[Paleopsych] Virginia Law Review: Dwight Lee: Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice

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Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: Politics, Ideology, and the Power of 
Public Choice

Virginia Law Review
MARCH, 1988
74 Va. L. Rev. 191

Dwight R. Lee *

* Professor of Economics and holder of the Ramsey Chair of Private Enterprise 
Economics, University of Georgia.

SUMMARY:

    ... THE major strength of public choice derives from the assumption that 
individuals, regardless of the decisionmaking environment, are motivated 
primarily by private interests rather than the public interest. ... According 
to this view, the private interest assumption misses the very essence of 
political decision-making and renders public choice largely irrelevant to an 
understanding of the political process. ... Critics of the private interest 
assumption buttress their criticism by pointing to numerous studies that 
indicate that people commonly vote against their economic interests in support 
of broad ideological concerns. ... The key to the public choice explanation for 
the importance of ideology in voting is found in the indecisiveness of the 
individual vote, and the willingness to vote despite this indecisiveness. ... 
If affecting the outcome of an election were the only benefit an individual 
could derive from voting, it would be difficult to explain why people vote in 
the numbers they do. ... The fact that people vote against their economic 
interest in order to support positions of which they approve for ideological 
reasons is hardly an embarrassment to public choice theorists. ... Thus, if the 
voter receives any ideological satisfaction from voting yes, he might as well 
do so; it will not cost him anything even if the legislation is detrimental to 
his economic interest. ...
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   [*191] THE major strength of public choice derives from the assumption that 
individuals, regardless of the decisionmaking environment, are motivated 
primarily by private interests rather than the public interest. Economists have 
long applied this assumption with considerable success to the analysis of 
market behavior. By applying the private interest assumption to political 
behavior, public choice economists have been able to use the analytical 
leverage of economic theory to develop new insights into the operation of the 
political process.

At the same time, critics attack the private interest assumption of public 
choice. Economics has always attracted criticism on the ground that, even in 
market settings, individuals are motivated by concerns broader than their 
private interests. Few deny, however, that private interest is the dominant 
motive in most market choices; when investigating traditional economic behavior 
the private interest assumption is widely, if sometimes grudgingly, accepted as 
a simplification justified by its explanatory power. There is greater 
resistance to the assumption of private interest as the dominant motive in 
political activity.

Most academics (including most economists) whose work concerns government 
policy and practice tend to assume, if only implicitly, that political 
decisionmakers are motivated by the desire to promote the interest of the 
general community. As stated by political scientist Steven Kelman: "There is 
the elementary fact that political decisions apply to the entire community. 
That they do so encourages people to think about others when taking a stand. 
This is in contrast to making personal decisions, when people think mainly of 
themselves." 1 According to this view, the private interest assumption misses 
the very essence of political decision-making [*192] and renders public choice 
largely irrelevant to an understanding of the political process. 2

Critics of the private interest assumption buttress their criticism by pointing 
to numerous studies that indicate that people commonly vote against their 
economic interests in support of broad ideological concerns. 3 Furthermore, the 
fact that people bother to vote at all is seen as evidence that in a political 
setting individuals put their civic responsibility ahead of their private 
interests. If, as public choice economists argue, an individual vote is 
unlikely to affect the outcome of an election, then why would a person 
motivated primarily by self-interest bother to vote at all?

The purpose of this Article is not to deny that individuals commonly vote on 
the basis of ideology and against their economic interests, or that individuals 
will take the trouble to vote, even though they recognize that their vote will 
surely not affect the outcome of the election. These are obvious facts of 
political life, and in no way are they inconsistent with public choice analysis 
or with the private interest assumption that underlies this analysis. Indeed, 
public choice better explains ideological voting than do the critics who point 
to ideological voting in an attempt to discredit public choice. The key to the 
public choice explanation for the importance of ideology in voting is found in 
the indecisiveness of the individual vote, and the willingness to vote despite 
this indecisiveness.

Parts I and II of this Article present a public choice explanation for the 
importance of ideology voting. Although the input of voters influences 
political outcomes, it does not necessarily control those outcomes. The 
concerns of voters interact with the concerns of organized interest groups to 
shape legislation. Part III discusses the effect that this interaction has on 
the ideological content of political decisions.

   [*193] I. VOTING AND THE LOW COST OF IDEOLOGICAL EXPRESSION

That large numbers of people vote is an empirical fact that cannot be denied. 
But why do they do so? People do not go to the polls to vote for one candidate 
over another for the same reason they go to the supermarket to choose one 
product over another. In the supermarket an individual's product choice is 
decisive; the individual receives the product he chooses because he chose it. 
The motivation for making choices in the supermarket is dominated by outcome 
considerations. This is not the case at the polls. The probability that an 
individual's vote will be decisive in a typical election is effectively zero. 
An individual may or may not receive the political outcome she favors, but not 
because she voted for it. The outcome will be the same whether she votes yea, 
nay, or not at all. The expectation of affecting the outcome has little to do 
with an individual's motivation to vote.

If affecting the outcome of an election were the only benefit an individual 
could derive from voting, it would be difficult to explain why people vote in 
the numbers they do. But people receive satisfaction from participating in 
processes they feel are important, from supporting things they believe are 
good, and from opposing things they believe are bad. People are motivated to go 
to the polls and vote for much the same reason they are motivated to go to the 
sports arena and cheer. It is the satisfaction that comes from participation 
and expression, not the expectation that they will determine the outcome, that 
draws people to the polls and to the sports arena. There is no more difficulty 
reconciling voting with private interest than there is with reconciling 
attendance at sporting events with private interest.

Of course, any activity can be reconciled with private interest by inserting it 
into the decisionmakers' utility function as a positively valued variable. The 
obvious criticism of this reconciliation is that the theory that explains 
everything explains nothing. For example, according to Professors Daniel Farber 
and Philip Frickey, "Attempts have been made to reconcile voter behavior with 
the economic model by postulating a 'taste' for voting. This explanation is 
tautological -- anything people do can be 'justified' by saying they have a 
taste for doing it." 4

   [*194] This criticism notwithstanding, it is obvious that people place 
positive value on a multitude of things, including participation and 
expression, and public choice theory is not rendered less useful by 
acknowledging this fact. Public choice assumes, as does economic theory in 
general, that, no matter what their objectives, people pursue them rationally. 
They will allocate their limited resources over alternative activities in order 
to maximize their personal satisfaction. This assumption moves the analysis 
beyond the level of a meaningless tautology that says nothing more than "people 
do those things that they want to do."

The general implication of economic analysis is that if the cost of engaging in 
an activity goes up, people will engage in it less, and vice versa. Applied to 
politics, the analysis implies that people will behave differently in a 
political setting than in a market setting because the relative costs of 
alternative choices are different. This allows behavioral predictions to be 
made on the basis of objective differences between political and market 
institutions, and between the incentives they generate. Methodological 
consistency is therefore possible when evaluating and contrasting differences 
in political and market behavior.

In particular, there is no need to resort to the assumption that people are 
more concerned with the public interest when making political choises than when 
making market choices in order to explain the importance of ideology in 
political behavior. Indeed, by applying the private interest assumption 
uniformly over both decisionmaking settings, public choice provides an 
evenhanded explanation of why ideological considerations are more important in 
political decisions than in market decisions. The fact that people vote against 
their economic interest in order to support positions of which they approve for 
ideological reasons is hardly an embarrassment to public choice theorists. To 
the contrary, the ability to provide a coherent explanation for ideological 
voting illustrates the power of public choice.

People put ideological considerations ahead of economic interests when voting 
for the simple reason that it costs them almost nothing to do so. Consider the 
situation facing an individual who is contemplating a vote for expensive 
environmental protection legislation, or for a candidate who pledges support 
for the legislation. On the one hand, the individual may feel that it is 
important to protect the natural environment, not only for himself but for 
[*195] others as well, and will feel a sense of moral virtue by voting for the 
legislation. On the other hand, he will realize that the legislation, if 
enacted, will impose costs on him in the form of higher prices and taxes. The 
voter can ignore these costs with impunity, however, because his vote will, 
with near certainty, make no difference as to whether or not the legislation is 
enacted. Thus, if the voter receives any ideological satisfaction from voting 
yes, he might as well do so; it will not cost him anything even if the 
legislation is detrimental to his economic interest. 5

This situation contrasts sharply with that faced by decisionmakers in a market 
setting. It is possible for consumers to seek goods produced by firms that 
incur the necessary costs of minimizing the negative environmental impact of 
their productive processes. If enough consumers expressed their ideological 
commitments to a clean environment in this way, it would pay firms to invest 
voluntarily in pollution abatement until, at the margin, the value from a 
cleaner environment equaled the cost of acquiring it, as reflected in higher 
product prices. But this is not an effective approach to environmental 
protection, because few individuals will buy more expensive products, when less 
expensive products are available, in order to reduce environmental pollution. 
To act on the basis of ideological considerations by choosing the more 
expensive products is costly because, as opposed to voting, the individual's 
choices in the marketplace are decisive. The demand curve for ideological 
expression is like all demand curves: greater costs result in less quantity 
demanded. Not surprisingly, then, ideology plays a minor role in market 
decisions and a major role in voting decisions.

II. SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND THE HIGH COST OF IDEOLOGICAL EXPRESSION

Although voters may make decisions predominantly on the basis of ideological 
considerations, the outcomes that emerge from the [*196] political process will 
reflect other considerations as well. Not all political actors will elevate 
ideology to a dominant role, for the simple reason that for some it is more 
costly to do so than it is for the individual voter. Special interest groups 
typically organize around narrowly motivated economic concerns, with little 
regard for ideological considerations. 6 This is to be expected, given the fact 
that organized groups are often able to exert decisive influence over political 
decisions. For an organized group to use this influence to promote an 
ideologically motivated outcome detrimental to its economic interest would be 
genuinely costly. 7

The clear implication is that the influence of politically organized groups 
will reduce the ideological content of political decisions. Public choice 
analysis suggests, however, that this occurs in ways that are not always 
obvious to the casual observer. Organized interests will have less influence on 
the general nature of the legislation that is passed than they will on the 
detailed implementation and enforcement of that legislation. 8

Consider, for example, the previous discussion of the costlessness of 
expressing concern for the environment by voting for an environmental 
protection program. The result is strong electoral, and therefore legislative, 
support for such programs that has little to do with special interest 
influence. But after an individual makes a costless expression of support for 
environmental protection at the polls, much remains to be done if the 
environment is to be protected adequately. It is unfortunately costly for an 
individual to express concern for environmental quality by lobbying for the 
most  [*197]  efficient environmental protection programs and by monitoring 
those who implement these programs. Predictably, there is little genuine public 
surveillance of environmental protection programs, and organized groups have 
significant latitude to influence environmental programs in ways that serve 
their private interests. This means, of course, that these programs are far 
less effective at protecting the environment than they could be. 9

Organized groups often do little to oppose legislation that is potentially 
adverse to their interests, especially when public opinion strongly favors the 
legislation. Well-organized groups often will "get on board" and "support" 
legislation that is inimical to their economic interests. But, as opposed to 
individuals who voted for the legislation and who quickly forgot it once it was 
passed, the affected organized interests will be unrelenting in their efforts 
to influence the day-to-day details of the legislation's implementation. This 
influence will typically not be exerted on behalf of the broad public interest. 
Government attempts to help the poor, protect the consumer, and regulate 
business pricing and practices provide additional examples of supposedly 
general interest legislation that is subverted by organized interest groups. 
The initial motivation for the legislation may have been dominated by 
ideological considerations, but narrow economic concerns motivate the special 
interest influence that does so much to determine its effect.

III. CONCLUSION

As critics of public choice are so fond of pointing out, ideological 
considerations are important in political decisionmaking. But, contrary to the 
criticism, the importance of ideology in politics is completely consistent with 
public choice analysis. Indeed, the power of public choice analysis is 
demonstrated by its ability to explain why ideology is more important in 
political choices than in market choices, without resorting to an ad hoc 
bifurcation of underlying  [*198]  motivations. Public choice assumes that an 
individual making a political decision is fundamentally the same as one making 
a market decision. The explanation for the difference in the ideological 
content of these decisions is found in the differences between political and 
market institutions, and in the effect these differences have on the costs of 
alternative choices. It is simply less costly for people to base decisions on 
ideological considerations in a political setting than in a market setting.

The public choice approach does more, however, than explain why ideology is 
more important in political behavior than in market behavior. The cost of 
ideological decisionmaking varies over different political settings, and the 
ideological content of political decisions varies accordingly. Ideological 
conviction and narrow economic interest interact in interesting ways to 
determine political outcomes, and public choice provides a methodologically 
consistent way of analyzing this interaction. In particular, public choice 
suggests that ideology will be more important than narrow economic interest in 
providing general direction to legislation, but less important in determining 
the details of the legislation and how it is implemented.

Public choice provides only one window through which to view the political 
process. Any serious attempt to understand political phenomena requires the 
view from many windows. But public choice provides a far better perspective on 
the role of ideology in politics than many of its critics seem to realize.

FOOTNOTES:


n1 S. Kelman, Making Public Policy: A Hopeful View of American Government 22 
(1987).

n2 Critics of public choice do not deny that private interest is a powerful 
motive, but rather argue that public choice overstates its influence over 
political behavior: "Instead of trying to mix self-interest and altruism into 
every decision, the individual might try to reserve certain decisions to 
self-interest and others to altruism." Id. at 244. Steven Kelman leaves no 
doubt that people tend to give the greatest weight, or "pride of place," to 
altruism in political decisions. Id.

n3 For citation and discussion of many of these studies, see, e.g., id. at 
255-59; S. Rhoades, The Economist's View of the World: Government, Markets, and 
Public Policy 153-58 (1985); Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public 
Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 897-900 (1987).

n4 Farber & Frickey, supra note 3, at 894 n.129.

n5 Tullock used the indecisiveness of individual votes to explain why people 
vote for poverty programs that, if passed, will cost them far more than they 
would contribute voluntarily. Tullock, The Charity of the Uncharitable, 9 W. 
Econ. J. 379 (1971). For discussions of the implications of the indecisiveness 
of an individual vote, see Brennan & Buchanan, Voter Choice: Evaluating 
Political Alternatives, 28 Am. Behav. Scientist 185 (1984); Brennan & Lomasky, 
The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington, 1 Econ. Phil. 189 (1985).

n6 Some politically active interest groups are organized around ideological 
issues for largely ideological reasons. However, most politically organized 
interest groups, certainly most well-financed interest groups, are motivated 
primarily by narrow economic concerns.

n7 The standard explanation for political interest groups' focus on narrow 
economic interests is that it is easier to organize a group around such 
interests. See M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 142-45 (1965). The 
argument of this Article is that once a group becomes politically influential, 
no matter what the initial impetus behind its organization, it is costly for it 
to ignore private economic concerns in order to advance an ideologically 
motivated agenda.

n8 Based on studies of the legislative impact of organized interest groups, 
some investigators have concluded that these groups have relatively little 
influence. See, e.g., R. Bauer, I. Pool & L. Dexter, American Business and 
Public Policy 341-49 (1963). However, the studies underlying this conclusion 
are flawed because they were concerned almost exclusively with whether Congress 
passes legislation the interest groups favor, and gave little attention to how 
these groups influence the details of legislation that is passed. See K. 
Schlozman & J. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy 8 (1986).

n9 There is compelling evidence that pollution control policy is less effective 
than it could be. See R. Crandall, H. Gruenspecht, T. Keeler & L. Lave, 
Regulating the Automobile 85-116 (1986); A. Kneese & C. Schultze, Pollution, 
Prices, & Public Policy (1975). There is also compelling evidence that the 
deficiencies in pollution control policy are in large measure the result of 
special interest influence. See J. Thomasian, The Clean Air Act, the Electric 
Utilities, and the Coal Market (1982); Bureaucracy vs. Environment: The 
Environmental Costs of Bureaucratic Governance (J. Baden & R. Stroup eds. 
1981); Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 
Yale L.J. 1466, 1497-1511 (1980).