[Paleopsych] TLS: John Gray: The tasks ahead . . .
Premise Checker
checker at panix.com
Mon Jun 6 18:01:49 UTC 2005
John Gray: The tasks ahead . . .
The Times Literary Supplement, 97.5.9
http://the-tls.co.uk/archive/story.aspx?story_id=2090351&window_type=print
A new social and political settlement, the historic successor of
post-war social democracy, is under construction in Britain. On May 1,
the British electorate dismissed the Conservatives as a party unfit to
govern the United Kingdom.
By inflicting on the Tories their worst humiliation since the Great
Reform Act of 1832, the electorate has made Tony Blair's modernization
of the Labour Party an unalterable fact of British political life.
After such a vindication there can be no question of Blair's
modernizing strategy being derailed in government by any reversion to
old Labour thinking. Instead the question is what modernization means
for the country that Blair's government has inherited. Which modernity
is Britain now embarked upon?
One vision of British modernity has been rejected irrevocably. The
project of refashioning Britain on the model of the American free
market has suffered a final political defeat. In its earlier phases,
Thatcherite policy was indispensable in building an internationally
competitive market economy in Britain. The triangular collusion of
government, trade unions and employers worked not as a pace-maker for
wealth creation but as an engine of industrial conflict. Mrs Thatcher
succeeded, where Labour could not, in dismantling the jerry-built
structures of British corporatism. The later administrations of
Thatcher and John Major sought to inject market mechanisms into
virtually every British institution. They became vehicles of a
modernizing project guided by the primitive ideology of market
liberalism.
Thatcher's project was programmed to fail. It was imposed on a country
whose attitudes to the market and to the social responsibilities of
government are, at bottom, not transatlantic but European. It was
bound to be repudiated when the social fracturing it produced appeared
to threaten the security of the middle classes. On May 1, Europhobic
nationalism suffered an electoral rout from which it will not recover.
As a result the Conservatives have been left rudderless. It no longer
matters much what Tories think or say. Conservatism has been undone by
its embrace of an ideology alien to the British political tradition.
Unless the Conservatives opt for a generation in the political
wilderness by electing a radically Eurosceptic leader to replace John
Major, we will hear no more of the Thatcherite project of making over
British society into a replica of American individualism.
Yet no error could be more radical than that which is made by those
who imagine that Thatcherism's demise will enable the social
democratic ancien regime of pre-Thatcher times to be re-established in
Britain. The world has changed too fundamentally for any such
restoration to be a possibility. Europe's social democratic regimes
were established during an era of closed economies. They rested on the
capacity of sovereign states to limit the free movement of capital and
production through exchange controls and tariffs. They cannot survive
in an en-vironment in which capital and production exercise unfettered
global mobility. The banalization of new technologies, which spread
swiftly and are turned to profitable uses throughout the world; the
intensification of global competition by the industrialization of the
highly literate and numerate societies of East Asia; the enormous
expansion of world markets consequent on the Soviet collapse and
economic reform in China; the power of the world bond markets over
national governments - this irresistible movement of economic
globalization has effectively destroyed the environment that enabled
social democracy to be established and maintained in Britain and other
European countries.
With the partial exception of Holland, the social democracies of
continental Europe today do not represent a modernity that is
applicable in Britain. They are mired in policies that belong to an
irrecoverable past. A labour market in which job security is
institutionalized is not sustainable when technological innovation is
wiping out entire occupations; pension schemes that tie benefits to a
single employer make little sense when no one can be sure of having
the same vocation across a working lifetime; welfare institutions that
are geared primarily to compensating people for failure are supremely
unfitted for an age of globalization. Unless Europe's social
democratic regimes reform themselves deeply and speedily they will be
blown away by the gale of global competition. There is no prospect of
a Blair government reshaping Britain's institutions on a semi-defunct
European model. The logic of his repeated endorsements of flexible
labour markets points in the opposite direction. In this, Blair is
unquestionably right. The historic role of Britain's new government
must be to take the lead in modernizing European social democracy. In
so doing, it will unavoidably confront the chief dilemma of the age,
which is how to reconcile the necessities of global markets with the
needs of social cohesion.
Old-style social democratic thinking is of little help here. It is
disabled by its preoccupation with issues of distribution. It focuses
more on redistributing income to people trapped in lives without hope
than on improving the primary distribution of skills and opportunities
in society. In this it has been deformed by the influence of
egalitarian theories such as that of John Rawls. Recent political
philosophy mirrors the thinking of the social democrats of a
generation ago in conceiving of social justice as securing a pattern
of outcomes across the whole of society. It has in common with
ideologies of the New Right (such as Hayek's) an insensitivity to the
diverse judgments of fairness we make in different areas of social
life. The Conservative regime was not toppled on May 1 because it
failed to conform to Rawls's difference principle. It was overturned
because it appeared indifferent to vital human needs and seemed
oblivious to the link that ought to exist between large rewards in
public utilities and some claim to meritorious performance.
It is already evident that the new social and economic settlement that
is emerging in Britain will not be embodied in redistributional
policies that pursue equality of outcome. Gordon Brown had made clear
that it will embody a conception of equal opportunity that is maximal,
com-prehensive and lifelong. It will promote merito-cracy and
inclusion rather than equal outcomes. The new realities of economic
globalization preclude traditional social democratic strategies of
redistribution through taxation. If the spread of opportunities and
skills is to be made fairer it will have to be achieved through
changes in priorities in public spending and by reforms of the welfare
state. This involves a marked shift from the liberal egalitarianism
that informed the work of a social democrat such as Anthony Crosland.
Rawlsian social democracy and the Hayekian free market are different
versions of the same liberal individualist philosophy, and they have
the same limitations. For both egalitarian and libertarian liberals,
the basic unit of society is an abstraction - the individual chooser.
Liberal individualists understand human beings as bundles of
preferences, ciphers without histories or enduring attachments. They
neglect the deep ways in which we are all embedded in common forms of
life. They pass over the truth, which has been well articulated in
communitarian theory, that personal well-being cannot be realized
fully in a fragmented society.
Yet communitarian thought can easily fail to track the complex
conflicts of modern plural societies. Contemporary Britain harbours a
variety of ways of life. Many Britons belong not to one but several
cultural traditions. If Britain's welfare state is to be radically
reformed, as man-ifestly it must, it cannot be by policies which aim
to return to an imaginary past of organic communities and seamless
families. Labour's social policies will work well in so far as they
respect diversity - sexual, familial, ethnic and cultural. There is no
one way in which the good life has to be lived now. A communitarian
vision of late modern Britain cannot be other than pluralist.
Labour's commitment to constitutional reform is an index of its
commitment to pluralism. Its proposals for devolution have their final
justification in the manifest fact that Britain is no longer unified
by a single, homogeneous national culture. Its commitment to
incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into British law
is the first stage in a long and delicate search for a stable balance
between the sovereign statehood of the United Kingdom and the
institutions of the European Union.
It is in education, more perhaps than in any other area of policy,
that Britain will benefit from a closer relationship with Europe. Can
a programme of educational reform succeed so long as Britain, unlike
any other European country, discourages selection in state schools?
Can economic renewal be sustained when Britain's schools are vehicles
for the transmission of an atavistic class culture? How can Britain
become one nation so long as it has a two-nation schooling system? How
can we pretend to any kind of modernity so long as we are schooled
into belonging to tribes and castes?
The peculiar deformations of Britain's class culture are only one of
many reasons why it cannot import its understanding of modernity from
any other country. Blair's government is right to look eclectically to
countries as diverse as Holland, Singapore and New Zealand for lessons
in modernization. Yet a successor to social democracy in Britain will
be enduring only if - unlike Thatcherism - it is home-grown. There is
in the end no model for Britain's passage to modernity. None of the
old ideologies of Right or Left can be of much guidance. No country
has yet reconciled the demands of global markets with the maintenance
of social stability. No British government has ever achieved a
sustainable balance between the disciplines of wealth-creation and the
claims of social justice. How Blair's government negotiates these
conflicting imperatives will determine the shape and fate of the new
British settlement.
More information about the paleopsych
mailing list