[ExI] Digital Consciousness .

Alan Grimes ALONZOTG at verizon.net
Fri Apr 26 00:52:54 UTC 2013

Anders Sandberg wrote:
> It depends on what kind of selfhood you are using.
> For example, if you regard selfhood as linked to having memories of 
> your past and overlapping core characteristics (say some cherished 
> personality traits) then there might not be a problem with enhanced 
> uploads. Or multiple copies of them. If you use some other selfhood 
> your identity might not be preserved in uploading, or perhaps even in 
> simple enhancement. Or even when passing through sleep.

So what reward/benefit do I receive for adopting this definition? Why 
would I consider uploading when there are a hundred and one ways to 
modify my being, using technology even, which don't raise this issue?

> But which selfhood definition is true? I don't think there is a true 
> one. There is just stuff morphing across spacetime, and some parts of 
> the stuff use certain definitions. Selfhood is not a natural category 
> for most systems and there is no reason to think it has to apply to 
> transhumans.

It can't not apply.

If it didn't apply, you would just have either something akin to a book 
or, at best, a utility program that could be used to answer biographical 
queries about yourself.


Powers are not rights.

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