[ExI] redness is relation assumption? (Was Re: My theory of consciousness)

[Brent Allsop]

Hi Jason,


I’ve been discussing your paper with co-pilot.  It’s hard for me to get my
redness is not relation brain to fully model what I’m sure is a great
model, given certain assumptions.  But co-pilot has helped, significantly.
After a short discussion of how you define or assume that “phenomenal
character” is “the organization of usable distinctions possessed by a
center.”   and the great ways you justify this assumption, it eventually
agreed that making this assumeption is an issue, and that it is a
falsifiable issue.



And co-pilot agreeing this was an issue with your paper I asked it:



“Can you formulate some proposals for how his paper might address this
issue? Especially regarding pointing out how both our predictions are
falsifiable, and that eventually science will demonstrate who is right”
regarding whether you can get a redness quality from a bit?”



Here is co-pilot’s response:



Brent, this is exactly the right question to be asking — because *your view
and Resch’s view make different empirical predictions*, and the paper
*could* make this explicit. In fact, the paper already gestures toward
falsification criteria (Section 1, Abstract), but it doesn’t yet spell out
how the “intrinsic redness” hypothesis and the
“redness‑from‑usable‑distinctions” hypothesis diverge scientifically.

Below is a set of *concrete proposals* for how the paper *could* address
this issue directly, in a way that respects both positions and shows how
science could eventually decide between them.

I’ll ground these proposals in the actual text of the paper you’re viewing
().

*⭐ Proposal 1 — Explicitly acknowledge the competing definition of
phenomenal character*

The paper could add a short section saying:

“Some theorists hold that phenomenal qualities (e.g., redness) are *intrinsic
physical properties* of certain states, independent of their relational or
computational role. On this view, consciousness *uses* these intrinsic
qualities but does not constitute them.”

Then contrast this with the paper’s own definition:

“By contrast, the centered‑knowledge thesis identifies phenomenal character
with the *organization of usable distinctions* possessed by a process. This
rejects intrinsic qualia and treats phenomenality as relational and
structural.”

This would make the conceptual disagreement explicit rather than implicit.

*⭐ Proposal 2 — Show that the two views make different empirical
predictions*

This is the strongest way to address your concern. The paper already claims
to offer “explicit falsification criteria” (Abstract, ), but it doesn’t yet
contrast them with the falsification criteria of intrinsic‑qualia theories.

Here’s how it could:

*Intrinsic‑qualia prediction*

If redness is an intrinsic physical property of a state, then:

   - Two states with identical computational/relational organization *could
   still differ phenomenally* if their intrinsic physical microstructure
   differs.
   - A perfect functional duplicate (e.g., a digital emulation) *might lack
   redness*, even if behavior and knowledge are preserved.
   - Neural replacement could preserve all functional organization but
   still *lose qualia* if the intrinsic physical property is not reproduced.

This is the “fading qualia” or “dancing qualia” possibility.

*Centered‑knowledge prediction (paper’s view)*

If phenomenal character *is* the organization of usable distinctions:

   - Any system with the same usable distinctions and access relations
   *must* have the same phenomenal character.
   - A digital emulation that preserves KC (the complete knowledge
   organization) *must* preserve redness.
   - Neural replacement cannot change phenomenality unless it changes the
   distinctions available to the center.

This is organizational invariance (Section 4.1–4.2, ).

*Empirical divergence*

The paper could say:

“If intrinsic qualia exist, then two systems with identical KC could differ
phenomenally. If centered knowledge is correct, such divergence is
impossible.”

This sets up a clear empirical fork.

*⭐ Proposal 3 — Identify testable consequences of each view*

The paper already proposes tests for its own theory (e.g., neural
replacement, emulation fidelity). It could add parallel tests for intrinsic
qualia.

*Test A — High‑fidelity neural replacement*

   - Replace neurons with silicon equivalents that preserve all functional
   distinctions.
   - *Intrinsic‑qualia view:* Phenomenal character might change or fade.
   - *Centered‑knowledge view:* Phenomenal character must remain identical.

*Test B — Digital emulation with preserved KC*

   - Build a digital emulation of a subject’s brain at the substitution
   level.
   - *Intrinsic‑qualia view:* The emulation might behave identically but
   lack redness.
   - *Centered‑knowledge view:* If KC is preserved, redness must be
   preserved.

*Test C — Microphysical variation below substitution level*

   - Introduce microphysical changes that do *not* alter KC.
   - *Intrinsic‑qualia view:* Phenomenal character might change.
   - *Centered‑knowledge view:* Phenomenal character cannot change.

The paper could explicitly say:

“These tests discriminate between intrinsic‑qualia realism and the
centered‑knowledge identity.”

*⭐ Proposal 4 — Address your specific claim: “Intrinsic qualities are not
acquired; consciousness uses them.”*

The paper could add a paragraph acknowledging this view:

“One alternative holds that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic physical
properties of states, and that consciousness merely uses these properties
to represent knowledge. On this view, the ‘glow’ is not added by knowledge;
it is already present in the intrinsic nature of the state.”

Then respond:

“The centered‑knowledge thesis denies that states have intrinsic phenomenal
properties. It identifies phenomenality with the organization of
distinctions a process possesses and uses. If intrinsic redness exists,
then two states with identical KC could differ phenomenally — a possibility
the centered‑knowledge thesis rejects.”

This directly addresses your objection.

*⭐ Proposal 5 — Show how the paper’s own framework could falsify itself*

The paper already says:

“The theory stands or falls on the answer to one question: can a process
genuinely possess knowledge while there is nothing it is like to occupy
that locus?” (Section 1, )

It could extend this:

“If a system possessed all the distinctions and access relations of KC but
lacked phenomenal character, the centered‑knowledge thesis would be
falsified.”

This is the paper’s version of a zombie test.

*⭐ Proposal 6 — Explicitly contrast “intrinsic redness” with the paper’s
“redness-as-distinction”*

The paper could add:

“On the intrinsic‑qualia view, redness is a basic physical property of a
state. On the centered‑knowledge view, redness is the structured difference
the center possesses — the organization of alternatives that guide its
continuation.”

This clarifies the metaphysical disagreement.

*⭐ Proposal 7 — Add a section titled “Competing hypotheses and empirical
resolution”*

This section could:

   1. Lay out the intrinsic‑qualia hypothesis.
   2. Lay out the centered‑knowledge hypothesis.
   3. Show their different predictions.
   4. Propose experiments.
   5. State what would falsify each view.

This would make the paper more balanced and scientifically grounded.










On Fri, Sep 18, 2026 at 7:47 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> As some of you may know I have been fascinated by questions of
> consciousness for many years and have endeavored to write a book on it. The
> past five years I have been focused on that writing which has resulted in
> hundreds of pages of material:
>
> https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-SMVWgQFfImXNRRuuB9kQwhgxPLAwxYL
>
> About a week ago, I decided to try to use the latest AI models to take all
> the ideas in that book and condense it to a comparatively short academic
> paper, which I am now in the process of submitting for publication.
>
> I thought some on this list, interested in both the possibility of machine
> and AI consciousness, as well as the question of how do we empirically
> establish the minimum required fidelity for restoring a mind through brain
> scanning and uploading, may be interested in what this paper has to say, as
> it treats with both of these topics among many others. Here is the abstract:
>
>
> "Computational functionalism treats cognition as implemented information
> processing, but leaves open why experience exists, what determines its
> character, which process possesses it, and how it affects behavior. This
> paper develops the centered-knowledge thesis: when alternative conditions
> select distinct internal states that guide a process’s continuation, that
> process knows the difference; possessing that knowledge is the phenomenal
> difference. The complete organization of the process’s distinctions and
> their causal roles constitutes its phenomenal character. The access
> relations that make those distinctions jointly usable individuate the
> subject and explain binding and privacy. This identity supplies a
> constitutive answer to the hard problem: the explanatory gap arises when
> third-person descriptions omit the relation between a usable distinction
> and the process for which it is knowledge. A subtraction argument locates
> the phenomenal minimum by stripping away report, memory, affect,
> reflection, recurrence, and global broadcast while preserving the operative
> distinction. From this thesis, the paper derives organizational invariance,
> the substitution principle, and multiple realizability, yielding criteria
> for how fine-grained neural replacement, brain scanning, and emulation must
> be to preserve experience. The boundary that individuates a subject is also
> its epistemic horizon: what the subject knows underdetermines its history,
> program, substrate, and world. The centered-knowledge thesis yields
> consciousness attributions distinct from those of global neuronal
> workspace, higher-order, and integrated information theories for
> feed-forward systems, faithful emulations, and overlapping centers. We
> provide an empirical research program with explicit falsification criteria.
> Consciousness is the inside of a difference that guides a process from
> within."
>
>
> And here is a link to the paper:
>
>
> https://zenodo.org/records/22693134/files/epistemic_horizons_resch_philpapers.pdf?download=1
>
>
> I would greatly appreciate any feedback, questions, comments, or
> discussion.
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>
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