[ExI] Uploads are self

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Mar 22, 2026, 6:11 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> I thought it might be worth giving a background to my answers to certain
> questions, as they seem to be less obvious than I think they should be.
>
> As far as I understand, we have a number of mental models that implement
> 'theory of mind': the ability to predict what other people are thinking, so
> as to better anticipate their actions. You could think of these as being
> models of other people. At some point in our evolution, we developed a
> model like this that was used to refer to 'this person' (the system
> containing the model), rather than others, so it became self-referential.
> This is what we call self-awareness, and leads us to say things like 'me',
> 'my mind', etc., and to regard ourselves as a distinct individual. (Maybe
> this is the answer to the question "How do I know I am me?").
>

Yes, words like me, now, and here, are all self-referential, or rather
indexical. They are also are apt to lead to illusions whenever one believes
they represent some privileged aspect of reality rather than just one of
many equally valid frames.

If you think "this branch" of the multiverse is the only real one (all the
others collapsed and ceased to be because you no longer see them) that
leads to the illusion of wave function collapse and the Copenhagen
interpretation (or other single universe maintaining interpretations).

Seeing through this illusion of a privileged here leads to the idea of a
multiverse where all "heres" are equally valid real, and represent there
own here to those finding themselves in them.

Likewise if you think "this time" in history is the only real one (the
others ceased to be in the past, or remain in an unrealized future) this
leads to the illusion of presentism.

Seeing through this illusion of a privileged now leads to the idea that all
"points in time" are equally real, and every point in time is its own now
to those finding themselves in them.

Finally, if you think "this consciousness experience I find myself in" (my
body, my mind, my conscious state) is the only "me" and all the rest are
others who are not you, this leads to the illusion of some unique
transtemporal identity marker tied to some particular body/mind, i.e.
closed individualism.

Seeing through this illusion that there's some transtemporal identity
marker privileging some perspectives as me, and others as not me, leads to
the idea that all conscious experiences are equally mine since every
experience is felt as though it is mine to those finding themselves within
that conscious state.


If Occam is your guiding principle, note that in every case we dispense
with an indexical illusion, we eliminate assumptions and simplify the
theory.


> "My personal identity" is another, more long-winded, way of saying the
> same thing: It's a way of referring to ourselves.
>
> So if we have a Philosophy of mind, it will naturally include this concept
> of personal identity, or self. There's no need for an additional Philosophy
> to just deal with that single aspect of minds. We don't have an additional
> 'philosophy of memory', and a 'philosophy of attention', 'philosophy of
> sensory perception', etc., etc., just as we have Geology instead of a
> collection of '-ologys' dealing separately with mountains, rivers, seabeds,
> alluvial plains, etc.
>
> Creating an extra, unnecessary field of philosophy for this particular
> aspect of the mind but not others, strikes me as motivated by dualism. I'm
> inclined to label it as a type of crypto-dualism.
>

Whether you acknowledge it or not, having a position in philosophy of
personal identity is unavoidable, once one commits to an opinion on whether
or not you survive any particular scenario.


> Just because it's a part of the mind that we are all aware of, and maybe
> give more prominence to than, say, memory mechanisms, is no more reason to
> treat it separately than the fact that mountains are tall is a reason to
> create a separate field of study for them, away from the rest of geology.
>

What tends to keep anything in philosophy is a lack of decisive empirical
experiments. In such cases, philosophy can be thought of like math: state
assumptions (like axioms in math) and then see what deductions can be drawn
(like proofs in math) and see if they lead to any absurdities (like
contradictions in math).

It is a very different approach from empiricism, but there are some
questions that empiricism can't settle.

Just a few examples:

- Do people refer to the same things (same "qualia") when they refer to
things like colors and tastes?

- How do we (or can we) know what we take to be reality is physical reality
or a simulation?

- Can other material substrates support conscious states or do they result
in unconscious automatons that merely act conscious without being so?


These are situations are beyond empirical tests because they are all tied
to limitations following from the subjective/objective divide. If we want
to deal with such questions we therefore must turn to other methods. It can
be uncomfortable for strong empiricists to even acknowledge the legitimacy
of such questions or the utility of other methods. But that doesn't stop
the questions from existing, or mattering to some people.


> There is no ghost in the machine, there's just the machine, so we do need
> to study machines, and we don't need to study ghosts.
>
> If you feel the need for a philosophy (rather than just being guided by
> what neuroscience is clearly telling us, which seems to me to be the
> sensible thing to do), then philosophy of mind is the one to take notice
> of, the other one is not needed, and as far as I can see, full of ghostly
> nonsense.
>

Once all ghosts are exorcised, when there are no physical facts, nor any
further facts to maintain some notion of a unique identity over time, then
it follows that all occurrances of minds, in whatever material, place, or
time, and having whatever content of experience, minds are then simply raw
conscious states which can be (and should be) regarded as self.

Based on everything you have said about minds and illusory notion of self,
I think your position fits best with open individualism, though I don't
think you'll ever admit that.

Jason
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