[ExI] Uploads are self

Tue Mar 24 20:54:11 UTC 2026

On Tue, Mar 24, 2026 at 9:20 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

* >>> Functionalism is a theory in the philosophy of mind. If one accepts
>>> functionalism, then that is enough to establish the uploaded mind will be
>>> conscious.*
>>>
>>
>> *>> Yes. And an implicit belief in functionalism is the reason you feel
>> certain that solipsism is untrue and your fellow human beings are
>> conscious, except when they are sleeping or under anesthesia or dead. *
>>
>
> *> I would say that strictly speaking functionalism isn't enough to escape
> solipsism, which also requires an ontological claim (e.g., that other
> people I see are real with functional brains of their own, rather than
> figments of my imagination).*
>

*But then you would have no reason to believe that your fellow human beings
were more likely to be conscious than an intelligent electronic machine.  *

*> But functionalism could perhaps be used to argue that even if they were
> figments of your imagination, then at a certain point of accuracy, your
> brain generating a simulation of their behavior would invoke something like
> a functional process that emulates (and thus generates) their mind.*
>

*Good point.  *

* >>> But functionalism is silent on the question of which experiences
>>> instantiated in which places are experience[s] you can expect to be yours.*
>>>
>>
>> *>>No, and when discussing this topic great care is needed in the use of
>> personal pronouns. According to functionalism the "you" of yesterday is the
>> "you" who says he remembers being the "you" of yesterday. And yes, if two
>> beings are able to do that then they are both the "you" of yesterday.*
>>
>
> *>Then you are assuming more than just functionalism. You're subscribing
> to a memory-based theory of personal identity. This is common, but by no
> means universal. There are functionalists who would consider as plausible,
> surviving through amnesia.*
>

*If personal survival is possible even with permanent amnesia (I'm
very skeptical  but for the sake of argument let's pretend it's true) then
memory would be sufficient but not necessary; so although there may be
others, the "you" who says he remembers being the "you" of yesterday would
still be one of the"yous" of today. *

* >> Using this procedure one can always look back through time and see a
>> continuous chain of "yous", but trying to do this into the future does
>> not work, it would be like pushing on a string.*
>>
>
> *> It works fine.You just aren't using your imagination. Setup a thought
> experiment to jump forward in time. Then you can apply your rearward-facing
> identity comparison function on this future state. If it matches then you
> can infer that indeed, this current you is linked to this future you.*
>

*You are in London in a duplicating chamber which will instantly send exact
copies of you to Helsinki and Moscow, you close your eyes and push the
"start" button. What one city will "you" see when "you" open your
eyes? Note that I am not asking what will Jason Resch see, the answer to
that is clearly London, Helsinki, and Moscow; instead I am asking
what one city will "you" see when "you" open "your" eyes? All three beings
are absolutely positively 100% certain that they are Jason Resch and are
not shy about saying so. But which one is "you"? *

 > This you can make predictions using it.

*No you cannot! Before the experiment you cannot answer the question, you
cannot predict if the real "you" will end up being in London, Helsinki or
Moscow. In fact it's even worse than that, even AFTER the experiment is
over it's STILL impossible to say if the correct answer would've been
London or Helsinki or Moscow. And that tells me that the reason the
question can't be answered is because it's not a question, it's gibberish.
It takes more than a question mark to turn a string of symbols into a
question, it's like asking what city will klogknee be in? Gibberish. *

> *> After all, what good is a theory that can't make predictions?*
>

*A theory that can not make a prediction or even a postdiction is of no use
whatsoever. So your theory of personal identity must be wrong.  *

> * >> As Hugh Everett said in his original PhD thesis that introduced the
>> Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, it would be like asking
>> which one was the real original amoeba after it reproduced by dividing in
>> two. *
>>
>
> *> That's a different problem. In the amoeba case (like a split
> teletransporter case) there is no unique original, for both have an equal
> claim.*
>

*Why, just before you enter the transporter/duplicator chamber, are you
more original than the amoeba just before it duplicated itself? For that
matter what's so original about either of you? Atoms are constantly
entering and leaving the bodies of both of you, not that it would matter
even if they did not because atoms do not have your names scratched on
them; carbon atoms are generic, according to science one carbon atom
behaves the same way as any other carbon atom. The only difference between
you and me is the way our atoms are arranged.  *

*>>And if you reject functionalism then you'd need to take the idea that
>> you're the only conscious being in the universe seriously. Do you really
>> want to do that? *
>>
>
> *> There are many routes to and out of solipsism, but they're are largely
> independent of any assumptions in philosophy of mind.*
>

*And there is a word for ideas that don't care about how the mind manages
to do what it can do and only cares about what it actually does, and that
word is "functionalism ". *

*About 15 years ago I wrote a post to this list on a somewhat related
topic, I repeat it here: *
===

I have a personal problem and I need some advice. A month ago I finished my
matter duplicating machine. It can find the position and velocity of every
atom in a human being to the limit imposed by Heisenberg's law. It can then
use this information to construct a copy of the person and it does it all
in a fraction of a second and without harming the original in any way. You
may be surprised that I was able to build such a complicated machine, but
you wouldn't be if you knew how good I am with my hands. The birdhouse I
made is simply lovely and I have all the latest tools from Sears.

I was a little nervous but last week I decided to test the machine by
duplicating myself. I walked into the chamber, it filled with smoke (damn
those old radio shack capacitors) there was a flash of light, and then 3
feet to my left was a man who looked exactly like me. It was at that
instant that the full realization of the terrible thing I did hit me. I
yelled "This is monstrous, there can only be one of me!", the other guy
yelled exactly the same thing. I thought he was trying to mock me, so I
reached for my 44 magnum that I always carry with me (I wonder why people
think I'm strange) and pointed it at my double. I noted with alarm that my
double also had a gun and he was pointing it at me. I shouted "You don't
have the guts to pull the trigger, but I do!". Again he mimicked my words
and did so in perfect synchronization, this made me even more angry and I
pulled the trigger, he did too. My gun went off but due to a random quantum
fluctuation his gun jammed. I buried him in my backyard.

Now after time has passed my anger has cooled and I can think more clearly
I've had some pangs of guilt about killing a living creature, but that's
not what really torments me. How do I know I'm not the copy? I feel exactly
the same as before, but would a copy feel different? Actually there is a
way to be certain, I have an old VHS video tape of the entire experiment.
My memory is that the copy first appeared 3 feet to my LEFT, if the tape
shows the original walking into the chamber and the copy materializing 3
feet to his RIGHT, then I would know that I am the copy. But I'm afraid to
look at the tape, should I be? If I found out I was the copy what should I
do? I suppose I should mourn the death of John K Clark, but how can I, I'm
not dead. If I am the copy would that mean that I have no real past and my
life is meaningless? Is it important, or should I just burn the tape and
forget all about it?

John K Clark
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