[ExI] My theory of consciousness

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Sep 26, 2026, 12:28 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 26/09/2026 15:22, Jason Resch wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 25, 2026, 4:38 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >
> >     Jason Resch wrote:
> >     > from the level of perspective of a program running on a computer,
> there is an abstract level below that program to which changes of
> implementation are invisible. A program may be able to read variables in
> its scope, but it can't tell how those values are physically implemented,
> it can't read outside it's address space, it can't tell if it's running on
> an emulator or not. It is trapped within a particular causal structure
> beyond which certain information has no way to get to or otherwise
> influence it. This is an epistemic firewall, and it nearly allows us to
> define what facts can or can't be relevant to the process at the level of
> the process.
> >     >
> >     > By considering the conscious state as a computational process, we
> can make a similar determination of what facts are able to enter and
> influence that conscious state, and this sets a minimum level of detail
> that a brain scan must capture and that a brain emulation must emulate to
> preserve the same character of consciousness.
> >
> >
> >     I don't see how the second paragraph follows from the first.
> >
> >     You're saying that a process can't access what underlies it, so for
> example we can't perceive the workings of our neurons, an addition
> operation has no information about whether it's being performed on an
> abacus or a computer, etc.
> >
> >
> > Yes, every process has an underlying interface (
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interface_(computing) ), so from the point
> of view of that process, there are only certain things that can make a
> difference to it.
>
>
> You're talking about /interfaces/ now. That's confusing, I thought you
> were talking about processes happening on different levels.
>

I am. Interfaces provide a clear example of boundaries that can separate
and isolate levels. Every computable process has such an interface boundary
(minimally at the Turing machine that computes it, but often times it
exists higher).



> To clarify, take the example of signals travelling through a network of
> some kind. This might be underlain by a different type of process like
> transistors switching on and off, or ion channels selectively allowing
> specific ions through membranes. The network has no 'knowledge' of the
> transistors/ion channels. In that example, what is the relevant interface?
>

You have to identify the process before you can answer that question. There
may be several independent processes in your example, depending on which
signals can ever reach or interact with others. Interest casualty as
paramount in defining process boundaries. There are also different levels
in the sense that some processes on your example may depend only on high
level logical operations on bits, while at other levels of description
there are electromagnetic fields and numbers of electrons.

When you identify the process you are talking about, then you can begin to
define the causal boundaries around it that can alter and affect that
process at the level you've defined it, for the possible states relevant
and accessible to that process that are capable of altering it's future
behavior.

All this is described in the first few pages of my paper.


>
>
> >
> >
> >     Then you say that this sets a minimum level of detail that must be
> captured in a brain scan. How? I don't see how one has any bearing on the
> other.
> >
> >
> > Here is an example in computing that I think illustrates it cleanly.
> Let's say you found a computer that does your taxes. You inspect this
> computer at various layers from its circuits and transistors to its
> programming code up to the high level UI it presents on screen.
> >
> > During your investigation you find the tax program is written in Java
> and runs on a Java virtual machine, which provides a well defined
> interface. It allows you to run this same program on very different
> hardware, by replacing the JVM with another suited for that different
> processor.
> >
> > The program can't tell that the hardware beneath that JVM interface has
> changed because there's no difference it can access that makes a a
> difference for it.
> >
> > In the theory of consciousness I defend in the paper, this inability to
> make a difference or possible distinction at the layer of a conscious mind
> process is operating at implies there can be no difference in awareness for
> that process, its internal behaviors at that level will be unchanged and so
> I argue it's consciousness must be unchanged as well.
> >
> > Now determining where this level is for the brain is not trivial,
>
>
> Well, that's making the assumption that there is only one such level. That
> is not true. There are many, many levels.
>

There are many levels in the brain. I've said that. The question is how do
we determine the level that is relevant to maintaining a conscious state.


> But never mind, you just seem to be arguing for substrate indifference for
> minds. In other words, presenting a defence against 'carbon chauvinism". Is
> this really necessary?


No, that is an assumption. The paper starts from computational
functionalism. But while computational functionalism gives us substrate
indifference, it doesn't tell us what the substitution level is. That is
one of the main contributions of this paper. Please read at least the
abstract to get a picture for what this paper provides beyond standard
functionalism.


You seem to be expending a lot of words and time on something that's pretty
> obvious to anyone with any common sense.
>

Have you taken a look at the paper?


>
> >  but I give a procedure in the paper for how it could begin. My hunch is
> it would be somewhere above where the reliable computational
> units/components of the brain start to begin.
> >
> >
> >     Knowing that a mind can't directly access the workings of the
> neurons that give rise to it doesn't give us any information about how
> exact an emulation of the neurons must be in order to recreate the mind.
> >
> >
> > But that is part of it. We identify ALL the things a mind is unable to
> access from its formal description as a process.
>
>
> I doubt that that is possible. We can identify a lot of things, but surely
> not ALL of them.
>
>
> >  All those things sit outside anything that makes a difference to what
> that process knows, and hence are details that can't affect the mind state.
>
>
> There are  things that the mind knows nothing about that DO affect its
> state (actually most things that change a mind state are going to be things
> that the mind knows nothing about, I expect).


A substance that changes one's state of awareness in a way noticable to the
mind affects what that kind knows (in the sense of that mind knowing a
difference in its consciousness). It doesn't mean the mind will know what
it is that causes that effect, however, as you rightly indicate.

Think about psychoactive drugs for instance. A mind has no knowledge about
> the molecular interactions that change when a drug is introduced to the
> system, but a definite change in state occurs.
>

You provide an excellent example for why  simulating only the spiking
neural network may not be enough, as the introduction of simple molecules
can perturb the behavior of those neurons. This is a great example and I
may include it in an updated version of the paper. Thank you.


>
> > Then we also will know all the things that can and do make a difference
> to the high level mind state. That is the level of detail that brain scans
> must include and that emulations must emulate.
> >
> >
> >     We are just as blind to the structure of neural circuitry as we are
> to the activation of individual synapses,
> >
> >
> > These are empirical problems to be solved to be sure. But note we
> presently also lack a theoretical basis for deciding which details matter
> for consciousness. Even if we had a complete understanding of neurons and
> synapses, we still need a theory of consciousness to guide us in
> determining whether we have to simulate neurons down to the molecular scale
> or not, or just their coarse spiking behavior, or perhaps we can even take
> shortcuts and get away with just simulating the high level input and output
> behavior of cortical columns.
>
>
> If we had a complete understanding of neurons and synapses, I don't see
> that anything else would be necessary. We'd have a set of information that
> describes a system in great detail, we'd have (presumably) a way of
> emulating that system to an arbitrary level of detail, so we just start
> with a coarse level of detail in the emulation, and keep increasing it
> until the system behaves as expected (i.e. produces the correct outputs for
> a set of specified inputs).


Yes but correct behavior is always indexed to some level of fidelity. Where
and how do you draw the line at defining the level you are checking again
for correctness?

The range of possible behavioral outputs will always be strictly less than
the range of internal states the mind can be in. So what you must index on
is the fidelity of internal states rather than just the outputs.

Much like was done with the fruit fly connectome recently. If it didn't
> behave like a fruit fly, we would have known that it didn't work.
>

A lot of shortcuts were made with that emulation. I would have a lot of
doubts whether its conscious state of this emulation was a good
approximation of the original fruit fly's awareness.


> I don't know what a 'theory of consciousness' would even look like. It
> sounds like the sort of thing that leads down a rabbit hole. Surely a
> theory of how minds are produced would be more relevant. Leave
> 'consciousness' out of it, I say. Nobody really knows what the word means
> anyway. I suspect it's something that can't really be defined.
>

To me, my having a mind implies being conscious. So when you say make a
theory of minds but don't bother with a theory of consciousness, that
system doesn't parse meaningfully to me.

A complete theory of consciousness would tell us which sorts of systems
qualify as minds.


> The thing to concentrate on is behaviour, not some elusive (probably
> forever) theory of consciousness. If we can get a brain emulation to behave
> the same as the original brain, we've succeeded. It's that simple.
>

Internal behavioral fidelity is the anchor I use in the process my paper
describes for identifying the level of fidelity required to reproduce a
mind. But I think this involves more than just checking motor neuron
output. I think it would involve tracking distinctions available to areas
in the brain including the visual cortex, language centers, and many
typically unconscious processes as well.

Essentially all physical processes consist of a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) of causal events and information flows through time. Determining the
boundaries of differences available to a process involves identifying a
subgraph of these events, by tracing causes backwards until a boundary is
reached.



> >
> >
> >     so we still don't know whether it's necessary to emulate each
> synapse, or just the overall circuitry.
> >
> >
> > Exactly, and this is why a theory of consciousness that offers these
> answers will be necessary before we make any promises of ressurecting
> someone via mind uploading.
> >
> > We might accidentally ressurect someone whose consciousness is not quite
> the same as it was before.
>
>
> Accidentally?
>
> Taking 'consciousness' to mean 'mind', I can't see that anyone who'd been
> uploaded would have, or want to have, exactly the same mind-state as before
> uploading. Just the knowledge that you've been uploaded would make a big
> difference, and there wouldn't be much point to uploading someone without
> their knowledge. I expect they'd soon find out, though, and then they'd be
> different. Personally, If I woke up one day to find I had been uploaded, it
> would make a /huge/ difference to me!
>


Here I'm talking about preserving the same qualities of experience
(qualia), to the same level of fidelity and richness they had before,
rather than any particular set of memories.

Jason
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20260926/9951c9fe/attachment.htm>