[ExI] The Upload Game

Lee Corbin lcorbin at rawbw.com
Sat Apr 26 06:20:56 UTC 2008

Stathis writes

> Most people would not mind a few minutes of memory loss while they
> would mind if they faced destruction of the original a few minutes
> after a backup copy was made. This is inconsistent, because the two
> situations are equivalent.


> Lee would say that it should be acceptable if you are destroyed
> with a short delay after your backup is made, provided that this
> is in exchange for some large enough benefit for the backup.
> This does restore consistency,

Right. And it's the only way I've ever found to do so.

> but at the cost of what I consider the whole point of survival:
> anticipation of future experiences. If I can convince myself
> that anticipation of future experiences doesn't matter, then
> I would have convinced myself that death doesn't matter.

As we've exchanged before, I don't think that anticipation
is sacrificed. But anticipation seems to be only an emotion,
and I've had to abandon trying to make consistent use of
it as anything more.  I, as a particular instance, *do* anticipate
waking up in my bed tomorrow (and a lot richer!), even though
my frozen duplicate in the next room is without the last few
mintues of my memories. 

But the emotion anticipation cannot be made consistent.
If Nurse Ratchet approaches my duplicate with the needle
it's that instance of me that must cringe, not this instance,
despite what physics is saying about the equivalence of
events. Do you believe that anticipation can be made
wholly consistent and logical?


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