[ExI] Uploads are self

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Mar 24, 2026, 7:24 AM John Clark via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 21/03/2026 21:19, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> * > Functionalism is a theory in the philosophy of mind. If one accepts
>> functionalism, then that is enough to establish the uploaded mind will be
>> conscious.*
>>
>
> *Yes. And an implicit belief in functionalism is the reason you feel
> certain that solipsism is untrue and your fellow human beings are
> conscious, except when they are sleeping or under anesthesia or dead. *
>

I would say that strictly speaking functionalism isn't enough to escape
solipsism, which also requires an ontological claim (e.g., that other
people I see are real with functional brains of their own, rather than
figments of my imagination). But functionalism could perhaps be used to
argue that even if they were figments of your imagination, then at a
certain point of accuracy, your brain generating a simulation of their
behavior would invoke something like a functional process that emulates
(and thus generates) their mind.


> * > But functionalism is silent on the question of which experiences
>> instantiated in which places are experience[s] you can expect to be yours.*
>>
>
> *No, and when discussing this topic great care is needed in the use of
> personal pronouns. According to functionalism the "you" of yesterday is the
> "you" who says he remembers being the "you" of yesterday. And yes, if two
> beings are able to do that then they are both the "you" of yesterday.*
>

Then you are assuming more than just functionalism. You're subscribing to a
memory-based theory of personal identity. This is common, but by no means
universal. There are functionalists who would consider as plausible,
surviving through amnesia.

* Using this procedure one can always look back through time and see a
> continuous chain of "yous", but trying to do this into the future does
> not work, it would be like pushing on a string.*
>

It works fine. You just aren't using your imagination. Setup a thought
experiment to jump forward in time. Then you can apply your rearward-facing
identity comparison function on this future state. If it matches then you
can infer that indeed, this current you is linked to this future you. This
you can make predictions using it.

After all, what good is a theory that can't make predictions?

* As Hugh Everett said in his original PhD thesis that introduced the Many
> Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, it would be like asking which
> one was the real original amoeba after it reproduced by dividing in two. *
>

That's a different problem. In the amoeba case (like a split
teletransporter case) there is no unique original, for both have an equal
claim.

But note that personal identity theories don't all demand unique
individuals. Many theories of personal identity are fine with saying both
amoebae are the same amoeba, or that both results of a splitting
teletransporter are equally the same person.


> *And if you reject functionalism then you'd need to take the idea that
> you're the only conscious being in the universe seriously. Do you really
> want to do that? *
>

There are many routes to and out of solipsism, but they're are largely
independent of any assumptions in philosophy of mind.

Jason

>
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