls squarely within the domain of the philosophy of personal identity. No theory in the philosophy of mind even attempts to answer this question.


Well, it's quite clear to me why this is: Because it's a stupid question.

"which experiences ..." Well, guess which ones. Who are we talking about? Yes, that person's experiences.

"... instantiated in which places.." Which place are we talking about? The place in which the mind in question is running.

These are tautologies. There's no need to ask these 'questions'.

The only thing which makes sense to me is that the 'philosophy of personal identity' is a form of post-modernism, rather than an actual thing.


> Accordingly, if you want to make the further assumption that the functionally-equivalent upload not only replicates your consciousness, but that you will personally and subjectively experience life as this upload, then you must state your assumed theory in the philosophy of personal identity.


That's not a 'further assumption'. It's the same thing. Why is it not clear that 'Your consciousness' and 'you' are different words for the same thing?
The upload replicates your consciousness.
You experience life as the upload.
Two sentences that mean the same thing.
How is it possible to be confused about this?


> So far you have ruled out empty-individualism. You have also ruled out bodily continuity versions of closed-individualism. You have vacillated on whether perfect identity is required for pattern identity. If you require perfect identity in the pattern, that is a version of closed individualism; however, if you loosen this to allow imperfect identity of patterns in the upload (after having already abandoned bodily continuity as important), that leads to open-individualism.
>
> You say this makes no sense to you. I am willing to help it make sense if you ask any question about anything I have said or anything that remains unclear.

>From The Internet:
"Empty individualism is a philosophical view that suggests personal identity corresponds to a fixed pattern that disappears with the passage of time, meaning that individuals exist only as "time-slices" or moments of experience. This contrasts with other views like closed individualism, which sees personal identity as continuous over time, and open individualism, which posits that there is only one subject of experience shared by all."

Nope, none of these work. The last one in particular is self-evidently false.

There is no need for a 'philosophy of personal identity'. Philosophy of mind is all we need. It's like saying we need both astronomy and astrology to make sense of the heavens.

I think it's safe to say that I have no questions about the philosophy of personal identity. All I will say is that it's quite possible to put together words into grammatically-correct sentences that are completely devoid of actual meaning.

-- 
Ben