[ExI] Bell's Inequality

Jason Resch jasonresch at gmail.com
Fri Dec 16 22:49:58 UTC 2016

On Thu, Dec 15, 2016 at 2:43 AM, Adrian Tymes <atymes at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 15, 2016 at 12:04 AM, Jason Resch <jasonresch at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > The difficulty is we
> > can't prove there is no collapse from our vantage point. Running an
> > execution of some program on a quantum computer necessitates that there
> is
> > no collapse from your point of view. If we run a brain simulation and we
> > know there is no collapse, then we know some, possibly exponentially
> > growing, number of divergent emulations of that mind were instantiated in
> > that superposition.
> I don't see how we know that any divergent emulation were
> instantiated.  All we know for sure is that at least one was: the one
> resulting in the resulting state.  We don't know whether any others
> existed.

If the wave function is real, and not merely a tool that yields right
probabilities for us, then the superpositions within the wave function
would all have an equal claim to reality.

> > The difference between quantum computers and fluid dynamics, is that some
> > large enough problem in fluid dynamics, using this method, will
> eventually
> > break down as the finite limited number of atoms leads to the fluid
> becoming
> > discrete atoms/molecules,
> I think you mean "small enough".  For large fluids, even a large
> number of atoms is still a fluid - but, yes, go small enough and you
> are indeed dealing with discrete particles rather than a fluid.

This is kind of what I meant, if the container is large enough, the
discrete nature of the fluid will eventually break down. E.g. a system of
pies, each of which splits into two pipes every foot, and if this goes on
for 1000 feet.

> > and this limit is pretty tightly constrained based
> > on the some 10^80 number of atoms in this universe.
> Granted as a practical limit, but the math and general nature of fluid
> dynamics holds up if we were to introduce 10^90 more atoms.
> > Quantum computers, using qubits, can for example, factor the product of
> any
> > two prime numbers so long as the quantum computer has at least twice as
> many
> > qubits as it takes to represent the number being factored. So a number
> that
> > is 10,000 bits long could be factored by a quantum computer with 20,000
> > qubits. However, this quantum computer, which could fit on your
> tabletop, is
> > effectively exploring 2^10,000 possibilities, more possibilities by far
> than
> > atoms in the observable universe, and it does so near instantaneously. A
> > classical computer, on the other hand, even if it were so big it used all
> > the atoms in the observable universe and it ran until the heat death of
> the
> > universe, would likely never find the answer.
> >
> > This is why fact that quantum computers can be built so strongly suggests
> > the existence/reality/and effective causality of vast unseen resources
> > present throughout the (now assuredly very real) wave function.
> For certain definitions of "resources", but it doesn't suggest any of
> those resources exist outside of or necessarily spawn other worlds.

Then what resources is the computation using? We can agree we get the final
answer and it is not by magic, so clearly something real is responsible for
yielding the answer. According to the theory, this thing is the wave
function, and the resources used are all of the wave functions various

> > Once one accepts the reality of the
> > wave function, all that is required to get to many worlds is to assume
> > yourself as Wigner's Friend (in the thought experiment).
> As in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wigner's_friend ?


>   As the article
> notes, the friend could be in a superimposed state.  Another
> possibility, which I have illustrated before, is that which way the
> experiment would go was determined at least as early as the last
> conscious actor performing any action that could influence the
> experiment (such as the exact timing of putting the cat in the box),
> even if no such actor knew the outcome yet.

There's nothing to motivate this theory.

In fact, there's been no reason to believe in Copenhagen Interpretation
since Everett used the assumption of no collapse to show how the math of
the theory produces the illusion of collapse. You can't get a more clear
cut case for Occam's razor's preference for MW over CI than this: explains
more, while assuming less.

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