[ExI] My theory of consciousness

[Ben Zaiboc]

On 26/09/2026 15:22, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 25, 2026, 4:38 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>     Jason Resch wrote:
>     > from the level of perspective of a program running on a computer, there is an abstract level below that program to which changes of implementation are invisible. A program may be able to read variables in its scope, but it can't tell how those values are physically implemented, it can't read outside it's address space, it can't tell if it's running on an emulator or not. It is trapped within a particular causal structure beyond which certain information has no way to get to or otherwise influence it. This is an epistemic firewall, and it nearly allows us to define what facts can or can't be relevant to the process at the level of the process.
>     >
>     > By considering the conscious state as a computational process, we can make a similar determination of what facts are able to enter and influence that conscious state, and this sets a minimum level of detail that a brain scan must capture and that a brain emulation must emulate to preserve the same character of consciousness.
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>     I don't see how the second paragraph follows from the first.
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>     You're saying that a process can't access what underlies it, so for example we can't perceive the workings of our neurons, an addition operation has no information about whether it's being performed on an abacus or a computer, etc.
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> Yes, every process has an underlying interface ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interface_(computing) ), so from the point of view of that process, there are only certain things that can make a difference to it.


You're talking about /interfaces/ now. That's confusing, I thought you were talking about processes happening on different levels.

To clarify, take the example of signals travelling through a network of some kind. This might be underlain by a different type of process like transistors switching on and off, or ion channels selectively allowing specific ions through membranes. The network has no 'knowledge' of the transistors/ion channels. In that example, what is the relevant interface?



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>     Then you say that this sets a minimum level of detail that must be captured in a brain scan. How? I don't see how one has any bearing on the other.
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> Here is an example in computing that I think illustrates it cleanly. Let's say you found a computer that does your taxes. You inspect this computer at various layers from its circuits and transistors to its programming code up to the high level UI it presents on screen.
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> During your investigation you find the tax program is written in Java and runs on a Java virtual machine, which provides a well defined interface. It allows you to run this same program on very different hardware, by replacing the JVM with another suited for that different processor.
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> The program can't tell that the hardware beneath that JVM interface has changed because there's no difference it can access that makes a a difference for it.
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> In the theory of consciousness I defend in the paper, this inability to make a difference or possible distinction at the layer of a conscious mind process is operating at implies there can be no difference in awareness for that process, its internal behaviors at that level will be unchanged and so I argue it's consciousness must be unchanged as well.
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> Now determining where this level is for the brain is not trivial,


Well, that's making the assumption that there is only one such level. That is not true. There are many, many levels.

But never mind, you just seem to be arguing for substrate indifference for minds. In other words, presenting a defence against 'carbon chauvinism". Is this really necessary? You seem to be expending a lot of words and time on something that's pretty obvious to anyone with any common sense.


>  but I give a procedure in the paper for how it could begin. My hunch is it would be somewhere above where the reliable computational units/components of the brain start to begin.
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>     Knowing that a mind can't directly access the workings of the neurons that give rise to it doesn't give us any information about how exact an emulation of the neurons must be in order to recreate the mind.
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> But that is part of it. We identify ALL the things a mind is unable to access from its formal description as a process.


I doubt that that is possible. We can identify a lot of things, but surely not ALL of them.


>  All those things sit outside anything that makes a difference to what that process knows, and hence are details that can't affect the mind state. 


There are  things that the mind knows nothing about that DO affect its state (actually most things that change a mind state are going to be things that the mind knows nothing about, I expect). Think about psychoactive drugs for instance. A mind has no knowledge about the molecular interactions that change when a drug is introduced to the system, but a definite change in state occurs.


> Then we also will know all the things that can and do make a difference to the high level mind state. That is the level of detail that brain scans must include and that emulations must emulate.
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>     We are just as blind to the structure of neural circuitry as we are to the activation of individual synapses, 
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> These are empirical problems to be solved to be sure. But note we presently also lack a theoretical basis for deciding which details matter for consciousness. Even if we had a complete understanding of neurons and synapses, we still need a theory of consciousness to guide us in determining whether we have to simulate neurons down to the molecular scale or not, or just their coarse spiking behavior, or perhaps we can even take shortcuts and get away with just simulating the high level input and output behavior of cortical columns.


If we had a complete understanding of neurons and synapses, I don't see that anything else would be necessary. We'd have a set of information that describes a system in great detail, we'd have (presumably) a way of emulating that system to an arbitrary level of detail, so we just start with a coarse level of detail in the emulation, and keep increasing it until the system behaves as expected (i.e. produces the correct outputs for a set of specified inputs). Much like was done with the fruit fly connectome recently. If it didn't behave like a fruit fly, we would have known that it didn't work.

I don't know what a 'theory of consciousness' would even look like. It sounds like the sort of thing that leads down a rabbit hole. Surely a theory of how minds are produced would be more relevant. Leave 'consciousness' out of it, I say. Nobody really knows what the word means anyway. I suspect it's something that can't really be defined.

The thing to concentrate on is behaviour, not some elusive (probably forever) theory of consciousness. If we can get a brain emulation to behave the same as the original brain, we've succeeded. It's that simple.

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>     so we still don't know whether it's necessary to emulate each synapse, or just the overall circuitry.
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> Exactly, and this is why a theory of consciousness that offers these answers will be necessary before we make any promises of ressurecting someone via mind uploading.
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> We might accidentally ressurect someone whose consciousness is not quite the same as it was before.


Accidentally?

Taking 'consciousness' to mean 'mind', I can't see that anyone who'd been uploaded would have, or want to have, exactly the same mind-state as before uploading. Just the knowledge that you've been uploaded would make a big difference, and there wouldn't be much point to uploading someone without their knowledge. I expect they'd soon find out, though, and then they'd be different. Personally, If I woke up one day to find I had been uploaded, it would make a /huge/ difference to me!

-- 
Ben