[ExI] Bell's Inequality

[Adrian Tymes]

On Fri, Dec 16, 2016 at 2:49 PM, Jason Resch <jasonresch at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 15, 2016 at 2:43 AM, Adrian Tymes <atymes at gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 15, 2016 at 12:04 AM, Jason Resch <jasonresch at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> > The difficulty is we
>> > can't prove there is no collapse from our vantage point. Running an
>> > execution of some program on a quantum computer necessitates that there
>> > is
>> > no collapse from your point of view. If we run a brain simulation and we
>> > know there is no collapse, then we know some, possibly exponentially
>> > growing, number of divergent emulations of that mind were instantiated
>> > in
>> > that superposition.
>>
>> I don't see how we know that any divergent emulation were
>> instantiated.  All we know for sure is that at least one was: the one
>> resulting in the resulting state.  We don't know whether any others
>> existed.
>
> If the wave function is real, and not merely a tool that yields right
> probabilities for us, then the superpositions within the wave function would
> all have an equal claim to reality.

Not so much.  If there is a "right" probability, then by definition it
has a superior claim.

> E.g. a system of pies, each
> of which splits into two pipes every foot

I know that was a typo, but "a system of pies" calls into mind some
weird mental imagery.  (Though the fact that I've been baking a bit
today may have helped.)  :P

>> > This is why fact that quantum computers can be built so strongly
>> > suggests
>> > the existence/reality/and effective causality of vast unseen resources
>> > present throughout the (now assuredly very real) wave function.
>>
>> For certain definitions of "resources", but it doesn't suggest any of
>> those resources exist outside of or necessarily spawn other worlds.
>
> Then what resources is the computation using? We can agree we get the final
> answer and it is not by magic, so clearly something real is responsible for
> yielding the answer. According to the theory, this thing is the wave
> function, and the resources used are all of the wave functions various
> superpositions.

"Assume MWI, therefore MWI."  Sorry, that's circular reasoning.

>>   As the article
>> notes, the friend could be in a superimposed state.  Another
>> possibility, which I have illustrated before, is that which way the
>> experiment would go was determined at least as early as the last
>> conscious actor performing any action that could influence the
>> experiment (such as the exact timing of putting the cat in the box),
>> even if no such actor knew the outcome yet.
>
> There's nothing to motivate this theory.

There's just as much to motivate that theory as there is MWI - to wit,
nothing that proves either way.

> In fact, there's been no reason to believe in Copenhagen Interpretation
> since Everett used the assumption of no collapse to show how the math of the
> theory produces the illusion of collapse. You can't get a more clear cut
> case for Occam's razor's preference for MW over CI than this: explains more,
> while assuming less.

If we're using Occam's Razor (which, granted, I have been), then
predetermination (with possible exception for conscious actors, up
until their last action that could influence a given result) seems
simpler than MWI, as it does not assume anything we can not observe.