[Paleopsych] The Times: Matthew Syed: A case of mistaken identity crisis
Premise Checker
checker at panix.com
Wed Jun 15 19:46:44 UTC 2005
Matthew Syed: A case of mistaken identity crisis
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,1072-1644788,00.html
5.6.8
Guest contributors
People afflicted with multiple personalities reveal that the idea of
the self is a fiction
THE MOST sinister form of abuse is that meted out to a child by a
parent. The young have a biological predisposition to "belong" -- a
duckling, for example, will instinctively snuggle up to a human leg if
that is the first thing it sees -- so it is particularly traumatic
when this need for tenderness is met with systematic physical or
sexual violence.
Pamela, the subject of a haunting documentary on Channel 4 tonight,
developed a novel, if somewhat disquieting, mechanism to cope with her
sadistic upbringing: she created new selves. When the pain, squalor
and ignominy became too much to endure, Pamela, as it were, "left it
all behind": while she was abused, she dissociated and departed to
another place -- leaving a new person in her place.
Rémy Aquarone, an analytical psychotherapist, has dealt with these
disturbing cases of what is known as Dissociative Identity Disorder
(DID). "Dissociation is a primitive defence mechanism," he said. "When
something is unbearable to consciousness and cannot be cognitively
processed, it is split off: quite literally dissociated."
In many cases the various "alters" have their own memories and
personality traits. When a switch is about to occur the patient often
undergoes a temporary look of vacancy before the background alter
"emerges". One psychoanalyst I spoke to had worked with a patient who
had a successful job in the City during the week and then travelled to
the South Coast at the weekend to work as a prostitute.
One of the most fascinating aspects of witnessing such people is our
own knee-jerk scepticism. I watched a tape of the documentary and
found it difficult to suppress a growing sense of incredulity, as if I
expected Pamela eventually to wink at the camera and say: "Gotcha!"
This response is not confined to lay people. Doctors repudiated the
condition when it was first diagnosed and it remains hotly contested
today, regarded by many as a phenomenon that has been induced under
hypnotic suggestion by over-zealous clinicians.
But why this reluctance? The problem here is not a lack of evidence --
which is overwhelming -- but a failure of intellectual courage. For
DID strikes at the heart of the most basic myth in our intellectual
vocabulary: the self.
Since we first learnt to use language we have regarded the
first-person pronoun as referring to something that existed in
childhood, exists today, will continue to exist in the future and --
for those of a religious persuasion -- will survive bodily death. We
fondly think of this self as the subject of our experiences, the
instigator of our actions and the custodian of our morality. We are
lulled into this idea by the seeming unity of our consciousness: our
various thoughts and perceptions all knitted into a seamless whole.
This cherished conception is, however, a cruel fiction. It has taken
extreme cases, such as DID, to ram the truth home. Take brain
dissection. In these operations, the corpus callosum -- a large strand
of neurons which facilitates communications between the hemispheres --
is cut to stop the spread of epileptic seizures from one half of the
brain to the other. Under certain laboratory conditions, two "centres
of consciousness" seem to appear in patients who have had this
operation.
For example, suppose that we flash the word CANNOT on a screen in
front of a brain-bisected patient in such a way that the letters CAN
hit one side of the retina, the letters NOT the other and we ensure
that the information hitting each retina stays in one lobe and is not
fed to the other. If such a patient is asked what word is being shown,
the mouth will say CAN while the hand controlled by the hemisphere
that does not control the mouth will write NOT. So much for the
"unity" of consciousness.
What about the notion of the self as instigator of action? We naïvely
suppose that we consciously decide to move, and then move. When
Benjamin Libet conducted an experiment on voluntary action in 1985 he
found that the brain activity began about half a second before the
person was aware of deciding to act. The conscious decision came far
too late to be the cause of the action, as though consciousness is a
mere afterthought. Many reacted to this with astonishment. Why? Did
they really suppose the body was animated by some ghostly mini me
lurking behind the brain?
A more plausible theory is that which is emerging from both biology
and artificial intelligence. As Daniel Dennett, the philosopher, puts
it: "Complex systems can in fact function in what seems to be a
thoroughly `purposeful and integrated' way simply by having lots of
subsystems doing their own thing without any central supervision." The
self, then, is not what it seems to be. There is no soul, no spirit,
no supervisor. There is just a brain, a dull grey collection of
neurons and neural pathways -- going about its business. The illusion
of self is merely a by-product of the brain's organisational
sophistication.
Seen in this light, DID is neither a philosophical absurdity nor a
medical fantasy but a vivid demonstration of the infinite adaptability
of the human mind in the quest for survival. Those who tune in tonight
will feel an overwhelming sense of compassion for the pathetic figure
of Pamela. But, for those who take the intellectual plunge, the most
acute pity will be directed inwardly. Accepting the death of "self" is
both strange and traumatic, bringing with it a profound a sense of
bereavement. Except that there is nothing there to bereave.
Being Pamela, Channel 4, 9pm
More information about the paleopsych
mailing list