[ExI] Uploads are self

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Mar 21, 2026, 6:25 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 21/03/2026 21:19, Jason Resch wrote:
> > Functionalism is a theory in the philosophy of mind. If one accepts
> functionalism, then that is enough to establish the uploaded mind will be
> conscious.
> >
> > But functionalism is silent on the question of which experiences
> instantiated in which places are experience[s] you can expect to be yours.
> > This question falls squarely within the domain of the philosophy of
> personal identity. No theory in the philosophy of mind even attempts to
> answer this question.
>
>
> Well, it's quite clear to me why this is: Because it's a stupid question.
>
> "which experiences ..." Well, guess which ones. Who are we talking about?
> Yes, that person's experiences.
>
> "... instantiated in which places.." Which place are we talking about? The
> place in which the mind in question is running.
>
> These are tautologies. There's no need to ask these 'questions'.
>


You may think so, but unless you can explain why they are tautologies
you'll fail to convince anyone else.


> The only thing which makes sense to me is that the 'philosophy of personal
> identity' is a form of post-modernism, rather than an actual thing.
>
>
> > Accordingly, if you want to make the further assumption that the
> functionally-equivalent upload not only replicates your consciousness, but
> that you will personally and subjectively experience life as this upload,
> then you must state your assumed theory in the philosophy of personal
> identity.
>
>
> That's not a 'further assumption'. It's the same thing. Why is it not
> clear that 'Your consciousness' and 'you' are different words for the same
> thing?
>

Because most people connect the word "you" with more than one "conscious
state." Then it is a one-to-many relationship, and thus they can't refer to
the same thing, unless you take the radical step of saying "you" is limited
to a single conscious state. But then you are subscribing to
empty-individualism.


The upload replicates your consciousness.
> You experience life as the upload.
> Two sentences that mean the same thing.
> How is it possible to be confused about this?
>

Did you read my paper? Consider some of the examples I give, such as
"Faulty Teletransporter", "Split Brains", "Trading Places", and "Bodily
Continuity or Psychological Continuity?" They highlight cases where there
are no obvious answers, and motivate a search for underlying principles of
identity.


>
> > So far you have ruled out empty-individualism. You have also ruled out
> bodily continuity versions of closed-individualism. You have vacillated on
> whether perfect identity is required for pattern identity. If you require
> perfect identity in the pattern, that is a version of closed individualism;
> however, if you loosen this to allow imperfect identity of patterns in the
> upload (after having already abandoned bodily continuity as important),
> that leads to open-individualism.
> >
> > You say this makes no sense to you. I am willing to help it make sense
> if you ask any question about anything I have said or anything that remains
> unclear.
>
> From The Internet:
> "Empty individualism is a philosophical view that suggests personal
> identity corresponds to a fixed pattern that disappears with the passage of
> time, meaning that individuals exist only as "time-slices" or moments of
> experience. This contrasts with other views like closed individualism,
> which sees personal identity as continuous over time, and open
> individualism, which posits that there is only one subject of experience
> shared by all."
>
> Nope, none of these work.


When appropriately defined they are exhaustive:

Empty: You includes only one observer moment.
Closed: You included more than one but not all observer moments.
Open: You includes all observer moments.

Since they are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, exactly one of these must
be true.


The last one in particular is self-evidently false.
>

What's your evidence?



> There is no need for a 'philosophy of personal identity'. Philosophy of
> mind is all we need. It's like saying we need both astronomy and astrology
> to make sense of the heavens.
>

They answer different questions. See the "Questions of Personal Identity"
section from my paper. You'll note that those questions are nothing like
the types of questions found in philosophy of mind.


> I think it's safe to say that I have no questions about the philosophy of
> personal identity. All I will say is that it's quite possible to put
> together words into grammatically-correct sentences that are completely
> devoid of actual meaning.
>

You're incuriousness on this topic is preventing you from you from even
trying to understand anything about the subject. That is fine, but don't
refuse to learn about it, and at the same time claim the field isn't about
anything.

Jason
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