[ExI] A Simulation Argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 06/01/2008, Ian Goddard <iamgoddard at yahoo.com> wrote:

>  If Occam's razor is a useful rule of thumb and the
> simulation theory is equally explanatory as the MWI,
> we should reject the MWI outright given the economy of
> the simulation theory. Indeed, the MWI would seem to
> be a prototype violation of Occam's razor wherein
> entities (worlds) are multiplied beyond necessity.

It's a common criticism, but in fact Occam's razor is the main
justification of the MWI.

The "entities" in Occam's razor are assumptions, not quantities of
physical objects. It is simpler to suppose that the universe is
infinite in extent than to suppose that it ends at the edge of visible
space, even though an infinite universe is infinitely larger than the
Hubble volume, and moreover isn't empirically verifiable. Similarly,
the MWI is what is left if you remove from quantum mechanics the
notion of an arbitrary "collapse of the wave function" or other
explanation such as the simulation one. It is of course *possible*
that there is a collapse or a simulation taking place, but these are
extra assumptions which the razor should cut away unless there is some
extra justification for them.

>  Furthermore, MWI requires that we posit states of
> affairs without antecedent in empirical experience.
> Nobody has seen one world branch off another world.
> MWI is metaphysical.

Yes, but arguably every theory of reality is metaphysical; for
example, the theory than objects don't disappear when you look away
from them and reappear when you look back. If you want to be a strict
positivist (and I must say, I think positivism has a lot going for
it), you should refrain from any metaphysical speculation including
the "common sense" kind.

> On the other hand,
> computer-generated simulations have antecedence in
> experience because humans have created and observed
> them. So at least we know worlds with simulations in
> them can exist. The simulation theory is therefore
> built up by classical Humean induction on empirical
> experience, which is to say the simulation theory
> looks like a scientific hypothesis, whether or not
> falsification criteria have been, or can be, clearly
> defined. ~Ian

You're making one other assumption which has no antecedence in
experience, namely that reality should be "classical" unless someone
is tampering with it. The only example of reality anyone has ever seen
is non-classical.




-- 
Stathis Papaioannou