[ExI] ai emotions

[Stuart LaForge]

Quoting Brent Allsop::


> Max Tegmark’s paper, like everythingelse in all of the peer reviewed  
> literature on physics, and consciousness, and particularlystudies on  
> perception of color are all completely qualia blind.

Perhaps because qualia are arbitrary encodings by consciousnesses for  
perceived physical phenomena. With emphasis on the word arbitrary.

> Everyone uses the term “red” in only a functionalist way, which  
> imparts no qualitative meaning, whatsoever.  For example, you said:  
> “Redness is a function of red”.  Statements like this provide no  
> qualitative meaning, especially when you consider what should be an  
> obvious fact that my redness could be like your greenness.

How red looks to us on the inside (subjectively) doesn't matter as  
long as it is consistent. It is irrelevant that I perceive red as  
green so long as we both agree to call it red, and I remember what it  
looks like, then we will always be in agreement as to what things are  
red.

Relativity disclaimer: this assumes we are not moving at any  
appreciable fraction of the speed of light with respect to another.  
Otherwise Doppler shifts make it so we no longer agree on an objects  
color.

> In order to know, qualitatively, the meaning of a word, like redness  
> or red, you need to keep in mind that it is only a label for a  
> particular set of physical properties or qualities.  Everyone uses  
> the term “red” to talk about when something reflects or emits red  
> light, they also use it as a label for a particular type of light,  
> they also use it to talk about “red” signals in the optic nerve and  
> “red” detectors in the retina…  ALL of these are purely  
> functionalist definitions and provide no qualitative meaning.  They  
> are completely ambiguous definitions,and nobody knows which physical  
> qualities they are talking about, when the use any such terms.

If consciousness didn't serve a function, it would be too costly to  
maintain. I am therefore fine with a functionalist definition of  
consciousness. The qualitative meaning is that meaning itself is  
qualitative. Without consciousness there is no meaning. Consciousness  
gives meaning to shit that happens in the physical universe. That is  
what I mean by redness

> In order to not be qualia blind, you need to use different words for  
> different sets of physical properties or qualities.  I use the word  
> “red” as a label for the physical property of anything that reflects  
> or emits 650 NM light.

That's a sensible definition of the word red.

> I use the word “redness” as a label for a very different set of  
> physical properties or qualities.  It is a label for a set of  
> physical qualities we can be directly aware of, as something our  
> brain uses to represent knowledge with.  This physical quality can  
> be used to represent any type of knowledge.  A bat could use it to  
> represent echolocation knowledge.  Some people could use it to  
> represent green knowledge, and so forth

Right. Red is a wavelength of light and redness is your own subjective  
experience of it. My redness might not be your redness but we would  
agree on what was red.

> To say “Redness is a function of red” is, again, completely qualia  
> blind and ambiguous.  Qualitatively, I have no idea what you are  
> talking about.

No it is a very precise way of describing what qualia are. They are  
your brain's "token" for a physical property that you can perceive.  
Functions just map the members of one set to another set. So functions  
can be qualitative if you define at least one of the sets to be so.

> Are you talking about your redness, or my redness which is like your  
> grenness?

Again how red "looks" to me versus the way it "looks" to you doesn't  
matter so long as we can consistently agree on what is red and what is  
green. And if we can't consistently agree, then your driver's license  
needs to be revoked. :-P

> Tononi’s idea of “redness = PHI(red)” is also completely sloppy,  
> definition wise.

That's not actually Tononi's idea, it is mine. Tononi equates  
consciousness with PHI but he defines it differently based on  
partitioning sets of information. Overall, I think his definition is  
unnecessarily complicated leading to making it too hard to calculate  
(NP-hard even) to be a useful definition.

> Is he talking about one person’s redness, which may be another’s  
> greenness….?  As I was saying, this, and everything else is  
> completely qualia blind.

Qualia don't explain anything. Instead they need to be explained. My  
definition does that. Don't ascribe qualia more importance than they  
merit. I really do think our souls are made out of math not qualia.
 
>
> Take the name of the neurotransmitter glutamate, for example.  We  
> know this is a label for a particular set of physical properties.   
> We also have abstract descriptions of glutamate's atomic makeup, and  
> how it behaves in synapses.  But, again, all of this abstract  
> information about glutamate is also just functional. It provides no  
> qualitative meaning. We know how glutamate behaves in a synapse, but  
> what is that glutamate behavior qualitatively like?  If you think of  
> the qualitative definition of the word redness, and the qualitative  
> definition of the word glutamate, you should realize that these  
> could be abstract labels for the same set of physics.  Not realizing  
> this is qualia blindness.

Again, it doesn't matter how one brain encodes redness vs another so  
long as they agree.

> The ONLY thing that provides qualitativ emeaning to anything is  
> subjective experience, or our ability to directly experience some of  
> the physics in our brain. ALL objectively observed information is  
> purely abstract, and devoid of any qualitative meaning.  We can’t  
> talk about consciousness in any way, until we start thinking  
> clearly, and non-ambiguously about the qualitative meaning of words.

Nothing in the universe can objectively observe anything else. Any  
observation is necessarily subjective even for the most simplest of  
measuring devices let alone full-blown brains. There is no absolute or  
privileged reference frame from which to be objective, not for an  
observer. If particles could not collapse one another's wave  
functions, they would never collide.

> Max Tegmark asserts the existence of some “perceptronium”?  Even if  
> there was such a thing, all objective observations of such would be  
> purely functional, while direct experience of such functional  
> descriptions would be qualitative.

> Proposing new physics buys you nothing about consciousness, as long  
> as you remain qualia blind, and fail to make the qualitative  
> connections.  Once you are no longer qualia blind, you realize you  
> don’t need any new physics.  You just need to think, clearly and  
> qualitatively, about what we already know of current physics.

I disagree. Consciousness is but one of a whole category of physical  
phenomena that would fall under the label emergence and emergent  
properties that current physics explains very poorly. New physics is  
precisely what we need.

> We simply must see people start using multiple words to talk about  
> different physical qualities.  Red for something that reflects or  
> emits red light, and redness for a very different set of physical  
> qualities, which could be a quality of anything we already know  
> about, objectively, in the brain, like glutamate.

I don't think that substrate-specific details matter that much. I  
think consciousness is a mathematical property analogous to the wave  
equation which is valid regardless of whether you are talking about  
water waves, sound waves, or electromagnetic waves. Let go of  
glutamate, it is substrate-specific detail that won't help you with  
understanding consciousness.

Consciousness is not magic, it is math.

Stuart LaForge