[ExI] Uploads are self

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Mar 22, 2026, 10:02 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 22/03/2026 11:33, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 22, 2026, 6:11 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >
> >     I thought it might be worth giving a background to my answers to
> certain questions, as they seem to be less obvious than I think they should
> be.
> >
> >     As far as I understand, we have a number of mental models that
> implement 'theory of mind': the ability to predict what other people are
> thinking, so as to better anticipate their actions. You could think of
> these as being models of other people. At some point in our evolution, we
> developed a model like this that was used to refer to 'this person' (the
> system containing the model), rather than others, so it became
> self-referential. This is what we call self-awareness, and leads us to say
> things like 'me', 'my mind', etc., and to regard ourselves as a distinct
> individual. (Maybe this is the answer to the question "How do I know I am
> me?").
> >
> >
> > Yes, words like me, now, and here, are all self-referential, or rather
> indexical. They are also are apt to lead to illusions whenever one believes
> they represent some privileged aspect of reality rather than just one of
> many equally valid frames.
>
>
> What does 'privileged aspect of reality' mean?
>


It refers to a belief that some aspect of reality is special in a way that
others are not. E.g. believing other times or places don't exist, thinking
earth is the center of the universe, thinking only certain bodies can be
the center of your subjective experience.


> How can "me" represent one of many equally valid frames? (and what do you
> mean by 'frame'?)
>

I clarify this below.



>
> > If you think "this branch" of the multiverse is the only real one (all
> the others collapsed and ceased to be because you no longer see them) that
> leads to the illusion of wave function collapse and the Copenhagen
> interpretation (or other single universe maintaining interpretations).
>
>
> I don't have any opinions about the multiverse. Maybe it means something,
> maybe not, maybe what it means actually exists, maybe not. I don't know,
> and don't really care. Let's leave the multiverse out of things.
>

You need not adopt any position here, it is only an example to illustrate
the power of what I call indexical illusions. Many physicists today remain
stuck in single universe interpretations, even though they make no sense
physically (the equations tell rather plainly that QM is a multiverse
theory) but they feel compelled to add the further uneccessry assumption
that those other branches, which they can't see from this branch, ceased to
be.

I have a pet theory that this is a hold over from how "object permanence"
has to be learned by experience.


>
> > Likewise if you think "this time" in history is the only real one (the
> others ceased to be in the past, or remain in an unrealized future) this
> leads to the illusion of presentism.
>
>
> I don't know what this even means.
>

The definitions in this article should help:
https://iep.utm.edu/time/#H14

There are also Wikipedia articles:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_presentism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternalism_(philosophy_of_time)

Essentially it is a question in the philosophy of time whether all points
in time exist (and the flow of time is a subjective phenomenon) or whether
the flow of time is objectively real, and the present is an objective
parameter of the universe.

The philosophy of time is a rare example where a final resolution to this
paradox came out of fundamental physics:

"I conclude that the problem of the reality and the determinateness of
future events is now solved. Moreover it is solved by physics and not by
philosophy. We have learned that we live in a four-dimensional and not a
three-dimensional world, and that space and time–or, better, space-like
separations and time-like separations–are just two aspects of a single
four-dimensional continuum."
-- Hilary Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry (1967)



>
> > Finally, if you think "this consciousness experience I find myself in"
> (my body, my mind, my conscious state) is the only "me" and all the rest
> are others who are not you, this leads to the illusion of some unique
> transtemporal identity marker tied to some particular body/mind, i.e.
> closed individualism.
>
>
> I reject dualism, so "this consciousness experience I find myself in" is a
> misleading statement. What it translates to is "I".
> "I am the only me" is a sentence, I can admit that, but so is "What's the
> difference between a duck?". I can understand "I=I", although there's
> absolutely no need to or point in stating it.
>
> "transtemporal identity marker" seems to be a fancy way of saying
> "oneself". I think (could you bring yourself, do you think, to use plain
> ordinary language instead of these florid and confusing phrases?).
> "Transtemporal", meaning 'through time', contributes nothing, because
> nobody exists only for one single moment of time (one planck time), then
> ceases to exist. (And if you're going to ask "How do you know?", I'm going
> to ignore it).
>

Once there is the notion of the *same self* existing *across times*, and
*across consciousness states* then you can no longer say such things like
"I am the only me" because what you mean by "I" is something different from
moment to moment.

You can be consistent in saying "I am the only me" if you reject
transtemporal identity, and limit oneself to only a single conscious state
in a single moment in time. This is empty individualism.

Given that you reject this position, saying "nobody exists only for one
single moment of time" then the question that follows is: what must be
preserved for one to survive from one moment to the next?



> "Tied to some particular body/mind", well that's another non-sequitur. The
> self-referential agent model that is the cause of 'I' has to exist in a
> mind, and bodies (or at least one bodily organ) are necessary for the
> production of minds.
>
> So you seem to be saying that "I=I" (which is just "I") is an illusion
> (I'm not arguing with that, but I suppose it depends on your definition of
> 'illusion'. Daniel Dennet says that consciousness is an illusion, as well),
> and that this is called 'closed individualism'.
>
> So 'closed individualism' is a fancy way of saying 'I exist'. Ok.
>

Closed individualism is a way of saying:
"I _exist_ in *these* conscious moments but I _don't exist_ in *these
other* consciousness moments."

Closed individualism is thereby privileging some conscious moments as
special (saying only some are associated with I).

This privileging is what I am calling out as based on an illusion, in the
same way some privileged the present moment in time over all other equally
valid and equally real points in time (or rather, slices through spacetime).


>
> > Seeing through this illusion that there's some transtemporal identity
> marker privileging some perspectives as me, and others as not me, leads to
> the idea that all conscious experiences are equally mine since every
> experience is felt as though it is mine to those finding themselves within
> that conscious state.
>
>
> 'Seeing through "I exist"'? I don't know what to make of that.
>

No, seeing through the illusion there some conscious experiences are
privileged.


> I think you're now saying that because there's me, and there's other
> people, that leads to the idea that I can experience what those other
> people experience, because I have my own experiences, and each of the other
> people has their own experiences.
>
> Can you now see why I think this is nonsense? It's just playing with words.


I agree that what you type above is nonsense. I don't know how to make
sense of it. It is not a position I am defending.

What I am saying is the self vs. other distinction is illusory. It is based
on the idea that of the set of all conscious experiences, only some of them
are blessed with the label as "mine."

You acknowledge that duplicates, in different bodies, with different
contents of experience, different recent memories, etc. can all validly be
regarded as self, that their experiences are your experiences. Given this
flexibility, by what rule do you distinguish (out of the set of all
possible experiences) are the ones that belong to you vs. the experiences
that don't belong to you?

Open-individualism is the view that there is no such rule, nor is there any
need of one. It is an unnecessary additional assumption that adds nothing
to the theory, and which the theory neither needs nor asks for.


Because each person can say the same thing (I experience things) there is
> only one I?
>
> We could also say that because there are many shiny things, there is only
> one shinyness. It would be wrong, of course, but we could say it.
>

I heard this analogy which might be instructive: "We are the flame, not the
candles."
There may be many candles out there in the world, but the flame on each of
them is a common trait in all of them.

I think that analogy helps explain what I am saying:

Across reality, there are many bodies, many minds, and many conscious
states. But what is common to each of them is that each is experienced as
directly and as vividly as the conscious experience you are having right
now. Other experiences have different contents and contexts, but they all
have this property of direct and immediate apprehension, they are thus
equally privileged as centers of experience. Try each have within them what
is required to be "I".


>
> > If Occam is your guiding principle, note that in every case we dispense
> with an indexical illusion, we eliminate assumptions and simplify the
> theory.
>
>
> There's more than one 'indexical illusion'?
> You need to explain what that actually means, because I don't know.
>

Presentist theories of time
Collapse theories of QM
Closed individualism theories of self

These are all cases of indexical illusions.
I explained each of these at the beginning of this email.


>
> >
> >     "My personal identity" is another, more long-winded, way of saying
> the same thing: It's a way of referring to ourselves.
> >
> >     So if we have a Philosophy of mind, it will naturally include this
> concept of personal identity, or self. There's no need for an additional
> Philosophy to just deal with that single aspect of minds. We don't have an
> additional 'philosophy of memory', and a 'philosophy of attention',
> 'philosophy of sensory perception', etc., etc., just as we have Geology
> instead of a collection of '-ologys' dealing separately with mountains,
> rivers, seabeds, alluvial plains, etc.
> >
> >     Creating an extra, unnecessary field of philosophy for this
> particular aspect of the mind but not others, strikes me as motivated by
> dualism. I'm inclined to label it as a type of crypto-dualism.
> >
> >
> > Whether you acknowledge it or not, having a position in philosophy of
> personal identity is unavoidable, once one commits to an opinion on whether
> or not you survive any particular scenario.
>
>
> Only if you acknowledge the validity of 'philosophy of personal identity'
> in the first place.
> If I think that the positions in this philosophy are silly, I'm obviously
> not going to adhere to any of them.
>

Thwn you are like someone who decides to buy an airplane ticket without any
appreciation of the theory of lift & gravity. Such a person can of course
fly quite safely without a second thought about lift or gravity, but the
point of my essay is for those afraid of flying, who need theoretical
justification for why they can expect to reach their intended destination
safely.

Since you believe you can survive the trip, you implicitly have an opinion
relating to this theory, but you are content in not wading into the details
of the theory. That's fine, most airline passengers don't concern
themselves with such things. But as pioneers of a new field, I think it is
prudent to establish at least some theoretical groundwork before people
risk their lives and futures on such technology.


>
> >
> >     Just because it's a part of the mind that we are all aware of, and
> maybe give more prominence to than, say, memory mechanisms, is no more
> reason to treat it separately than the fact that mountains are tall is a
> reason to create a separate field of study for them, away from the rest of
> geology.
> >
> >
> > What tends to keep anything in philosophy is a lack of decisive
> empirical experiments.
> ...
> > It is a very different approach from empiricism, but there are some
> questions that empiricism can't settle.
> >
> > Just a few examples:
> >
> > - Do people refer to the same things (same "qualia") when they refer to
> things like colors and tastes?
>
>
> We can't know.
>

Not by empirical means, but there are a number of good rational arguments.


>
> > - How do we (or can we) know what we take to be reality is physical
> reality or a simulation?
>
>
> We can't know.
>

Not by empirical means, but there are a number of good rational arguments.


>
> > - Can other material substrates support conscious states or do they
> result in unconscious automatons (sic) that merely act conscious without
> being so?
>
>
> Strictly speaking, we don't know, but logically, we know that
> philosophical zombies can't exist.
>

Yes, now you are seeing the utility of rational arguments!

We can't empirically detect zombies, but we can by way of rational
argument, rule them out. Thus we use philosophy to justify our belief in
substrate indifference.


When we do have minds running in non-biological substrates, we will be in
> the same position as we are now with regard to other people.
>
>
> > These are situations are beyond empirical tests because they are all
> tied to limitations following from the subjective/objective divide. If we
> want to deal with such questions
>
>
> You can't 'deal with' questions that are inherently undecidable. All you
> can do is either demonstrate that they are decidable after all, or leave
> them alone (ok, you can play games with them, see below).
>

Undecidability is an extremely apt comparison!

The same Godelean gap between what is provable is also a case of a
subjective limitation (operating from within the vantage point and confines
of a particular mathematical system). This same gap isn't the root of most
of the empirically unprovable situations I named:

Since you are trapped in your own subjectively, you can't escape yourself
to see the qualia of another.

Since you are trapped in your own subjectivity, you can't wake an outside
view to confirm reality is what your senses tell you it is.

Since you are tapped in your own subjectivity, you can't directly see the
minds that maybe may not be present in other substrates.



>
> >  we therefore must turn to other methods. It can be uncomfortable for
> strong empiricists to even acknowledge the legitimacy of such questions or
> the utility of other methods. But that doesn't stop the questions from
> existing, or mattering to some people.
>
>
> Ok, I get that. People want to know stuff, even if the stuff is
> unknowable. Enter a human ability called 'imagination'. Aka 'fantasy'.
> It doesn't actually solve anything, but it can make people happier.
>

You relied on philosophy to arrive at the opinion of substrate
indifference, and thus are making the bet that you can survive as an upload.

Why then, do you think other rational leaps cannot be made for the other
questions I listed? Consider Bostrom's simulation argument. It is a purely
rational and mathematical based means to calculate the probability that one
exists in a simulation. This is something that can't be determined
empirically, but he showed it can be calculated and estimated using a few
basic assumptions.

Consider also the Dancing Qualia and Hemispheric Visual Cortex replacement
arguments (in my essay) and how they rationally establish the sameness of
qualia between two functionally equivalent minds made of different
substrates.

Again this is breakthrough which wasn't established by an objective
empirical test, but simply by rational thought alone.



>
> >
> >     There is no ghost in the machine, there's just the machine, so we do
> need to study machines, and we don't need to study ghosts.
> >
> >     If you feel the need for a philosophy (rather than just being guided
> by what neuroscience is clearly telling us, which seems to me to be the
> sensible thing to do), then philosophy of mind is the one to take notice
> of, the other one is not needed, and as far as I can see, full of ghostly
> nonsense.
> >
> >
> > Once all ghosts are exorcised, when there are no physical facts
>
>
>  ... there's nothing left.
>
>
> > , nor any further facts to maintain some notion of a unique identity
> over time, then it follows that all occurrances of minds, in whatever
> material, place, or time, and having whatever content of experience, minds
> are then simply raw conscious states which can be (and should be) regarded
> as self.
>
>
> What's a 'raw conscious state'? We're not talking about pan-psychism here,
> are we?


No.

I don't /think/ so, but best to make sure.
> Is it 'immaterial consciousness'?
>

No. I just mean, consider the conscious state, free of any external
attachments of specific identities or selves.

And don't confuse 'consciousness' with 'self'. They are different things.
> There are creatures that display no sense of self that are still conscious
> (being conscious of other things, but not of themselves), as far as we can
> tell.
>

True.


> Self-awareness requires a self-referential model of an agent (e.g. a
> person, or a creature). Consciousness doesn't.
>

Yes I agree.


>
> > Based on everything you have said about minds and illusory notion of
> self, I think your position fits best with open individualism, though I
> don't think you'll ever admit that.
>
>
> Hm, I'd have thought my position fits best with 'closed individualism' (I
> exist), based on the above. Even though it's totally silly, at least it's
> coherent, unlike the rest.
>

I would have put you there, except that in several cases you acknowledge
surviving beyond a single moment in time.

I agree that empty-individualism is more consistent than
closed-individualism. It avoids most of the problems closed-individualism
gets into. The primary advantage then that open-individualism has over
empty- is the probability arguments.

Jason
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