[Paleopsych] MEQ: (Patai) Norvell B. De Atkine: The Arab Mind Revisited

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Norvell B. De Atkine: The Arab Mind Revisited
Middle East Quarterly - Summer 2004

    Editors' preface: In the spring of 2004, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal
    drove headlines in the United States and the Middle East. Journalist
    Seymour Hersh wrote a report in The New Yorker, entitled "The Gray
    Zone," describing the abuse of prisoners as the outcome of a
    deliberate policy. Hersh also made reference to a book, The Arab Mind,
    by the cultural anthropologist Raphael Patai (1910-96):

      The notion that Arabs are particularly vulnerable to sexual
      humiliation became a talking point among pro-war Washington
      conservatives in the months before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.
      One book that was frequently cited was The Arab Mind, a study of
      Arab culture and psychology, first published in 1973, by Raphael
      Patai, a cultural anthropologist who taught at, among other
      universities, Columbia and Princeton, and who died in 1996. The
      book includes a twenty-five-page chapter on Arabs and sex,
      depicting sex as a taboo vested with shame and repression. The
      Patai book, an academic told me, was "the bible of the neocons on
      Arab behavior." In their discussions, he said, two themes
      emerged"one, that Arabs only understand force and, two, that the
      biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation."[25][1]

    This mention of Patai's book (on the sole authority of "an academic
    [who] told me") sent journalists scurrying to read itand denounce it.
    Brian Whitaker, writing in The Guardian, called it a "classic case of
    orientalism which, by focusing on what Edward Said called the
    otherness' of Arab culture, sets up barriers that can then be
    exploited for political purposes." He quoted an academic as saying,
    "The best use for this volume, if any, is for a doorstop."[26][2] Ann
    Marlowe, in Salon.com, called it "a smear job masquerading under the
    merest veneer of civility."[27][3] Louis Werner, in Al-Ahram Weekly
    and elsewhere, embellished Hersh's account with a made-up detail: The
    Arab Mind, he wrote, "was apparently used as a field manual by U.S.
    Army Intelligence in Abu Ghraib prison."[28][4] (Hersh made no such
    claim.) Only Lee Smith, writing in Slate.com, suggested that critics
    had misread Patai, whom he described as "a keen and sympathetic
    observer of Arab society," a "popularizer of difficult ideas, and also
    a serious scholar."[29][5]

    No one took the trouble to crosscheck Hersh's academic source on the
    supposed influence of Patai's book as the "frequently cited bible of
    the neocons.'" A more accurate description of The Arab Mind would be a
    prohibited book. Edward Said had denounced Patai twenty-five years
    earlier, in Orientalism;[30][6] in academe, The Arab Mind long ago
    entered the list of disapproved texts. It was easy to point an
    accusing finger at the book (again). Patai himself was also a
    convenient target. A Hungarian-born Jew and lifelong Zionist, he lived
    in British-mandated Palestine from 1933 to 1947, and in 1936, earned
    the first doctorate ever awarded by the Hebrew University. He edited
    Theodor Herzl's complete diaries and served as the first president of
    the American Friends of Tel Aviv University. For many antiwar
    conspiracy theorists, the idea of someone like Patai as intellectual
    father of the Abu Ghraib scandal proved irresistible.

    The only concrete evidence for the book's use in any branch of
    government appeared in the foreword to the most recent reprint (2002)
    of The Arab Mind, by Col. (res.) Norvell B. De Atkine, an instructor
    in Middle East studies at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School.
    De Atkine wrote that he assigned the book to military personnel in his
    own courses because students found its cultural insights useful in
    explaining behavior they encountered on assignment.

    While critics skimmed Patai's book for generalizing quotes, they
    skirted the book's premise, as restated by De Atkine: culture matters
    and cultures differ. The realization by Americans that culture counts
    explains the commercial success of several cultural handbooks,
    addressing the very issues that concerned Patai.[31][7] And while
    there is no reason to believe that The Arab Mind had the specific
    influence Hersh attributed to it, the resulting publicity has sent its
    sales soaring, further extending the life of the book.

    The following is De Atkine's foreword to The Arab Mind, reprinted here
    in full.

Incurable Romanticism

    It is a particular pleasure to write a foreword to this much-needed
    reprint of Raphael Patai's classic analysis of Arab culture and
    society. In view of the events of 2001including another bloody year of
    heightened conflict between Palestinians and Israelis and the
    horrendous terrorist assault on the United States on September 11there
    is a critical need to bring this seminal study of the modal Arab
    personality to the attention of policymakers, scholars, and the
    general public.

    In the wake of the September 11 attack, there was a torrent of
    commentary on "why" such an assault took place, and on the motivation
    and mindset of the terrorists. Much of this commentary was either
    ill-informed or agenda-driven. A number of U.S. Middle East scholars
    attributed the attack to a simple matter of imbalance in the American
    approach to the perennial Arab-Israeli conflict. This facile
    explanation did nothing to improve the credibility of the community of
    Middle East scholars in the United States, already much diminished by
    their misreading of the Arab world and their reaction to the U.S.
    response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

    To begin a process of understanding the seemingly irrational hatred
    that motivated the World Trade Center attackers, one must understand
    the social and cultural environment in which they lived and the modal
    personality traits that make them susceptible to engaging in terrorist
    actions. This book does a great deal to further that understanding. In
    fact, it is essential reading. At the institution where I teach
    military officers, The Arab Mind forms the basis of my cultural
    instruction, complemented by my own experiences of some twenty-five
    years living in, studying, or teaching about the Middle East.

    Raphael Patai prefaces his 1973 edition of The Arab Mind with the
    sentence, "When it comes to the Arabs, I must admit to an incurable
    romanticism." So it is with me. I first became interested in the Arab
    world in an elective course at the United States Military Academy many
    years ago, and my military career thereafter was divided between
    assignments with regular army artillery units and tours in the Middle
    East. It was during my preparatory study at the American University of
    Beirut that I was introduced to the writings of Raphael Patai. In a
    sociology class we used his book, Golden River to Golden Road:
    Society, Culture and Change in the Middle East.[32][8] Since that
    time, I have read a number of his books and admired his careful
    scholarship, lucid writing style, and empathetic approach to his
    subject matter.

    Over the past twelve years, I have also briefed hundreds of military
    teams being deployed to the Middle East. When returning from the
    Middle East, my students, as well as the members of these teams,
    invariably comment on the paramount usefulness of the cultural
    instruction in their assignments. In doing so they validate the
    analysis and descriptions offered by Raphael Patai.

    The officers returning from the Arab world describe the cultural
    barriers they encounter as by far the most difficult to navigate, far
    beyond those of political perceptions. Thinking back on it, I recall
    many occasions on which I was perplexed by actions or behavior on the
    part of my Arab hostsactions and behavior that would have been
    perfectly understandable had I read The Arab Mind. I have hence
    emphasized to my students that there must be a combination of
    observation and study to begin a process of understanding another
    culture. Simply observing a culture through the prism of our own
    beliefs and cultural worldview leads to many misconceptions. More
    often than not, this results in a form of cultural shock that can be
    totally debilitating to a foreigner working with Arabs. Less common,
    but equally non-productive, is the soldier who becomes caught up in a
    culture he views as idyllic and "goes native." Inevitably there will
    come a time (usually during a political crisis) when the cultural
    chasm will force unpleasant reality to resurface.

Mines and Warts

    In writing about a culture, one must tread a sensibility minefield,
    and none is more treacherous than that of the Middle East. In pursuit
    of intellectual honesty and a true-to-life depiction of a people, some
    less-than-appealing traits will surface. All cultures and peoples have
    their warts. One trait I have observed in Arab societywhich has become
    more pronounced over the yearsis an extreme sensitivity to any
    critical depiction of Arab culture, no matter how gently the adverse
    factors are presented. In his postscript to the 1983 edition of The
    Arab Mind, Patai mentions a spate of self-critical assessments of Arab
    society by Arab intellectuals in the wake of the "new Arab" said to
    have emerged after the 1973 war; but this tendency to self-criticize
    proved to be illusory. While we in the United States constantly
    criticize our society and leadership, similar introspection is rarely
    seen in the Arab world today. When criticism is voiced, it is usually
    in terms of a condemnation of Arab acceptance of some aspect of
    Western culture. Criticism also often emanates from outside the Arab
    region and, despite the so-called globalization of communication, only
    the elite have access to it. This is particularly true when political
    systems or ideology are discussed.

    In no small way, this tendency has led to the current state of affairs
    in the Arab world. For this reason, as well as the fact that Patai was
    not an Arab, some scholars are dismissive of The Arab Mind, terming it
    stereotyped in its portrayal of Arab personality traits. In part, this
    stems from the postmodernist philosophy of a recent generation of
    scholars who have been inculcated with the currently fashionable idea
    of cultural and moral relativism. Much of the American political
    science writing on the Middle East today is jargon- and agenda-laden,
    bordering on the indecipherable. A fixation on race, class, and gender
    has had a destructive effect on Middle East scholarship. It is a real
    task to find suitable recent texts that are scholarly and sound in
    content, but also readable.

    In fact, some of the best and most useful writing on the Arab world
    has been by outsiders, mostly Europeans, especially the French and
    British. Many of the best and most illuminating works were written
    decades ago. The idea that outsiders cannot assess another culture is
    patently foolish. The best study done on American societyto take one
    famous examplewas written some 160 years ago by the French visitor,
    Alexis de Tocqueville, and it still holds mostly true today.

    The empathy and warmth of Raphael Patai toward the Arab people are
    evident throughout this book. There is neither animus nor rancor nor
    condescension. Arabs are portrayed as people who, like all people,
    have virtues and vices. Patai's description of his relationship with
    the Jerusalem sheikh, Ahmad Fakhr al-Khatib, is indicative of the
    esteem in which he held his Arab friends. It is a lamentable fact that
    friendships such as this one would be almost impossible to conceive of
    at the present time.

    Along with his empathy for and understanding of Arab culture, Patai
    has a powerfully keen faculty for observation. In a passage in his
    autobiographical Journeyman in Jerusalem,[33][9] he describes in
    minute detail an Arab date juice vendor and the way he dispenses his
    juice. It is this ability to observe and appreciate detail that
    enables Patai to grasp the significance of the gestures, nuances of
    speech, and behavior patterns of Arabs. To most Americans, the
    subtlety of Arab culture is bewildering and incomprehensible. Yet, if
    one is to work productively in the region, one must have an
    understanding of these cultural traits.

    It might legitimately be asked how well Patai's analysis bears up in
    today's world. After all, it has been about thirty years since the
    majority of The Arab Mind was written. The short answer is that it has
    not aged at all. The analysis is just as prescient and on-the-mark now
    as on the day it was written. One could even make the argument that,
    in fact, many of the traits described have become more pronounced. For
    instance, Islamist demagogues have skillfully used the lure of the
    Arabic language, so carefully explained by Patai as a powerful
    motivator, to galvanize the streets in this era of the Islamic
    revival, in a way even the great orator Abdul Nasser could not

Blustery Arabic

    Patai devoted a large portion of this book to the Arabic language, its
    powerful appeal, as well as its inhibiting effects. The proneness to
    exaggeration he describes was amply displayed in the Gulf war by the
    exhortations of Saddam Hussein to the Arabs in the "mother of all
    battles." This penchant for rhetoric and use of hyperbole were a
    feature of the Arab press during the war. The ferocity of the Arab
    depiction of Iraqi prowess had American experts convinced that there
    would be thousands of American casualties. Even when the war was
    turning into a humiliating rout, the "Arab street" was loath to accept
    this reality as fact.

    More recently, the same pattern has been seen in the Arab adoption of
    Osama bin Laden as a new Saladin who, with insulting and derogatory
    language in his description of American martial qualities, conveyed a
    sense of invincibility and power that has subsequently been shown to
    be largely imaginary. Saddam Hussein used similar bluster prior to the
    1990 Gulf war. Patai traces this custom, which continues to the
    present era, back to pre-Islamic days. It is also an apt example of
    the Arab tendency to substitute words for action and a desired outcome
    for a less palatable reality, or to indulge in wishful thinkingall of
    which are reflected in the numerous historical examples Patai
    provides. This tendency, combined with Arabs' predilection to idealize
    their own history, always in reference to some mythic or heroic era,
    has present-day implications. Thus the American incursion into the
    Gulf in 1990 became the seventh crusade and was frequently referred to
    as another Western and Christian attempt to occupy the Holy Land of
    Islama belief galvanizing the current crop of Middle Eastern
    terrorists. Meanwhile, Israel is frequently referred to as a "crusader

    Patai's discussion of the duality of Arab society, and of the
    proclivity for intra-Arab conflict, continues to be revalidated in
    each decade. The Arab-against-Arab division in the 1990 Gulf war is
    but one example of a continuing Arab condition. Juxtaposed against the
    ideal of Arab unity is the present reality of twenty-two divided
    states, each with the self-interest of its ruling family or elite
    group paramount in policy decisions. In the 1960s, it was the
    "progressive states" versus the "reactionary states," which pitted
    Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Libya against Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
    and Morocco. Today it is secular forces versus the Islamists, a
    conflict to one degree or another being played out in every Arab

    Even when facing a common enemyusually Israel in this era, but also
    Iran or Turkeymutual distrust and intra-Arab hostility prevail. In the
    Iraqi-Iranian war, for example, Arab support was generally limited to
    financial helpwith provisions for repayment, as the angry Saddam
    Hussein learned after the war. In [1998], when Turkey threatened Syria
    with armed conflict if the leader of the nationalistic Kurdish
    movement in Turkey continued to be supported by Syria, it was very
    clear that Syria would find itself standing alone. Thus the Asad
    regime was forced to make a humiliating submission to Turkish demands.
    Perhaps the most telling validation of Patai's insight into the
    conflictual nature of Arab society relates to the Palestinians. While
    their conflict with Israel has been a bloody one over the years, it
    cannot approach the level of death and destruction incurred in
    Palestinian wars against Lebanese, Syrians, and Jordanians. Despite
    this great violence, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict retains its
    place as the primary galvanizing issue for the "Arab street."

Sinister West

    Perhaps the section of this book most relevant to today's political
    and social environment is the chapter on the psychology of
    Westernization. After centuries of certitude that their civilization
    was superiora belief evolving from the very poor impression the
    European crusaders made on the Arabs and fully justified by the
    realitythe Arab self-image was rudely shattered by the easy French
    conquest of Egypt in 1798. A declining Middle East had been far
    surpassed by a revitalized Europe. The initial shock among the Arab
    elite was followed by a period of limited emulation, at least in the
    form of Western political and social values.

    As the Western political hold on the Arabs receded, Western cultural
    influence increased, which in many ways was even more irritating to
    the Arab eliteparticularly in terms of the technology invasion that at
    every level was a daily reminder of the inability of the Middle East
    to compete. Patai's assessment of the Arab view of technology has been
    amply supported over the last decades. Clearly enthusiastic users of
    technology, particularly in war weaponry, the Arabs nevertheless
    remain a lagging producer of technology. Partially, as Patai
    demonstrates, this is a reaction to the "jinn" (devil) of Western
    culture as it appears to the Arab of the twenty-first century. While
    recognizing the superiority of Western technology, the traditional
    Arab sees Western culture as destructive to his way of life; hence the
    ever-present battle between modernity and modernism: Can a society
    modernize without the secular lifestyle that appears to accompany the
    process? Adherents of the Islamist ideology, espousing a politicized,
    radical Islam, see no contradiction between a seventh-century
    theocracy and twenty-first century technology and would answer yes;
    however, history does not support such a view in the Middle Eastern
    context. As a Muslim coworker put it, "We want your TV sets but not
    your programs, your VCRs but not your movies." This will be the
    battleground of every Arab nation for the coming generation.

    In his section on the "sinister West," Patai gets to the heart of the
    burning hatred that seems to drive brutal acts of terrorism against
    Americans. Despite its lack of a colonial past in the Middle East,
    America, as the most powerful representative of the "West," has
    inherited primary enemy status, in place of the French and British.
    Patai points out the Arabs' tendency to blame others for the problems
    evident in their political systems, quality of life, and economic
    power. The Arab media and Arab intellectuals, invoking the staple
    mantras against colonialism, Zionism, and imperialism, provide
    convenient outside culprits for every corrupt or dysfunctional system
    or event in the Arab world. Moreover, this is often magnified and
    supported by a number of the newer generation of Western scholars
    inculcated with Marxist teaching who, unwittingly perhaps, help Arab
    intellectuals to avoid ever having to come to grips with the very real
    domestic issues that must be confronted. The Arab world combines a
    rejection of Western values with a penchant for carrying around
    historical baggage of doubtful utility. At the same time, there is a
    simplistic, if understandable, yearning for return to a more glorious
    and pristine past that would enable the Arabs once again to confront
    the West on equal terms. This particular belief has found many Arab
    adherents in the past decade.

    Patai also delves into the extremely sensitive issue of the nature of
    Islam in a particularly prescient manner. He views the fatalistic
    element inherit in Islam as an important factor in providing great
    strength to Muslims in times of stress or tragedy; in normal or better
    times, however, it acts as an impediment. Given their pervasive belief
    that God provides and disposes of all human activity, Muslims tend to
    reject the Western concept of man creating his own environment as an
    intrusion on God's realm. This includes any attempt to change God's
    plan for the fate of the individual. Certainly one can point to
    numerous exceptions. But, having worked for long periods with Arab
    military units, I can attest to their often cavalier attitude toward
    safety precautions, perhaps reflecting a Qur'anic saying, heard in
    various forms, that "death will overtake you even if you be inside a
    fortress." Just observing how few Arabs use seat belts in their
    automobiles can be a revelation. This manifestation of Arab fatalism
    is often misconstrued as a lesser value put on human life.

    In the all-important area of Muslim relations with other religions,
    Patai sums up the differences between Christianity and Islam as being
    functional, not doctrinal. The proponents of fundamentalist Islam do
    not fear Christianity. They fear that Westernization will "bring about
    a reduction of the function of Islam to the modest level on which
    Christianity plays its role in the Western world." The quarrel is not
    so much with Christianitywhich most Muslims see as a weak religion of
    diminishing importanceas with the secularism that has replaced it.
    Frequently in the Arab world one hears references to the [singer]
    "Madonna" culture and its manifestations of drugs and sexual
    promiscuity. Today, while Western military power has become much less
    of a threat, the inroads made by Western cultural values have become
    more of one.

    My special area of interest has been the impact of culture on military
    structure, strategy, and operations,[34][10] and in this regard the
    assessments of Patai, although not aimed at this area, are
    particularly informative. As he wrote, "despite the adoption of
    Western weaponry, military methods, and war aims, both the leaders and
    the people have kept alive old Arab traditions." The observations and
    studies of military specialists continue to support his conclusion.
    The Arab military establishment's ineffectiveness in the past century
    has never been a matter of lack of courage or intelligence. Rather, it
    has been a consequence of a pervasive cultural and political
    environment that stifles the development of initiative, independent
    thinking, and innovation. This has been commented on by a number of
    Middle East specialists, both Arab and non-Arab, but none explains it
    as well as Patai, who suggests that Arabs conform not to an
    individualistic, inner-directed standard but rather to a standard
    established and maintained rigidly within Arab society. As I noticed
    among the officers with whom I worked, there was a real reluctance to
    "get out front." The distrust of the military's loyalty to the regime
    reinforces a military system in which a young, charismatic officer
    with innovative ideas will be identified as a future threat to be
    carefully monitored by the ubiquitous security agencies.

Family Cohesion

    Patai also carefully illuminates the many virtues of Arab society. The
    hospitality, generosity, and depth of personal friendships common in
    the Arab world are rarely encountered in our more frenetic society.
    The Arab sense of honor and of obligation to the familyespecially to
    the family's old and young memberscan be contrasted to the frequently
    dysfunctional family life found in our own country. Within Arab
    culture, old people are seen as a foundation for family cohesion, and
    children are welcomed as gifts from God rather than as burdens.
    Daughterswho traditionally are valued less than sonsremain the
    responsibility of their families, carrying their honor even after
    marriage (and it is this sense of family cohesion and honor that, in
    its negative aspect, results in the restrictions and controls placed
    on women). The idea that the state should bear responsibility for the
    welfare of their family would be considered insulting to most Arabs.

    Finally, in his 1983 edition, Patai takes an optimistic view of the
    future of the Arab world but adds a caveat to his prediction with the
    comment that this could happen "only if the Arabs can rid themselves
    of their obsession with and hatred of Zionism, Israel, and American
    imperialism." In the eighteen years since those words were written,
    none of these obsessions has been put to rest. In fact, they have
    increased. The imported 1960s and 1970s Western ideologies of Marxism
    and socialism have given way to Islamism, a synthesis of Western-style
    totalitarianism and superficial Islamic teachings, which has
    resurrected historical mythology and revitalized an amorphous but
    palpable hatred of the Western "jinns." Nevertheless, many astute
    observers of the Arab world see the so-called "Islamic revival" with
    its attendant pathologies as cresting and beginning to recede.

    Ultimately, the Arabs, who are an immensely determined and adaptable
    people, will produce leadership capable of freeing them from
    ideological and political bondage, and this will allow them to achieve
    their rightful place in the world.

      Col. Norvell B. De Atkine (ret.) served eight years in Lebanon,
      Jordan, and Egypt (in addition to extensive combat service in
      Vietnam). A West Pointer, he holds a graduate degree in Arab
      studies from the American University of Beirut. He teaches at the
      John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North
      Carolina. The opinions expressed here are strictly his own.
      Reprinted from The Arab Mind (Hatherleigh Press, 2002), by
      permission, all rights reserved.

    [35][1] Seymour Hersh, "The Gray Zone," The New Yorker, May 24, 2004.
    [36][2] The Guardian (London), May 24, 2004. This, despite the fact
    that Whitaker himself, a year earlier, had quoted an authoritative
    Arab source on "the Arab mind." As coalition forces encircled Baghdad,
    he wrote a piece on the "sense of humiliation" among Arabs and brought
    a quote from a Kuwaiti spokesman that could have come straight from
    Patai's book: "In the Arab world, there is a classical, traditional
    enemy. This traditional enemy has always been the west or the
    Americans. This is one vision that always existed in the Arab mind."
    The Guardian, Apr. 9, 2003.
    [37][3] Ann Marlowe, "Sex, Violence, and The Arab Mind,'" Salon.com,
    [39][4] Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), July 1-7, 2004.
    [40][5] Lee Smith, "Inside the Arab Mind," Slate.com, at
    [42][6] Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978), pp.
    [43][7] Most notably, Margaret K. Nydell, Understanding Arabs: A Guide
    for Westerners (Yarmouth, Me.: Intercultural Press, 1996), reviewed in
    Middle East Quarterly, [44]June 1997, p. 90.
    [45][8] Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962, and
    subsequent editions.
    [46][9] Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1992.
    [47][10] Norvell De Atkine, "Why Arabs Lose Wars," Middle East
    Quarterly, [48]Dec. 1999, pp. 17-27.

      [52]Other items from the Summer 2004 Middle East Quarterly
      [53]Other items by Norvell B. De Atkine
      [54]Other items in category Middle East patterns


   25. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn1
   26. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn2
   27. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn3
   28. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn4
   29. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn5
   30. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn6
   31. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn7
   32. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn8
   33. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn9
   34. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn10
   35. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref1
   36. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref2
   37. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref3
   38. http://www.salonmag.com/books/feature/2004/06/08/arab_mind/index_np.html
   39. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref4
   40. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref5
   41. http://slate.msn.com/id/2101328/
   42. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref6
   43. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref7
   44. http://www.meforum.org/article/354
   45. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref8
   46. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref9
   47. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref10
   52. http://www.meforum.org/meq/issues/200406
   53. http://www.meforum.org/docs/author/Norvell+B.+De+Atkine
   54. http://www.meforum.org/docs/cat/25

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