[ExI] My theory of consciousness

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Sep 25, 2026, 4:38 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> Jason Resch wrote:
> > from the level of perspective of a program running on a computer, there
> is an abstract level below that program to which changes of implementation
> are invisible. A program may be able to read variables in its scope, but it
> can't tell how those values are physically implemented, it can't read
> outside it's address space, it can't tell if it's running on an emulator or
> not. It is trapped within a particular causal structure beyond which
> certain information has no way to get to or otherwise influence it. This is
> an epistemic firewall, and it nearly allows us to define what facts can or
> can't be relevant to the process at the level of the process.
> >
> > By considering the conscious state as a computational process, we can
> make a similar determination of what facts are able to enter and influence
> that conscious state, and this sets a minimum level of detail that a brain
> scan must capture and that a brain emulation must emulate to preserve the
> same character of consciousness.
>
>
> I don't see how the second paragraph follows from the first.
>
> You're saying that a process can't access what underlies it, so for
> example we can't perceive the workings of our neurons, an addition
> operation has no information about whether it's being performed on an
> abacus or a computer, etc.
>

Yes, every process has an underlying interface (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interface_(computing) ), so from the point of
view of that process, there are only certain things that can make a
difference to it.


> Then you say that this sets a minimum level of detail that must be
> captured in a brain scan. How? I don't see how one has any bearing on the
> other.
>

Here is an example in computing that I think illustrates it cleanly. Let's
say you found a computer that does your taxes. You inspect this computer at
various layers from its circuits and transistors to its programming code up
to the high level UI it presents on screen.

During your investigation you find the tax program is written in Java and
runs on a Java virtual machine, which provides a well defined interface. It
allows you to run this same program on very different hardware, by
replacing the JVM with another suited for that different processor.

The program can't tell that the hardware beneath that JVM interface has
changed because there's no difference it can access that makes a a
difference for it.

In the theory of consciousness I defend in the paper, this inability to
make a difference or possible distinction at the layer of a conscious mind
process is operating at implies there can be no difference in awareness for
that process, its internal behaviors at that level will be unchanged and so
I argue it's consciousness must be unchanged as well.

Now determining where this level is for the brain is not trivial, but I
give a procedure in the paper for how it could begin. My hunch is it would
be somewhere above where the reliable computational units/components of the
brain start to begin.


> Knowing that a mind can't directly access the workings of the neurons that
> give rise to it doesn't give us any information about how exact an
> emulation of the neurons must be in order to recreate the mind.


But that is part of it. We identify ALL the things a mind is unable to
access from its formal description as a process. All those things sit
outside anything that makes a difference to what that process knows, and
hence are details that can't affect the mind state. Then we also will know
all the things that can and do make a difference to the high level mind
state. That is the level of detail that brain scans must include and that
emulations must emulate.


We are just as blind to the structure of neural circuitry as we are to the
> activation of individual synapses,


These are empirical problems to be solved to be sure. But note we presently
also lack a theoretical basis for deciding which details matter for
consciousness. Even if we had a complete understanding of neurons and
synapses, we still need a theory of consciousness to guide us in
determining whether we have to simulate neurons down to the molecular scale
or not, or just their coarse spiking behavior, or perhaps we can even take
shortcuts and get away with just simulating the high level input and output
behavior of cortical columns.


so we still don't know whether it's necessary to emulate each synapse, or
> just the overall circuitry.
>

Exactly, and this is why a theory of consciousness that offers these
answers will be necessary before we make any promises of ressurecting
someone via mind uploading.

We might accidentally ressurect someone whose consciousness is not quite
the same as it was before.

Jason
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