[ExI] I hate to say it but, I agree with Trump

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 5, 2026 at 3:48 PM <spike at rainier66.com> wrote:

*> Iran has been refining uranium for some time, over the objection of
> Israel and the USA.  It isn’t difficult to understand why*


*You're right it isn't difficult to understand why Iran has accelerated its
nuclear program so much, and the blame for that can be placed entirely on
King Donald because he killed the Iran nuclear deal (also called the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) during his first term on May 8,
2018. Don't believe me? Well let's see what our old friend Mr.Grok has to
say.*
*===*

*Me: Please compare the amount of uranium 235 that Iran had enriched by May
8 2018 when Trump killed the Iran nuclear deal, with the amount it had
enriched just before the start of the Iran war.*

*Grok: "**In May 2018 (around the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8),
Iran had a small stockpile of low-enriched uranium under strict limits;
just before the June 2025 Iran-Israel/US conflict (the “Twelve-Day War”
starting ~June 13), it had a vastly larger and higher-enriched stockpile.*
May 2018 (IAEA verification around the Trump withdrawal)

   - *Iran was complying with JCPOA limits*. Enrichment was capped at *3.67%
   U-235*.
   - As of *14 May 2018*, the stockpile of uranium enriched up to 3.67%
   U-235 was *123.9 kg* (uranium mass). This consisted of ~110.4 kg as UF₆
   plus smaller amounts in oxides, fuel, and scrap.
   - The overall JCPOA limit was 300 kg of UF₆ (≈202.8 kg uranium mass) at
   ≤3.67%. Iran was well below this and had no higher-enriched material under
   the deal.
   - This was *far below the amount needed for a single bomb’s worth of
   weapons-grade* material if further enriched.

Just before the start of the 2025 conflict (IAEA estimates as of 13 June
2025)

Military attacks began on/around 13 June 2025. The IAEA’s last
verified/estimated figures before that (drawing on Iranian declarations,
inspections up to 12 June, and production estimates) showed:

   - *Total enriched uranium stockpile*: ≈ *9,875 kg* (uranium mass; ≈9,040
   kg as UF₆ + ~834 kg in other forms).
   - Breakdown of the main UF₆ portion (uranium mass):
      - Up to 2% U-235: ≈2,391 kg
      - Up to 5% U-235: ≈6,024 kg
      - Up to 20% U-235: ≈184 kg
      - Up to *60% U-235*: ≈*441 kg*
   - The 60% material (near weapons-grade; only a short further enrichment
   step to ~90%) alone was theoretically enough, if further enriched, for
   multiple bombs by common IAEA/yardstick estimates (~42 kg of 60% material ≈
   one bomb’s worth of potential).

Comparison

   - *Quantity*: *From ~124 kg of ≤3.67% material in May 2018 to nearly 10
   tonnes total enriched uranium* (of which hundreds of kg were at 20% and
   60%) by mid-June 2025 — an increase of roughly *80-fold* in total
   enriched uranium mass.
   - *Quality/enrichment level*: 2018 material was all low-enriched
   reactor-grade (≤3.67%). By 2025 Iran had large holdings at 5%, significant
   20%, and a substantial near-weapons-grade (60%) stockpile that did not
   exist under the JCPOA.
   - *Context*: After the 2018 U.S. withdrawal and reimposition of
   sanctions, Iran gradually exceeded JCPOA limits starting in 2019 (higher
   enrichment, larger stockpiles, more advanced centrifuges). By early–mid
   2025 the program had expanded dramatically. Post-June 2025 strikes and
   reduced IAEA access, the exact status/location of the pre-war stockpile
   became unverified.

These figures are uranium mass (not UF₆ mass) from IAEA reports and
consistent secondary analyses. “Amount of uranium-235” in public discussion
usually refers to the mass of the *enriched uranium product* (which
contains the stated % of the isotope U-235), not the pure isotope mass
alone. Pure U-235 content would be a fraction of the above totals (e.g.,
roughly 3.67% of the 2018 stockpile vs. a weighted average of the much
higher 2025 percentages)."

===

*Me: Is there any evidence that Iran violated the JCPOA (also called the
Iran nuclear deal) before May 8, 2018?*

*Grok: "**No significant evidence of material violations of the JCPOA’s
nuclear restrictions by Iran before May 8, 2018.* The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), which was responsible for verifying and monitoring
Iran’s compliance, repeatedly confirmed that Iran was implementing its
nuclear-related commitments under the deal from Implementation Day (January
16, 2016) through the period leading up to the U.S. withdrawal.
Key points from IAEA and official assessments

   - *Quarterly IAEA reports* (from 2016 through the May/June 2018 report
   covering the period around the withdrawal) consistently stated that Iran
   was abiding by the limits on uranium enrichment levels (≤3.67% U-235),
   enriched uranium stockpile size (≤300 kg UF₆ or equivalent), centrifuge
   numbers and types, heavy water stockpile (≤130 metric tons), research
   reactor redesign, reprocessing bans, and related restrictions. Access and
   monitoring under the Additional Protocol and JCPOA-specific measures were
   also ongoing.
   - The IAEA report finalized around late May 2018 (the first after the
   U.S. announcement) reaffirmed compliance on these points, with the
   low-enriched uranium stockpile at about 123.9 kg (well under the limit) as
   of mid-May 2018.
   - Contemporary statements from the U.S. State Department (under both
   Obama and early Trump administrations), the EU, other JCPOA participants
   (UK, France, Germany, Russia, China), and the UN Security Council framework
   under Resolution 2231 aligned with the IAEA’s findings of Iranian
   compliance with the nuclear terms up to that point.

Minor/temporary issues sometimes cited

Iran briefly exceeded the heavy water stockpile limit of 130 metric tons on
two occasions in 2016 (shortly after Implementation Day). In both cases,
the excess was small, and Iran promptly shipped out enough material to
return below the limit. These were resolved without being treated as
ongoing or significant non-compliance by the IAEA or the JCPOA Joint
Commission.

Other critiques raised by the Trump administration or critics (e.g., claims
about the “spirit” of the deal, ballistic missiles, regional activities, or
alleged intimidation of inspectors) fell outside the JCPOA’s specific
nuclear restrictions and verification scope. T*he IAEA did not report that
Iran was blocking required access or failing its core nuclear commitments
prior to May 2018*. Some later U.S. statements after withdrawal
retroactively characterized Iran’s pre-deal history or the deal’s structure
itself as problematic, but these do not constitute evidence of JCPOA
violations during the period the deal was being implemented by Iran.

In short, the authoritative verification body (IAEA) and the other parties
to the agreement *found Iran in compliance with the JCPOA’s nuclear
provisions before the U.S. withdrawal*. Iran’s clear, successive breaches
of the enrichment and stockpile limits began in mid-2019, after the U.S.
exit and the reimposition of sanctions."

===

*Don't believe Grok? Want a second opinion? OK I'll give Mr. GPT the exact
same command: *

*ME: **Please compare the amount of uranium 235 that Iran had enriched by
May 8 2018 when Trump killed the Iran nuclear deal, with the amount it had
enriched just before the start of the Iran war.*

*GPT*: "There is a *very large difference*, both in the amount of enriched
uranium and, even more importantly, in its enrichment level.

One complication is that the IAEA does *not have a verified inventory
immediately before the 2026 Iran war*. The latest reliable pre-war figure
comes from the IAEA's estimate as of *June 13, 2025*, before the
U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities. The IAEA subsequently
lost access to the affected facilities.
The comparison
May 2018 Just before the 2025 attacks / current war period
Enriched uranium *123.9 kg* *9,874.9 kg* total
Uranium enriched to ~60% *0 kg* *440.9 kg*
Highest enrichment *3.67%* *60%*
Approx. amount of U-235 in the highest-enriched material ~*4.5 kg* ~*265 kg*

The May 2018 figure is from the IAEA report covering the period around
Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA. *On May 14, just six days after May 8,
the IAEA measured 123.9 kg of uranium enriched to 3.67% U-235. Iran had not
enriched above 3.67%.*

*By June 13, 2025, the IAEA estimated Iran possessed 9,874.9 kg of enriched
uranium in all forms.* Of that, *440.9 kg was enriched to as much as 60%
U-235*, with another 184.1 kg at up to 20%, 6,024.4 kg at up to 5%, and
2,391.1 kg at up to 2%.
But here's the really striking part

If by "amount of uranium-235" you literally mean the *U-235 isotope itself*,
rather than the total mass of uranium that has been enriched, the
difference is even more dramatic.

*In 2018: 123.9 kg × 3.67% ≈ 4.55 kg of U-235*

*In 2025: 440.9 kg × 60% ≈ 264.5 kg of U-235*

*So the amount of U-235 contained in Iran's 60%-enriched stockpile was
roughly 58 times greater than the entire U-235 content of the
3.67%-enriched stockpile in May 2018.*

And there is an important distinction here: Iran's *total enriched-uranium
inventory* went from roughly *124 kg in May 2018 to nearly 9.9 metric
tons in June 2025—about 80 times as much material.*

*The quality of the material changed enormously too. Going from 3.67% to
60%* isn't a small incremental improvement: 60% enrichment is already most
of the way, in terms of separative work, toward the roughly 90% enrichment
normally associated with weapons-grade uranium.

So, in a nutshell:

*May 2018:* ~124 kg of uranium at ≤3.67% enrichment, essentially none at
high enrichment.
*June 2025:* ~9,875 kg total enriched uranium, including *440.9 kg at up to
60% enrichment*.

And that *440.9 kg figure is the number that has been at the center of the
nuclear concern during the war*. The IAEA says it has not been able to
establish what happened to that material after the 2025 attacks.

*  John K Clark*
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