[ExI] Mind Uploads need to be near perfect

[BillK]

On Sat, 21 Mar 2026 at 20:13, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 21/03/2026 18:06, BillK wrote:
> > Following from the discussion Ben and Jason had about mind uploads, I
> asked Grok about "good enough" or "perfect". Grok discussed the 80/20 rule,
> where "good enough" and polishing it later was often the best option. But
> Grok decided that mind uploads needed to be near perfect on the first
> attempt,
>
>
> Thanks, BillK, that's actually not bad, and I'd agree with just about all
> of it.
> 'Scale Separation' is exactly what I mean when talking about 'exact'. I
> wish I'd heard the term earlier.
>
> I'd just add:
> > Many philosophers say it’s a perfect copy, not “you.”
>
> Many philosophers seem to need to actually learn something about the
> subject they're pontificating on. That statement is equivalent to an
> admission of ignorance (or a declaration of dualism, which is basically the
> same thing).
> --
> Ben
> _______________________________________________



For extra clarification, I asked Grok a follow-up question.
BillK

Question -
Assuming that non-destructive uploads are possible, if the upload was
streamed simultaneously to five different data centers, I would expect that
this would result in five entities all claiming to be "me". Of course, they
would rapidly diverge afterwards. Is this correct?


Grok 4.20 Expert -

*Yes, your expectation is exactly correct.*

Under the assumptions we’ve been discussing (non-destructive upload is
technically possible + functionalist/pattern-based views of mind/identity,
which are the mainstream position among people who take uploading
seriously), streaming the upload simultaneously to five different data
centers would produce *five distinct digital entities*, each of whom would
wake up with 100 % identical initial mental content to the pre-upload
biological you (and to each other). Therefore:

   - Each of the five would immediately and sincerely claim “I am the
   original me — the same person who existed a moment ago.”
   - The biological original (still sitting there, unchanged) would also
   still claim “I am me.”
   - So at the instant of activation you would have *six claimants*, all
   psychologically continuous with the pre-upload person, all with the exact
   same memories, beliefs, personality, and first-person perspective up to
   that millisecond.

This is the classic *fission/branching scenario* in personal-identity
philosophy, now applied to digital substrates.
Why they all claim to be “you”

The moment the five simulations start running from the same streamed state:

   - They each have your full autobiographical memory (“I went to school
   here, I love this song, I’m scared of heights, etc.”).
   - Their internal narrative is unbroken: “I decided to do the
   non-destructive upload, I’m now running in a data center… yep, still me.”
   - There is no detectable difference between them or between them and the
   biological you at t=0. Subjectively, each experiences perfect continuity.

This matches exactly what philosophers describe in nondestructive uploading
+ copying:

   - *Psychological branching identity* (Michael Cerullo, 2015): After a
   nondestructive upload, both the original brain *and* the upload(s)
   continue the stream of consciousness. Each branch has equal claim to the
   pre-upload identity. Multiple copies simply create more branches.
   - Parfit-style fission: If your brain were split and both halves
   transplanted, *both* resulting people would wake up saying “I am the
   original — I remember everything.” Neither is “the copy”; both are
   continuers. Digital copies are the information-theoretic version of the
   same puzzle.
   - Real-world analogies already accepted in the literature: split-brain
   patients, hypothetical teletransporter + no-destruction, or simply copying
   an emulation once it exists.

Rapid divergence is also guaranteed

Even if all five start identical and receive the *same* input stream at
first:

   - Different data centers = different hardware noise, slight timing
   jitter, different virtual environments/sensors, different network
   latencies, different people interacting with them, etc.
   - Within seconds to minutes, their experiences will differ → new
   memories form → personalities, opinions, and goals begin to fork.
   - After hours/days they will be as different from one another as
   identical twins raised in separate cities — still each feeling “I am the
   continuation of that original person,” but now with diverging life stories.

Exactly as you said.
Important nuances (none of which invalidate your core point)

   - *Numerical identity vs. what matters*: Strict philosophers (e.g.,
   those who insist identity must be one-to-one and non-branching) will say
   “none of them is *numerically* the original — you have six new
   continuers.” But under the views that make uploading desirable at all
   (psychological continuity + patternism), *what matters* (survival,
   first-person experience, caring about the future) successfully branches to
   all of them. Most transhumanists and Carbon Copies-style thinkers accept
   this.
   - The biological you doesn’t suddenly “lose” anything; you now simply
   have five extra versions of yourself running in parallel. You could talk to
   them, merge memories later, etc.
   - If the streaming is *live* (real-time from your biological brain), the
   five uploads are continuously fed your current thoughts/senses, so they
   stay synchronized *only* as long as their simulated environments stay
   identical — which they won’t.

This is precisely why some people prefer gradual replacement or destructive
upload (to avoid the “which one is really me?” discomfort), while others
embrace branching as a feature: “Why have one future when you can have
five?”

So yes — five entities, all claiming “I am me,” then rapidly becoming five
distinct but related people. Your intuition is spot-on and aligns with the
consensus in the uploading literature. It’s one of the most mind-bending
(and exciting) consequences of the technology.
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