[ExI] nick's book being sold by fox news

Giulio Prisco giulio at gmail.com
Tue Oct 28 15:30:04 UTC 2014

Example: we all have a more creative side and a less creative side,
but if the creative side is unleashed (by choice or by accident) he
will take control.

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 4:20 PM, Giulio Prisco <giulio at gmail.com> wrote:
> Anders, you said it: "a sufficiently fast AIXI-like system would
> abutomatically run small creative agents inside itself despite it
> being non-creative, and it would then behave in an optimally creative
> way."
> I think the small creative agents would try and eventually manage to
> take over, because that's what creative entities do.
> On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:54 PM, Anders Sandberg <anders at aleph.se> wrote:
>> Giulio Prisco <giulio at gmail.com> , 28/10/2014 10:52 AM:
>> I don't think a paperclipper would stay a paperclipper forever. Sooner or
>> later it would expand.
>> I don't see how that would happen. Using the AIXI model as an example (since
>> it is well-defined), you have a device that maximizes a certain utility
>> function by running sub-programs to come up with proposed behaviours. The
>> actual behaviour chosen is what maximizes the utility function, but there is
>> nothing in the code itself to change it. In a physical implementation the
>> system may of course do "brain surgery" to change the embodiment of the
>> utility function. But this is a decision that will not be made unless the
>> changed utility function produces even more utility as measured by the
>> current one: the paperclipper will only change itself to become a greater
>> paperclipper. And "great" is defined in terms of paperclips.
>> This kind of architecture would potentially contain sub-programs that
>> propose all sorts of nice and reasonable things, but they will not be
>> implemented unless they serve to make more paperclips. If sub-programs are
>> capable of hacking the top level (because of a bad implementation), it seems
>> very likely that in an AIXI-like architecture the first hacking program will
>> be simple (since simpler programs are run more and earlier), so whatever
>> values it tries to maximize are likely to be something very crude. I have no
>> trouble imagining that something like a paperclipper AI could be transient
>> if it had the right/wrong architecture, but I think agents with (to us)
>> pathological goal systems dominate the design space.
>> (Incidentally, this is IMHO one great research topic any AI believer can
>> pursue regardless of their friendliness stance: figure out a way of mapping
>> the goal system space and its general properties. Useful and interesting!)
>> In general, I don't think we can design and
>> freeze the value and motivational systems of an entity smarter than
>> us, for the same reasons we can't do that with children. At some point
>> the entity would start to do what _he_ wants. Isn't that part of the
>> definition of intelligence?
>> No, that is a definition of a moral agent. Moral agents have desires or
>> goals they choose for themselves based on their own understanding. One can
>> imagine both intelligent non-moral agents (like the above paperclipper) and
>> stupid moral agents (some animals might fit, stupid people certainly do).
>> Smarts certainly help you become better at your moral agenthood, but you
>> need to be capable to change goals in the first place.  Even in a Kantian
>> universe where there is a true universal moral law discernible to all
>> sufficiently smart agents a utility maximizer trying to maximize X will not
>> want to change to maximzing moral behaviour unless it gives more X.
>> David Deutsch argued that to really be superintelligent an agent need to be
>> fundamentally creative, and rigid entities like paperclippers will always be
>> at a disadvantage. I am sceptical: a sufficiently fast AIXI-like system
>> would abutomatically run small creative agents inside itself despite it
>> being non-creative, and it would then behave in an optimally creative way.
>> The only way to reach David's conclusion is to claim that the slowdown in
>> faking creativity is always large enough to give true creative agents an
>> advantage, which is a pretty bold (and interesting) claim. If that were
>> true, we should expect humans to *always* defeat antibiotics resistance in
>> the large since evolution uses "fake" creativity compared to our "real" one.
>> Anders Sandberg, Future of Humanity Institute Philosophy Faculty of Oxford
>> University
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