[ExI] [extropy-chat] What should survive and why?

Thu May 3 06:45:53 UTC 2007

On 03/05/07, Heartland <velvethum at hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> Stathis to Heartland:
> >>    One of the problems in this debate is that the terminology can seem
> to
> >>    imply the conclusion which is at issue in the first place. This is
> >>    where I find the concept of the observer moment useful. An observer
> >>    moment, or OM, unambiguously specifies an instance of conscious
> >>    experience. Even if all hell breaks loose with duplications, we can
>
> Eugen to Stathis:
> > It's hardly a moment, though. "Conscious experience", whatever that
> means.
> > implies a trajectory segment long enough for higher-order processes to
> > happen, which puts it into some 100 ms country.
>
> What Eugen points out is, of course, exactly what I've been trying to
> point out
> to you (Stathis) and others several times before by saying that any
> process  (and
> minds are undoubtedly processes, not patterns) is undefined across time
> intervals =
> 0. This means that there's no such thing as a "snapshot of process." Using
> your
> terminology, there's no such thing as observer *moment.* If anything,
> there can
> only be observer *intervals.*

That's OK, my main purpose in making this point was to avoid confusion when
the pronouns and proper names seem to refer to the "same" person when the
whole argument is over what should qualify as "same", so you can consider
the observer as extended over time as long as no-one is claiming there is
some significant change during the interval.

Having said that, it seems you are assuming as fundamental to physics that
time is continuous and linear, whereas as far as I am aware discrete, and/or
non-linear (i.e. block universe) time is consistent with all experimental
observations. And even if it could be shown that time is continuous and
linear, you still have the problem of how to conceptualise an infinitesimal
interval, during which by definition there is no room for any change.

First we should decide what death means and that will inform us when death
> occurs,
> not the other way around. (Lee, I completely disagree with you on this
> point too.)
> Definition of death should
> follow from a definition of life. Life is a physical (dynamic) process
> (its
> activity, to be precise), not a (static) pattern. Absence of that activity
> is death
> even though I realize this is not immediately obvious.

This is the problem. A lot of people will say that temporary suspension of
the processes that characterise life is *not* death. I would go as far as
suggesting that the great majority of people would say this. Where does this
leave you with your definition? Who decides what death actually is?

Stathis:
> >> The arbitrariness of the definition of death - yours and mine - is
> >> what is at issue.
>
> Yes. You and many others define it in terms of likeness. I define it in
> terms of
> utility. I argue that utility has priority over likeness as the latter is
> a
> consequence of the former. Survival should be about preservation of our
> ability to
> derive benefit rather than about preservation of likeness.

You are assuming that which is at issue in this statement. I would say that
what you are calling preservation of likeness *is* survival. To put it
slightly differently, if it's only my likeness that survives after a period
of interrupted neural activity, then it's also only my likeness that
survives a period of normal neural activity. You have to come up with a
reason why the interruption should change anything.

Stathis:
> >> I believe that the mind can survive in different hardware.
>
> Okay, that's better.
>
> Stathis:
> You have agreed to as much when you allowed that swapping out the atoms in
> >> your brain for "different" atoms does not necessarily kill you.
>
> Yes.
>
> Stathis:
> >> However, you claim that even brief interruption of the activity in
> >> the brain *does* kill you. If the mental supervenes on the physical,
> >> and the same atoms are going about their business in the same way a
> >> moment later, then the same mental process should be being
> >> implemented despite the interruption.
>
> Obviously you're using the word "same" as in "same type," not as in "same
> instance." You're not showing inconsistencies within my own argument, but
> merely
> pointing out that this argument is inconsistent with your beliefs. What
> I'm saying
> is supposed to be inconsistent with your beliefs. :-)

You seem to be agreeing that there might be absolutely no difference between
the instance and the type, other than the past history. Suppose you discover
that yesterday there was a nanosecond interruption in your brain processes
with the result that today you are a different instance of Heartland.
Heartland1's family are very upset at this news, and out of pity for them
you (Heartland2) decide to sacrifice your life to bring back Heartland1 by
means of time travel. So you send someone back into the past to prevent the
brain interruption which caused Heartland1's death. As a result - nothing
physical or mental changes. Your brain is exactly the same, and your
thoughts are exactly the same, because the brief interruption (although it
killed you) did not result in any observable change the next day. However,
despite this, the original Heartland1 is now still alive and Heartland2 is
dead. Heartland1 and his family rejoice, while Heartland2 doesn't do
anything - he is dead and gone. So you could be alive or dead, one person or
a different person, with no physical or mental change whatsoever. Isn't this
a little strange?

Stathis:
> That is, if the
> >> post-interruption physical state is exactly the same as if it would
> >> have been had there been no interruption, and yet the interruption
> >> gives rise to a different person, then the difference must be due to
> >> some non-physical factor. Worse than that, the difference must be
> >> due to some non-mental factor as well, since if the physical state
> >> is the same the mental state must also be the same. So the
> >> interruption causes a non-physical, non-mental change which results
> >> in one person dying and another being born in their place. Even if
> >> this were coherent (and I don't believe it is), it would imply the
> >> existence of a soul.
>
> Here's the deal. If you assume "same" to mean "same type," you can accuse
> me of a
> belief in soul and be "right" within your own framework of assumptions. If
> I assume
> "same" to mean "same instance," I can show you (and I think I did) that
> you
> believe in souls too and I'm going to be "right" as well. Of course, I
> knew from
> the beginning that we would be locked in the stalemate like this which is
> precisely
> why I offered you "master and servant" scenario to think about right at
> the
> beginning of our discussion hoping you would reevaluate your ideas about
> what it
> means to survive. Should survival reduce to preservation of some degree of
> my
> likeness (type), as Lee suggests, or should it reduce to preservation of
> my
> (current instance's)
> ability to derive benefit which is what I advocate? In other words, what
> should
> survive and why?

Within the framework you are proposing, I argue that it is impossible to
distinguish between an instance and a type. I could claim that your instance
changes whenever you observe a red light and you would have no
counterargument that could not also be used against your claim that your
instance changes whenever your brain activity is temporarily interrupted.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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