[ExI] Digital Consciousness .
anders at aleph.se
Thu Apr 25 23:32:08 UTC 2013
On 25/04/2013 21:52, Alan Grimes wrote:
> Kelly Anderson wrote:
>> Furthermore, claiming identity based on pattern identity theory
>> and then claiming the ability to make whole-sale changes is
>> isomorphic to having your cake and eating it too.
>> I don't want my upload to be identical to me. I want my upload to be
>> a better me. That's why I call it transhumanism. Or am I missing
>> something vital here?
> By what means, then, can you call such an upload, your future self???
It depends on what kind of selfhood you are using.
For example, if you regard selfhood as linked to having memories of your
past and overlapping core characteristics (say some cherished
personality traits) then there might not be a problem with enhanced
uploads. Or multiple copies of them. If you use some other selfhood your
identity might not be preserved in uploading, or perhaps even in simple
enhancement. Or even when passing through sleep.
But which selfhood definition is true? I don't think there is a true
one. There is just stuff morphing across spacetime, and some parts of
the stuff use certain definitions. Selfhood is not a natural category
for most systems and there is no reason to think it has to apply to
OK, this Anders-instance just speed-read through Osamu Tezuka's Buddha,
so it might be unusually serene tonight :-)
Future of Humanity Institute
Oxford Martin School
Faculty of Philosophy
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