[ExI] teachers

[Keith Henson]

Long ago I thought this out in the context of the story "The Clinic
Seed."  In that world, uploads and downloads were common.  So while a
person was in the uploaded state, the memory of what they were doing
in cyberspace was downloaded into their stored and inactive
body/biological brain.  They could shift their consciousness freely
between uploaded or physical states.

The rules of that time were one at a time, you could be active in
either the real world or as an upload but not both at a time because
of population concerns.

The technology is far beyond us at this time, but I don't see the
relative difference between upload and download as being much
different.

Keith

On Sat, Aug 26, 2023 at 1:51 AM efc--- via extropy-chat
<extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
> My position is that a separate uploaded copy of me is not me, thus would
> not grant the physical me immortality. I would look at it as a mind-seed,
> or something slightly similar to a part of me that lives on, just as a
> part of me lives on in a child, although actually that part is way more of
> me, than in a child.
>
> However, when talking about continuity and uploading, I think the ship of
> theseus uploading is much more interesting from an identity point of view.
>
> As some, or all of you already know, imagine that I'm uploaded neruon by
> neuron, over time. I would not have a break, and my mind would transition
> onto the new media.
>
> I would like to know what the people here who do not believe uploading
> grants a form of immortality think about that scenario? Would it fit in
> with your idea of identity and would you see yourselves being "immortal"
> through a shop of theseus procedure if it were possible?
>
> As for the copy approach, a starting point for me would be that my
> identity is probably based on my mind, sense of continuity and location.
> In a copy, continuity and location would go 2x, and thus not work with the
> definition of identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x, both continuity
> would be perserved, and location would be single.
>
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:
> >>
> >> An important component of what a lot of people want out of immortality is
> >> not so much continuity as it is not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no,
> >> they're not the same thing].
> >>
> >> If I'm dying of cancer, and you do a brain scan, the resulting upload will
> >> remember being me, but /I'm/ still gonna experience a painful death. And
> >> no, killing me painlessly, or even instantaneously, during or in the
> >> immediate aftermath of the brain scan doesn't solve the problem either.
> >>
> >> If "me" is ever on two substrates simultaneously, you may have copied me,
> >> but you haven't moved me, and a copy, by definition, isn't the me I want to
> >> be immortal.
> >
> > So this 'me' that you are talking about, must be something that, when copied,
> > somehow changes into 'not-me'. I don't understand this. If it's an exact
> > copy, how is it not exactly the same? How can there not now be two 'me's? Two
> > identical beings, in every way, including their subjective experience, with
> > no discontinuity with the original singular being?
> >
> > When I hit 'send' on this message, everyone on the list will get a copy, and
> > I will keep a copy. Which one is the real message? If they were conscious,
> > why would that make any difference?
> >
> > You say "you may have copied me, but you haven't moved me". But how do you
> > move data? You make a second copy of it then delete the first copy. So
> > destroying copy 1 when copy 2 is made would be 'moving me', yet you say it
> > wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I can't see (short of a belief in an
> > uncopyable supernatural 'soul') how this could be.
> >
> > This is a crucial point, for those of us interested in uploading, so I think
> > we should really understand it, yet it makes no sense to me. Would you please
> > explain further?
> >
> > Could you also please explain the comment about continuity and
> > not-discontinuity not being the same thing?
> >
> > Ben
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> >
> >
>
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