[extropy-chat] Personal Identity (was: A view on cryonics)

[Rafal Smigrodzki]

Hi Slawek,

s. p. wrote:

> Well, don't get me wrong. "Mind pattern defines personal identity" 
> theory is
> not entirely false. The reason why it breaks down so easily when 
> applied to
> even most basic thought experiments is the same as why it is not entirely
> false - it's simply not a complete/precise theory because it focuses 
> on just one
> of the aspects of what PI is. Obviously, to some extent, PI depends on 
> the
> mind pattern in a sense that if mind pattern changes or is damaged, it 
> must
> influence PI, but is that all there is to it?

### Somehow I don't recall any thought experiments of yours that would 
make my feeling of personal identity break down. Can you refresh my memory?

If I recall correctly, at some point I had you claiming that forcibly 
erasing all your memories by rearranging synaptic strengths into a 
totally different personality wouldn't really kill you as long as your 
brain was going on living.Wasn't that a cool thought experiment?
-----------------------------

>
> Example: Suppose some person uploads his mind pattern onto 2 machines 
> which now
> run his mind.
>
> Question: Do these coexisting uploads share the same PI?
>
> Answer: They do not, because each mind process is defined by parameters
> (matter in space-time) that do not share the same exact values. These
> uploads share the same *kind* of mind process but their identities are
> different. They are not the same person but perfect clones only.

### If they are my uploads, they do, since I (and therefore each of  my 
copies) choose to treat my copies as self (I am a *kind* of mind, not a 
particular mind). If they are your uploads, then it's as you say.

-------------------------------

>
> Question: If one of the uploads is damaged beyond repair (dies), does it
> mean the damaged upload will still live because the other upload will?
>
> Answer: No, the damaged upload dies and won't live again unless you time
> travel and physically transport it to the present. His subjective 
> experience
> is now death (=nothingness).
>
### Yesterday there was a man named Slawek. Today a man named 
Slawek-continuation writes a post. What is the subjective experience of 
yesterday's Slawek? Is he dead? Or is he writing a post?

Rafal