[extropy-chat] Personal Identity (was: A view on cryonics)

[s. p.]

Giulio wrote:
>In a sense you are not the same person after getting a haircut: some
matter
>is missing, you look different in the mirror so after a while your
>self-image is affected, etc.
>But of course you are the same person after getting a haircut.

This is correct. The reason why a person remains the same after getting a
haircut is that even though some atoms are lost, these atoms had no
influence on personal identity in the first place. More precisely, personal
identity depends entirely on the condition of one's mind and in this case
the lost atoms did not affect personal identity because they were not part
of the mind structure.

Brett wrote:
>I don't think my identity is a matter of taste, its a matter of
fact. You as an other may present to me as a pattern but I
don't present to myself as a pattern.

I agree. Some people prefer describing personal identity in terms of
"tastes" or spiritual values. These attitudes often lead to some bizarre
views such as "identity is an illusion" or "even though identity is not an
illusion, we will never get a handle on what it is which gives me a license
to define identity in whatever terms I like and you better respect it".
These attitudes are hard to understand because personal identity depends on
a mind powered by the brain which is a physical object, and like all other
objects, it can and should be subject to scientific investigation.

There is nothing magical about personal identity even though the concept is
abstracted from the abstraction of the brain (brain->mind->identity).
Moreover, once we agree that, in science, there's only one correct
explanation for something at the exclusion of other theories, we can say
that there can only be one explanation/description of personal identity that
is true and all other theories are false.

With that said, I don't think that the one true definition of what personal
identity is should be expected to be grasped easily. It is easy to expect
that personal identity depends entirely on the mind pattern, and you'll have
more friends when you convince yourself of that. "Personal identity depends
entirely on mind pattern" view is so much easier to grasp than the
alternatives because it gives a warm feeling of assurance that as long as
there exist records detailing our mind structures, we can expect to live
forever. Besides, "personal identity depends entirely on mind pattern" view
is easily understandable which adds to its popularity.

Well, don't get me wrong. "Mind pattern defines personal identity" theory is
not entirely false. The reason why it breaks down so easily when applied to
even most basic thought experiments is the same as why it is not entirely
false - it's simply not a complete/precise theory because it focuses on just 
one
of the aspects of what PI is. Obviously, to some extent, PI depends on the
mind pattern in a sense that if mind pattern changes or is damaged, it must
influence PI, but is that all there is to it?

I assume here that all people who think about PI have assumed that the
concept should be grounded (=what PI depends on most) in mind. However,
there is great potential for problems when we ground PI in the incorrect
*definition* of the mind. Perhaps that's why there are many disagreements
when it comes to debating PI.

In my view it is incorrect to define mind as a mind pattern because patterns
are static and our minds are dynamic. The reason why "mind pattern" view is
not entirely false, but merely incomplete, is that it ignores the dynamic
nature of our minds. That dynamic manifests itself not as a pattern but as a
*process* that this pattern enters into. We are able to think and be
conscious not because our mind structures carry this or other pattern but
because there exists an process that executes on that pattern.

Analogously, mind pattern is just like a computer software loaded onto a
hardware (brain). If the power is cut to the computer, the machine just
sits there and does nothing. It is "dead". It comes to "life" only when the
electricity flows through hardware and forces software-defined processes to
take place. "Life", however, is not, in this case, a function of electricity
but the function of an overall process that happens within the system. The
mental existence likewise can only occur when electrical signals flow
through our brainware-software, i.e. that existence/life is totally
dependent on the process that executes on the mind pattern. Life is a
process, not a pattern.

Next step is to define the parameters of a process. Each process is defined
by matter flowing through space and time. Mind process can therefore be
defined as a function of the flow of matter in space and time also, and
since personal identity is grounded in the mind process, it can only be
defined by matter flowing through space-time.

Example: Suppose some person uploads his mind pattern onto 2 machines which 
now
run his mind.

Question: Do these coexisting uploads share the same PI?

Answer: They do not, because each mind process is defined by parameters
(matter in space-time) that do not share the same exact values. These
uploads share the same *kind* of mind process but their identities are
different. They are not the same person but perfect clones only.

Question: If one of the uploads is damaged beyond repair (dies), does it
mean the damaged upload will still live because the other upload will?

Answer: No, the damaged upload dies and won't live again unless you time
travel and physically transport it to the present. His subjective experience
is now death (=nothingness).

Slawomir Paliwoda

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