[ExI] My theory of consciousness

[Ben Zaiboc]

Jason Resch wrote:
> from the level of perspective of a program running on a computer, there is an abstract level below that program to which changes of implementation are invisible. A program may be able to read variables in its scope, but it can't tell how those values are physically implemented, it can't read outside it's address space, it can't tell if it's running on an emulator or not. It is trapped within a particular causal structure beyond which certain information has no way to get to or otherwise influence it. This is an epistemic firewall, and it nearly allows us to define what facts can or can't be relevant to the process at the level of the process.
>
> By considering the conscious state as a computational process, we can make a similar determination of what facts are able to enter and influence that conscious state, and this sets a minimum level of detail that a brain scan must capture and that a brain emulation must emulate to preserve the same character of consciousness.


I don't see how the second paragraph follows from the first.

You're saying that a process can't access what underlies it, so for example we can't perceive the workings of our neurons, an addition operation has no information about whether it's being performed on an abacus or a computer, etc.

Then you say that this sets a minimum level of detail that must be captured in a brain scan. How? I don't see how one has any bearing on the other.

Knowing that a mind can't directly access the workings of the neurons that give rise to it doesn't give us any information about how exact an emulation of the neurons must be in order to recreate the mind. We are just as blind to the structure of neural circuitry as we are to the activation of individual synapses, so we still don't know whether it's necessary to emulate each synapse, or just the overall circuitry.
-- 
Ben