[extropy-chat] Consciousness is a process in multi-dimensional time! [Was: Qualia Bet]

Marc Geddes marc.geddes at gmail.com
Wed Dec 14 04:38:32 UTC 2005


>I'm not sure what exactly it means for something to "exist" that does
not sit in our network of causation.  My claims were not intended to
be much about "existence."  Instead, my main claim is that we can
never get any evidence about such things, whether they exist or not.


Robin Hanson  rhanson at gmu.edu  http://hanson.gmu.edu
Associate Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323



I would certainly dispute your claim Robin.  Many Mathematical Platonists
ascribe objective reality to mathematical entities (like the number '2' )
and at the same time think that such entities are not inside the network of
physical causation.  Kripe  1972) showed that physical causality is not
needed in order to obtain evidence of something.  He pointed out a
non-causal entity can be 'referenced' by means of a meaningful description.
 No causal contact is required.  Furthermore, evidence for the existence of
such entities need not come from direct physical contact, but from their
explanatory power (see the 'Indispensability argument' of Quine (1951) and
Putnam (1971).



There could be more than one different 'type' of 'causality'.  This is my
favored idea.  In the most general sense of the word 'causality' , it just
means 'cause and effect'.  But the notion of cause and effect does not
logically have to be restricted to physical processes.  The question is
whether or not all 'causal' processes are in principle reducible to physical
processes.



--



There could be highly abstract notions of causality which don't directly
match up to the causal processes taking place in the brain.  Take the notion
of a mathematical proof for instance.  The first line of the proof could be
defined as an 'abstract cause'; the second line of the proof could be
defined as an 'abstract effect' and so on.  So it seems to me that a
mathematical proof could be defined as an ABSTRACT kind of causality,
analogous to the physical kind.



Let's go back to the question of 'numbers' and 'qualia' again.  I asked
where numbers existed and you (Robin) answered that they were abstract
patterns not rooted in physical causal networks - only *particular*
instances of patterns were physically instantiated.  Above I've suggested
that the way to make sense of this is through the notion of more than one
kind of causality.  I suggest that abstract patterns like numbers are
'processes' of a non-physical kind (i.e. abstract causality).  One could
imagine that entities like numbers or qualia that are *in part* inside
physical reality, and *in part* outside physical reality.  One could obtain
evidence of such entities if the parts of the entity that are *outside*
physical reality imply observable consequences *within* physical reality.



This was just my idea of 'extra time dimensions' - that there's more than
one valid kind of 'cause and effect'.   When I first suggested this as the
solution to the consciousness puzzle here on Extropy, wta-talk and the SL4
list people thought I'd finally flipped my lid.  But if you think about it
for a while it actually seems quite likely that there are extra time
dimensions and qualia are simply multi-dimensional forms of causality (i.e.
processes taking place in multiple time dimensions).



'Qualia' are generated by brain processes.  But brain processes are
*mathematical* in nature (they are 'algorithms').  Mathematical entities are
abstract patterns. As you Robin agreed, abstract patterns (like
'algorithms') don't exist directly inside physical causal networks, only
particular instances of them do.  This is clear by pointing to the fact that
many different kinds of physical brain processes could enact the *same*
computation (algorithm).  So the physical processes in the brain can't be
*identical* to the mathematical entity (the algorithm) itself.



The only way to make sense of this is to generalize the notion of causality
to include ABSTRACT kinds of causality as I suggested earlier.  Then an
algorithm can be defined as a process taking place in multi-dimensional
time.  This *includes* physical time (physical causality) but extends beyond
it.  So long as a postulated entity (like a 'Quale') is defined as being at
least *partially* inside the network of physical causality, there'll be
observable consequences and scientific evidence for the existence of the
Quale can be gathered.   But this does *not* mean that the Quale fits
completely inside physical causal networks.  .  Take the analogy of a
three-dimensional object (say a cube) passing through a 2-dimensional plane
which we'll call Flatland.  The inhabitants of Flatland can only see in
2-dimensions and they might argue that 'we can only ever gather evidence of
something if it exists in our 2-d space.  Therefore only 2-d objects exist'.
Did you spot the gross error in the reasoning?  Just like a cube passing
through a 2-d plane has part of itself intersecting the plane, a Quale could
be *part* of physical causality without fitting entirely into physical
reality.  The argument summarized again:



(1) Qualia are generated by brain processes



(2) Brain processes are enacting algorithms (mathematical patterns)



(3) The algorithm itself (the mathematical pattern) can't exist totally
inside physical reality, because mathematical patterns are abstractions and
many different types of brain processes can enact the same algorithm.  So
the brain processes themselves can't be identical to the mathematical
algorithm



(4) An algorithm is a process.  But as demonstrated above, it can't be a
process which is confined to physical reality - since it's an ABSTRACT
process.  Therefore it must be a process taking place at least partially
outside physical reality.



(5) Processes are events along time dimensions.  As demonstrated above,
there are processes at least partially taking place outside physical
reality, in the form of mathematical patterns.  Therefore these processes
must be taking place in multiple time dimensions



Ergo, extra time dimensions exist.  And consciousness is a process taking
place in multi-dimensional time.




Gts wrote:


>Types of "Shape" and "Number" are classic platonic ideas, and Locke writes
that these properties are in objects, whether or not we perceive them.
If  qualia
truly have objective reality as you and I want to say then I think  we have
to admit they too are qualities of the object whether or not we  perceive
them. What else could we mean by objective? We might say the  qualities have
their origin in the platonic realm of ideas, and can be  seen only when we
perceive the object, but they are nevertheless objective  properties of the
object.


We do seem to be in partial agreement but I hope I can persuade you that
Qualia are *not* primary properties of physical objects!



 'Green' can't possibly be  a primary property of green objects! To see why,
just imagine an alien with a brain wired differently from ours, so that what
we see as 'Green', the alien sees as 'Red'.  He would see our so-called
'Green' objects as Red.



Remember, we agreed that Qualia are objectively real and that they're 'real'
in the same sense that 'numbers' are real.  So it's a mistake to say that
they're primary properties of physical objects.  Instead, they exist in
Plato's world of abstract forms.



A Quale, as I said, is a *relationship* between a physical object and an
observer.  Qualia, for the reasons I just gave, cannot be primary properties
of physical objects, but instead exist in Plato's world of abstract forms.  To
see how this works, imagine that Plato's world of forms is 2-dimensional.  To
locate the 'Green Quale' in Plato's world you would need two
co-ordinates.  Then
the properties possessed by physical things (like green objects) are
*psuedo-Quale* (or proto-Quale) which give *one* co-ordinate for a location
in Plato's world.  But a second thing (an observer) is needed to give the
*second* co-ordinate and fix the location of the Quale in Plato's world.  The
Green Quale itself is not a property of the Green object, nor is it
equivalent to the material processes in the brain of the observer, but
exists instead in Plato's world of forms.

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