[ExI] teachers

[efc at swisscows.email]

My position is that a separate uploaded copy of me is not me, thus would 
not grant the physical me immortality. I would look at it as a mind-seed, 
or something slightly similar to a part of me that lives on, just as a 
part of me lives on in a child, although actually that part is way more of 
me, than in a child.

However, when talking about continuity and uploading, I think the ship of 
theseus uploading is much more interesting from an identity point of view.

As some, or all of you already know, imagine that I'm uploaded neruon by 
neuron, over time. I would not have a break, and my mind would transition 
onto the new media.

I would like to know what the people here who do not believe uploading 
grants a form of immortality think about that scenario? Would it fit in 
with your idea of identity and would you see yourselves being "immortal" 
through a shop of theseus procedure if it were possible?

As for the copy approach, a starting point for me would be that my 
identity is probably based on my mind, sense of continuity and location. 
In a copy, continuity and location would go 2x, and thus not work with the 
definition of identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x, both continuity 
would be perserved, and location would be single.

Best regards,
Daniel


On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat wrote:

> On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:
>> 
>> An important component of what a lot of people want out of immortality is 
>> not so much continuity as it is not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no, 
>> they're not the same thing].
>> 
>> If I'm dying of cancer, and you do a brain scan, the resulting upload will 
>> remember being me, but /I'm/ still gonna experience a painful death. And 
>> no, killing me painlessly, or even instantaneously, during or in the 
>> immediate aftermath of the brain scan doesn't solve the problem either.
>> 
>> If "me" is ever on two substrates simultaneously, you may have copied me, 
>> but you haven't moved me, and a copy, by definition, isn't the me I want to 
>> be immortal.
>
> So this 'me' that you are talking about, must be something that, when copied, 
> somehow changes into 'not-me'. I don't understand this. If it's an exact 
> copy, how is it not exactly the same? How can there not now be two 'me's? Two 
> identical beings, in every way, including their subjective experience, with 
> no discontinuity with the original singular being?
>
> When I hit 'send' on this message, everyone on the list will get a copy, and 
> I will keep a copy. Which one is the real message? If they were conscious, 
> why would that make any difference?
>
> You say "you may have copied me, but you haven't moved me". But how do you 
> move data? You make a second copy of it then delete the first copy. So 
> destroying copy 1 when copy 2 is made would be 'moving me', yet you say it 
> wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I can't see (short of a belief in an 
> uncopyable supernatural 'soul') how this could be.
>
> This is a crucial point, for those of us interested in uploading, so I think 
> we should really understand it, yet it makes no sense to me. Would you please 
> explain further?
>
> Could you also please explain the comment about continuity and 
> not-discontinuity not being the same thing?
>
> Ben
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