[ExI] Do digital computers feel?

Thu Feb 16 03:23:20 UTC 2017

On Wed., 15 Feb. 2017 at 4:48 pm, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
> Hi Stathis,
>
>
> Thanks for expressing all this so concisely. I hope I can be as concise so
> we can make progress with this.  I think the key point in our
> misunderstanding is captured by you with this:
>
> On 2/14/2017 5:02 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> You're missing the point when you talk about "qualitative representation".
> *Observable behaviour* is the only thing necessary to consider in order to
> replicate *observable behaviour*. The argument is that if you ignore qualia
> and just replicate *observable behaviour* then the qualia will also
> necessarily be replicated. I gave an example of this which I believe is
> clear (tell me if not) with the glutamate/glycine swap.
>
>
> Yes, your answer was very clear.  I agree with most of what you are
> saying, but we both believe that the other is missing the point.  You first
> want to focus on: "If you ignore qualia and just replicate *observable
> behavior* then the qualia will also necessarily be replicated."  But even
> if I do agree with this, from how I see things, it is still missing or
> removing some important functionality.  In the past you never want to move
> beyond this, because or until this has been settled.  The problem is, I
> can't point out the required functionality being removed, until you first
> understand and agree with some other things in the qualitative theory.  So,
> this time, could you move beyond that, at least for a bit and digest this
> initial description, then given that understanding (if you agree), I'll be
> able to point out the reasons I can't yet accept this functionalist way of
> doing neuro substitution.
>
> Let's start on the subjective side of things, again, with our simple 3
> element system.  The system is experiencing both redness and greenness as a
> unified composite qualitative experience.  So, there are two qualitative
> representations of knowledge and there is a 3rd part of the system that is
> binding the two different representations into one composite experience.
> The fact that the system is aware of both of these qualitative
> representations at the same time, is the critical base functionality on
> which the comparison system is derived - outputting an indicator that could
> lead to one saying they are consciously aware that they are qualitatively
> the same or not.
>
> So, given that we subjectively know that, would you agree with the
> following?  There must be something that is performing the functionality of
> the redness experience, and there is something that is performing the
> functionality of the greenness, and there is a 3rd element that is
> performing the function of binding these two representations of information
> together to make a composite experience - enabling the 3rd
> awareness/comparison neuron to indicate whether they are the same or not.
>
> You seem loath to want to go there, instead, first, wanting to first focus
> on: "If you ignore qualia and just replicate *observable behavior* then the
> qualia will also necessarily be replicated."  But this ignoring of qualia
> is the problem, and you end up removing the most important parts of the
> functionality we want to observe as we neuro substitute.
>
> Let's compare this subjective way of observing things to the objective way
> of observing things, and for the time being assume it is glutamate that has
> or performs the redness experience functionality, and it is glycene that
> performs the greenness experience functionality.  Given that, with
> subjective observation, we would experience a redness detector and with
> objective observation we would see a glutamate detector.  So, what the 3rd
> part of the system (we are assuming it is a single neuron for simplicity's
> sake) is basically an objective and subjective comparison system -
> outputting an indicator as to whether the two representations of knowledge
> are functioning the same or not.  This functionality derived from the way
> it binds together awareness of the two representations of knowledge to make
> one composite qualitative experience.
>
> Now, when you say you replace glutamate with glycene, and you replace the
> glutamate receptor with a glycene receptor, then assert that the comparison
> neuron will behave the same, you are removing the important comparison
> functionality, or simply falsifying the theory that it is only glutamate
> that reliably performs the redness function (if so, necessitating that it
> be something else, yet to be discovered, that is reliably performing the
> redness functionality we know so well).  Both representations of knowledge
> are now the same qualitative glycene (or the greenness functionality), yet
> you are asserting that the output is still indicating that the two are
> different.  This removal of the correct functionality as you do the neuro
> substitution, is why I can't accept your line of reasoning, along with it
> being the source of all the "hard" problems.
>

I started answering point by point but I think it is best to just respond
to this point, because it seems that you are ignoring what
neurotransmitters actually do. Neurotransmitters are small molecules that
are released from the presynaptic neuron and bind to the appropriate
receptor on the postsynaptic neuron. Receptors are proteins in the cell
membrane which have special sites to which neurotransmitters attach
non-covalently (without forming a permanent chemical bond), sometimes
described as being analogous to a lock and key mechanism. As a result of
this interaction the receptor protein is pulled into a different shape,
leading to a cascade of events in the neuron. With so-called ionotropic
receptors the binding of the neurotransmitter opens up channels in the
receptor allowing ions to move into and out of the neuron: sodium,
potassium or calcium ions. Since ions are charged entities, this changes
the voltage across the cell membrane, which can then change the shape of
transmembrane proteins called voltage-gated ion channels, which can then
cause a spike in voltage to propagates down the axon of the neuron, and
ultimately to cause neurotransmitter release at the end of the axon,
triggering the next neuron in the chain.

Now, if we swap glutamate for glycine in this setup it won't work - glycine
will not bind to the glutamate receptors. If we swap the glutamate
receptors for glycine receptors it won't work - glutamate will not bind to
glycine receptors. But if we swap glutamate for glycine and glutamate
receptors for glycine receptors, and the glycine receptors otherwise have
similar properties to the glutamate receptors (open similar ion channels
when glycine binds), then the neuron will behave in the same way in regard
to when it will fire, and hence all the downstream neurons and the muscles
will behave in the same way, and the subject will behave in the same way.
"The subject will behave in the same way" means, among other things, that
the subject will say in a before/after comparison that the strawberries
look red to him in exactly the same way as they did before. If you don't
agree with this, then please point out where in the detailed chain of
events I have described I have missed something and explain how the
glutamate/glycine swap (leaving everything else in the brain the same) can
possibly lead to the subject saying that his qualia have changed.

If you assume the qualia experience functionality will arise or emerge in
> some other way or some other abstracted level, then it is this other
> abstracted location of qualia that can't be ignored, and must be able to be
> reliably compared via composite awareness.  I am talking about doing a
> neuro substitution at this level, with the required qualia comparison
> functionality, not the level you are talking about, where the qualia being
> compared is being removed.  If you are going to claim that a comparison
> functionality can be constructed out of this simplistic lower level (I
> don't see how this could be done), then provide at least one theoretically
> possible description of such (as I have done with glutamate, glycene, and a
> binder neuron to make a composite experience), and with that, whatever it
> is, it will be obvious what happens, and why, as the neural substitution
> occurs.
>
> If you do the neural substitutuion on a system that, instead of ignoring
> and removing qualia comparison, you provide any testable theoretical method
> of really doing the function of qualitative comparison, it can be obvious
> what is going on during the neural substitution.  Let's do this by having
> two sets of such identical 3 element qualitative comparison systems, one
> that doesn't change and is for constant reference comparison purposes, and
> the other one is the one we will perform the neuro substitution on.  We
> will bind these two systems with the same provided binding system in a meta
> comparison functioning system which will monitor and compare all the
> qualities, as the neural substitution takes place on one of the systems, so
> you can prove to everyone, both objectively and subjectively, exactly what
> it is going on, and why both of the 3 element systems are always
> indicating: "It is red" even though one is the qualia invert of the other
> after one of the neuro substitution steps.  If you duplicate all this
> *observable behavior*, including the meta awareness of what is going on
> with both systems, there will be no hard problems when it is neuro
> substituted since you are not removing the most important *observable
> behavior*.
>
> Does that help?
>
>
> Brent Allsop
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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