[Paleopsych] MEQ: (Patai) Norvell B. De Atkine: The Arab Mind Revisited
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Norvell B. De Atkine: The Arab Mind Revisited
Middle East Quarterly - Summer 2004
http://www.meforum.org/article/636
Editors' preface: In the spring of 2004, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal
drove headlines in the United States and the Middle East. Journalist
Seymour Hersh wrote a report in The New Yorker, entitled "The Gray
Zone," describing the abuse of prisoners as the outcome of a
deliberate policy. Hersh also made reference to a book, The Arab Mind,
by the cultural anthropologist Raphael Patai (1910-96):
The notion that Arabs are particularly vulnerable to sexual
humiliation became a talking point among pro-war Washington
conservatives in the months before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.
One book that was frequently cited was The Arab Mind, a study of
Arab culture and psychology, first published in 1973, by Raphael
Patai, a cultural anthropologist who taught at, among other
universities, Columbia and Princeton, and who died in 1996. The
book includes a twenty-five-page chapter on Arabs and sex,
depicting sex as a taboo vested with shame and repression. The
Patai book, an academic told me, was "the bible of the neocons on
Arab behavior." In their discussions, he said, two themes
emerged"one, that Arabs only understand force and, two, that the
biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation."[25][1]
This mention of Patai's book (on the sole authority of "an academic
[who] told me") sent journalists scurrying to read itand denounce it.
Brian Whitaker, writing in The Guardian, called it a "classic case of
orientalism which, by focusing on what Edward Said called the
otherness' of Arab culture, sets up barriers that can then be
exploited for political purposes." He quoted an academic as saying,
"The best use for this volume, if any, is for a doorstop."[26][2] Ann
Marlowe, in Salon.com, called it "a smear job masquerading under the
merest veneer of civility."[27][3] Louis Werner, in Al-Ahram Weekly
and elsewhere, embellished Hersh's account with a made-up detail: The
Arab Mind, he wrote, "was apparently used as a field manual by U.S.
Army Intelligence in Abu Ghraib prison."[28][4] (Hersh made no such
claim.) Only Lee Smith, writing in Slate.com, suggested that critics
had misread Patai, whom he described as "a keen and sympathetic
observer of Arab society," a "popularizer of difficult ideas, and also
a serious scholar."[29][5]
No one took the trouble to crosscheck Hersh's academic source on the
supposed influence of Patai's book as the "frequently cited bible of
the neocons.'" A more accurate description of The Arab Mind would be a
prohibited book. Edward Said had denounced Patai twenty-five years
earlier, in Orientalism;[30][6] in academe, The Arab Mind long ago
entered the list of disapproved texts. It was easy to point an
accusing finger at the book (again). Patai himself was also a
convenient target. A Hungarian-born Jew and lifelong Zionist, he lived
in British-mandated Palestine from 1933 to 1947, and in 1936, earned
the first doctorate ever awarded by the Hebrew University. He edited
Theodor Herzl's complete diaries and served as the first president of
the American Friends of Tel Aviv University. For many antiwar
conspiracy theorists, the idea of someone like Patai as intellectual
father of the Abu Ghraib scandal proved irresistible.
The only concrete evidence for the book's use in any branch of
government appeared in the foreword to the most recent reprint (2002)
of The Arab Mind, by Col. (res.) Norvell B. De Atkine, an instructor
in Middle East studies at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School.
De Atkine wrote that he assigned the book to military personnel in his
own courses because students found its cultural insights useful in
explaining behavior they encountered on assignment.
While critics skimmed Patai's book for generalizing quotes, they
skirted the book's premise, as restated by De Atkine: culture matters
and cultures differ. The realization by Americans that culture counts
explains the commercial success of several cultural handbooks,
addressing the very issues that concerned Patai.[31][7] And while
there is no reason to believe that The Arab Mind had the specific
influence Hersh attributed to it, the resulting publicity has sent its
sales soaring, further extending the life of the book.
The following is De Atkine's foreword to The Arab Mind, reprinted here
in full.
Incurable Romanticism
It is a particular pleasure to write a foreword to this much-needed
reprint of Raphael Patai's classic analysis of Arab culture and
society. In view of the events of 2001including another bloody year of
heightened conflict between Palestinians and Israelis and the
horrendous terrorist assault on the United States on September 11there
is a critical need to bring this seminal study of the modal Arab
personality to the attention of policymakers, scholars, and the
general public.
In the wake of the September 11 attack, there was a torrent of
commentary on "why" such an assault took place, and on the motivation
and mindset of the terrorists. Much of this commentary was either
ill-informed or agenda-driven. A number of U.S. Middle East scholars
attributed the attack to a simple matter of imbalance in the American
approach to the perennial Arab-Israeli conflict. This facile
explanation did nothing to improve the credibility of the community of
Middle East scholars in the United States, already much diminished by
their misreading of the Arab world and their reaction to the U.S.
response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
To begin a process of understanding the seemingly irrational hatred
that motivated the World Trade Center attackers, one must understand
the social and cultural environment in which they lived and the modal
personality traits that make them susceptible to engaging in terrorist
actions. This book does a great deal to further that understanding. In
fact, it is essential reading. At the institution where I teach
military officers, The Arab Mind forms the basis of my cultural
instruction, complemented by my own experiences of some twenty-five
years living in, studying, or teaching about the Middle East.
Raphael Patai prefaces his 1973 edition of The Arab Mind with the
sentence, "When it comes to the Arabs, I must admit to an incurable
romanticism." So it is with me. I first became interested in the Arab
world in an elective course at the United States Military Academy many
years ago, and my military career thereafter was divided between
assignments with regular army artillery units and tours in the Middle
East. It was during my preparatory study at the American University of
Beirut that I was introduced to the writings of Raphael Patai. In a
sociology class we used his book, Golden River to Golden Road:
Society, Culture and Change in the Middle East.[32][8] Since that
time, I have read a number of his books and admired his careful
scholarship, lucid writing style, and empathetic approach to his
subject matter.
Over the past twelve years, I have also briefed hundreds of military
teams being deployed to the Middle East. When returning from the
Middle East, my students, as well as the members of these teams,
invariably comment on the paramount usefulness of the cultural
instruction in their assignments. In doing so they validate the
analysis and descriptions offered by Raphael Patai.
The officers returning from the Arab world describe the cultural
barriers they encounter as by far the most difficult to navigate, far
beyond those of political perceptions. Thinking back on it, I recall
many occasions on which I was perplexed by actions or behavior on the
part of my Arab hostsactions and behavior that would have been
perfectly understandable had I read The Arab Mind. I have hence
emphasized to my students that there must be a combination of
observation and study to begin a process of understanding another
culture. Simply observing a culture through the prism of our own
beliefs and cultural worldview leads to many misconceptions. More
often than not, this results in a form of cultural shock that can be
totally debilitating to a foreigner working with Arabs. Less common,
but equally non-productive, is the soldier who becomes caught up in a
culture he views as idyllic and "goes native." Inevitably there will
come a time (usually during a political crisis) when the cultural
chasm will force unpleasant reality to resurface.
Mines and Warts
In writing about a culture, one must tread a sensibility minefield,
and none is more treacherous than that of the Middle East. In pursuit
of intellectual honesty and a true-to-life depiction of a people, some
less-than-appealing traits will surface. All cultures and peoples have
their warts. One trait I have observed in Arab societywhich has become
more pronounced over the yearsis an extreme sensitivity to any
critical depiction of Arab culture, no matter how gently the adverse
factors are presented. In his postscript to the 1983 edition of The
Arab Mind, Patai mentions a spate of self-critical assessments of Arab
society by Arab intellectuals in the wake of the "new Arab" said to
have emerged after the 1973 war; but this tendency to self-criticize
proved to be illusory. While we in the United States constantly
criticize our society and leadership, similar introspection is rarely
seen in the Arab world today. When criticism is voiced, it is usually
in terms of a condemnation of Arab acceptance of some aspect of
Western culture. Criticism also often emanates from outside the Arab
region and, despite the so-called globalization of communication, only
the elite have access to it. This is particularly true when political
systems or ideology are discussed.
In no small way, this tendency has led to the current state of affairs
in the Arab world. For this reason, as well as the fact that Patai was
not an Arab, some scholars are dismissive of The Arab Mind, terming it
stereotyped in its portrayal of Arab personality traits. In part, this
stems from the postmodernist philosophy of a recent generation of
scholars who have been inculcated with the currently fashionable idea
of cultural and moral relativism. Much of the American political
science writing on the Middle East today is jargon- and agenda-laden,
bordering on the indecipherable. A fixation on race, class, and gender
has had a destructive effect on Middle East scholarship. It is a real
task to find suitable recent texts that are scholarly and sound in
content, but also readable.
In fact, some of the best and most useful writing on the Arab world
has been by outsiders, mostly Europeans, especially the French and
British. Many of the best and most illuminating works were written
decades ago. The idea that outsiders cannot assess another culture is
patently foolish. The best study done on American societyto take one
famous examplewas written some 160 years ago by the French visitor,
Alexis de Tocqueville, and it still holds mostly true today.
The empathy and warmth of Raphael Patai toward the Arab people are
evident throughout this book. There is neither animus nor rancor nor
condescension. Arabs are portrayed as people who, like all people,
have virtues and vices. Patai's description of his relationship with
the Jerusalem sheikh, Ahmad Fakhr al-Khatib, is indicative of the
esteem in which he held his Arab friends. It is a lamentable fact that
friendships such as this one would be almost impossible to conceive of
at the present time.
Along with his empathy for and understanding of Arab culture, Patai
has a powerfully keen faculty for observation. In a passage in his
autobiographical Journeyman in Jerusalem,[33][9] he describes in
minute detail an Arab date juice vendor and the way he dispenses his
juice. It is this ability to observe and appreciate detail that
enables Patai to grasp the significance of the gestures, nuances of
speech, and behavior patterns of Arabs. To most Americans, the
subtlety of Arab culture is bewildering and incomprehensible. Yet, if
one is to work productively in the region, one must have an
understanding of these cultural traits.
It might legitimately be asked how well Patai's analysis bears up in
today's world. After all, it has been about thirty years since the
majority of The Arab Mind was written. The short answer is that it has
not aged at all. The analysis is just as prescient and on-the-mark now
as on the day it was written. One could even make the argument that,
in fact, many of the traits described have become more pronounced. For
instance, Islamist demagogues have skillfully used the lure of the
Arabic language, so carefully explained by Patai as a powerful
motivator, to galvanize the streets in this era of the Islamic
revival, in a way even the great orator Abdul Nasser could not
achieve.
Blustery Arabic
Patai devoted a large portion of this book to the Arabic language, its
powerful appeal, as well as its inhibiting effects. The proneness to
exaggeration he describes was amply displayed in the Gulf war by the
exhortations of Saddam Hussein to the Arabs in the "mother of all
battles." This penchant for rhetoric and use of hyperbole were a
feature of the Arab press during the war. The ferocity of the Arab
depiction of Iraqi prowess had American experts convinced that there
would be thousands of American casualties. Even when the war was
turning into a humiliating rout, the "Arab street" was loath to accept
this reality as fact.
More recently, the same pattern has been seen in the Arab adoption of
Osama bin Laden as a new Saladin who, with insulting and derogatory
language in his description of American martial qualities, conveyed a
sense of invincibility and power that has subsequently been shown to
be largely imaginary. Saddam Hussein used similar bluster prior to the
1990 Gulf war. Patai traces this custom, which continues to the
present era, back to pre-Islamic days. It is also an apt example of
the Arab tendency to substitute words for action and a desired outcome
for a less palatable reality, or to indulge in wishful thinkingall of
which are reflected in the numerous historical examples Patai
provides. This tendency, combined with Arabs' predilection to idealize
their own history, always in reference to some mythic or heroic era,
has present-day implications. Thus the American incursion into the
Gulf in 1990 became the seventh crusade and was frequently referred to
as another Western and Christian attempt to occupy the Holy Land of
Islama belief galvanizing the current crop of Middle Eastern
terrorists. Meanwhile, Israel is frequently referred to as a "crusader
state."
Patai's discussion of the duality of Arab society, and of the
proclivity for intra-Arab conflict, continues to be revalidated in
each decade. The Arab-against-Arab division in the 1990 Gulf war is
but one example of a continuing Arab condition. Juxtaposed against the
ideal of Arab unity is the present reality of twenty-two divided
states, each with the self-interest of its ruling family or elite
group paramount in policy decisions. In the 1960s, it was the
"progressive states" versus the "reactionary states," which pitted
Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Libya against Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and Morocco. Today it is secular forces versus the Islamists, a
conflict to one degree or another being played out in every Arab
state.
Even when facing a common enemyusually Israel in this era, but also
Iran or Turkeymutual distrust and intra-Arab hostility prevail. In the
Iraqi-Iranian war, for example, Arab support was generally limited to
financial helpwith provisions for repayment, as the angry Saddam
Hussein learned after the war. In [1998], when Turkey threatened Syria
with armed conflict if the leader of the nationalistic Kurdish
movement in Turkey continued to be supported by Syria, it was very
clear that Syria would find itself standing alone. Thus the Asad
regime was forced to make a humiliating submission to Turkish demands.
Perhaps the most telling validation of Patai's insight into the
conflictual nature of Arab society relates to the Palestinians. While
their conflict with Israel has been a bloody one over the years, it
cannot approach the level of death and destruction incurred in
Palestinian wars against Lebanese, Syrians, and Jordanians. Despite
this great violence, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict retains its
place as the primary galvanizing issue for the "Arab street."
Sinister West
Perhaps the section of this book most relevant to today's political
and social environment is the chapter on the psychology of
Westernization. After centuries of certitude that their civilization
was superiora belief evolving from the very poor impression the
European crusaders made on the Arabs and fully justified by the
realitythe Arab self-image was rudely shattered by the easy French
conquest of Egypt in 1798. A declining Middle East had been far
surpassed by a revitalized Europe. The initial shock among the Arab
elite was followed by a period of limited emulation, at least in the
form of Western political and social values.
As the Western political hold on the Arabs receded, Western cultural
influence increased, which in many ways was even more irritating to
the Arab eliteparticularly in terms of the technology invasion that at
every level was a daily reminder of the inability of the Middle East
to compete. Patai's assessment of the Arab view of technology has been
amply supported over the last decades. Clearly enthusiastic users of
technology, particularly in war weaponry, the Arabs nevertheless
remain a lagging producer of technology. Partially, as Patai
demonstrates, this is a reaction to the "jinn" (devil) of Western
culture as it appears to the Arab of the twenty-first century. While
recognizing the superiority of Western technology, the traditional
Arab sees Western culture as destructive to his way of life; hence the
ever-present battle between modernity and modernism: Can a society
modernize without the secular lifestyle that appears to accompany the
process? Adherents of the Islamist ideology, espousing a politicized,
radical Islam, see no contradiction between a seventh-century
theocracy and twenty-first century technology and would answer yes;
however, history does not support such a view in the Middle Eastern
context. As a Muslim coworker put it, "We want your TV sets but not
your programs, your VCRs but not your movies." This will be the
battleground of every Arab nation for the coming generation.
In his section on the "sinister West," Patai gets to the heart of the
burning hatred that seems to drive brutal acts of terrorism against
Americans. Despite its lack of a colonial past in the Middle East,
America, as the most powerful representative of the "West," has
inherited primary enemy status, in place of the French and British.
Patai points out the Arabs' tendency to blame others for the problems
evident in their political systems, quality of life, and economic
power. The Arab media and Arab intellectuals, invoking the staple
mantras against colonialism, Zionism, and imperialism, provide
convenient outside culprits for every corrupt or dysfunctional system
or event in the Arab world. Moreover, this is often magnified and
supported by a number of the newer generation of Western scholars
inculcated with Marxist teaching who, unwittingly perhaps, help Arab
intellectuals to avoid ever having to come to grips with the very real
domestic issues that must be confronted. The Arab world combines a
rejection of Western values with a penchant for carrying around
historical baggage of doubtful utility. At the same time, there is a
simplistic, if understandable, yearning for return to a more glorious
and pristine past that would enable the Arabs once again to confront
the West on equal terms. This particular belief has found many Arab
adherents in the past decade.
Patai also delves into the extremely sensitive issue of the nature of
Islam in a particularly prescient manner. He views the fatalistic
element inherit in Islam as an important factor in providing great
strength to Muslims in times of stress or tragedy; in normal or better
times, however, it acts as an impediment. Given their pervasive belief
that God provides and disposes of all human activity, Muslims tend to
reject the Western concept of man creating his own environment as an
intrusion on God's realm. This includes any attempt to change God's
plan for the fate of the individual. Certainly one can point to
numerous exceptions. But, having worked for long periods with Arab
military units, I can attest to their often cavalier attitude toward
safety precautions, perhaps reflecting a Qur'anic saying, heard in
various forms, that "death will overtake you even if you be inside a
fortress." Just observing how few Arabs use seat belts in their
automobiles can be a revelation. This manifestation of Arab fatalism
is often misconstrued as a lesser value put on human life.
In the all-important area of Muslim relations with other religions,
Patai sums up the differences between Christianity and Islam as being
functional, not doctrinal. The proponents of fundamentalist Islam do
not fear Christianity. They fear that Westernization will "bring about
a reduction of the function of Islam to the modest level on which
Christianity plays its role in the Western world." The quarrel is not
so much with Christianitywhich most Muslims see as a weak religion of
diminishing importanceas with the secularism that has replaced it.
Frequently in the Arab world one hears references to the [singer]
"Madonna" culture and its manifestations of drugs and sexual
promiscuity. Today, while Western military power has become much less
of a threat, the inroads made by Western cultural values have become
more of one.
My special area of interest has been the impact of culture on military
structure, strategy, and operations,[34][10] and in this regard the
assessments of Patai, although not aimed at this area, are
particularly informative. As he wrote, "despite the adoption of
Western weaponry, military methods, and war aims, both the leaders and
the people have kept alive old Arab traditions." The observations and
studies of military specialists continue to support his conclusion.
The Arab military establishment's ineffectiveness in the past century
has never been a matter of lack of courage or intelligence. Rather, it
has been a consequence of a pervasive cultural and political
environment that stifles the development of initiative, independent
thinking, and innovation. This has been commented on by a number of
Middle East specialists, both Arab and non-Arab, but none explains it
as well as Patai, who suggests that Arabs conform not to an
individualistic, inner-directed standard but rather to a standard
established and maintained rigidly within Arab society. As I noticed
among the officers with whom I worked, there was a real reluctance to
"get out front." The distrust of the military's loyalty to the regime
reinforces a military system in which a young, charismatic officer
with innovative ideas will be identified as a future threat to be
carefully monitored by the ubiquitous security agencies.
Family Cohesion
Patai also carefully illuminates the many virtues of Arab society. The
hospitality, generosity, and depth of personal friendships common in
the Arab world are rarely encountered in our more frenetic society.
The Arab sense of honor and of obligation to the familyespecially to
the family's old and young memberscan be contrasted to the frequently
dysfunctional family life found in our own country. Within Arab
culture, old people are seen as a foundation for family cohesion, and
children are welcomed as gifts from God rather than as burdens.
Daughterswho traditionally are valued less than sonsremain the
responsibility of their families, carrying their honor even after
marriage (and it is this sense of family cohesion and honor that, in
its negative aspect, results in the restrictions and controls placed
on women). The idea that the state should bear responsibility for the
welfare of their family would be considered insulting to most Arabs.
Finally, in his 1983 edition, Patai takes an optimistic view of the
future of the Arab world but adds a caveat to his prediction with the
comment that this could happen "only if the Arabs can rid themselves
of their obsession with and hatred of Zionism, Israel, and American
imperialism." In the eighteen years since those words were written,
none of these obsessions has been put to rest. In fact, they have
increased. The imported 1960s and 1970s Western ideologies of Marxism
and socialism have given way to Islamism, a synthesis of Western-style
totalitarianism and superficial Islamic teachings, which has
resurrected historical mythology and revitalized an amorphous but
palpable hatred of the Western "jinns." Nevertheless, many astute
observers of the Arab world see the so-called "Islamic revival" with
its attendant pathologies as cresting and beginning to recede.
Ultimately, the Arabs, who are an immensely determined and adaptable
people, will produce leadership capable of freeing them from
ideological and political bondage, and this will allow them to achieve
their rightful place in the world.
Col. Norvell B. De Atkine (ret.) served eight years in Lebanon,
Jordan, and Egypt (in addition to extensive combat service in
Vietnam). A West Pointer, he holds a graduate degree in Arab
studies from the American University of Beirut. He teaches at the
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina. The opinions expressed here are strictly his own.
Reprinted from The Arab Mind (Hatherleigh Press, 2002), by
permission, all rights reserved.
[35][1] Seymour Hersh, "The Gray Zone," The New Yorker, May 24, 2004.
[36][2] The Guardian (London), May 24, 2004. This, despite the fact
that Whitaker himself, a year earlier, had quoted an authoritative
Arab source on "the Arab mind." As coalition forces encircled Baghdad,
he wrote a piece on the "sense of humiliation" among Arabs and brought
a quote from a Kuwaiti spokesman that could have come straight from
Patai's book: "In the Arab world, there is a classical, traditional
enemy. This traditional enemy has always been the west or the
Americans. This is one vision that always existed in the Arab mind."
The Guardian, Apr. 9, 2003.
[37][3] Ann Marlowe, "Sex, Violence, and The Arab Mind,'" Salon.com,
at
[38]http://www.salonmag.com/books/feature/2004/06/08/arab_mind/index_n
p.html.
[39][4] Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), July 1-7, 2004.
[40][5] Lee Smith, "Inside the Arab Mind," Slate.com, at
[41]http://slate.msn.com/id/2101328/.
[42][6] Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978), pp.
308-9.
[43][7] Most notably, Margaret K. Nydell, Understanding Arabs: A Guide
for Westerners (Yarmouth, Me.: Intercultural Press, 1996), reviewed in
Middle East Quarterly, [44]June 1997, p. 90.
[45][8] Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962, and
subsequent editions.
[46][9] Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1992.
[47][10] Norvell De Atkine, "Why Arabs Lose Wars," Middle East
Quarterly, [48]Dec. 1999, pp. 17-27.
[52]Other items from the Summer 2004 Middle East Quarterly
[53]Other items by Norvell B. De Atkine
[54]Other items in category Middle East patterns
References
25. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn1
26. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn2
27. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn3
28. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn4
29. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn5
30. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn6
31. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn7
32. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn8
33. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn9
34. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftn10
35. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref1
36. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref2
37. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref3
38. http://www.salonmag.com/books/feature/2004/06/08/arab_mind/index_np.html
39. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref4
40. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref5
41. http://slate.msn.com/id/2101328/
42. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref6
43. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref7
44. http://www.meforum.org/article/354
45. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref8
46. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref9
47. http://www.meforum.org/article/636#_ftnref10
52. http://www.meforum.org/meq/issues/200406
53. http://www.meforum.org/docs/author/Norvell+B.+De+Atkine
54. http://www.meforum.org/docs/cat/25
Hidden links:
55. http://t.extreme-dm.com/?login=mefmef
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