[ExI] teachers

[Jason Resch]

The question you are asking about below concerns the topic in philosophy
known as personal identity. That topic asks: which I experiences belong to
which person's, in other words, how do we define the temporal borders of a
person. There are in general three approaches generally taken:

1. No-self/Anatta/empty individualism: each observer-moment, or
thought-moment is its own isolated thing, there's no such thing as a self
which has multiple distinct thought-moments.

2. Continuity theories/closed individualism:  either bodily or
psychological continuity. A self is a continual things either though the
continuation of some physical body, or some more abstractly defined
psychological organization.

3. Universalism/open Individualism: There are no bodily or psychological
preconditions for an experience being yours, all experiences are I, and in
truth there is only one mind.

I think #2 leads to contradictions. #1 and #3 are logically consistent.
Between #1 and #3, #3 is more useful (it permits decision theory) and
further, there are strong probabilistic arguments for it. For example,
those given in "One self: the logic of experience" which I cite here:

https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_Individualism_and_the_Afterlife

One consequence of Open Individualism is that it dissolves any concern of
whether some particular copy is you, as all conscious perspectives are you.

Jason


On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> My position is that a separate uploaded copy of me is not me, thus would
> not grant the physical me immortality. I would look at it as a mind-seed,
> or something slightly similar to a part of me that lives on, just as a part
> of me lives on in a child, although actually that part is way more of me,
> than in a child.
>
> However, when talking about continuity and uploading, I think the ship of
> theseus uploading is much more interesting from an identity point of view.
>
> As some, or all of you already know, imagine that I'm uploaded neruon by
> neuron, over time. I would not have a break, and my mind would transition
> onto the new media.
>
> I would like to know what the people here who do not believe uploading
> grants a form of immortality think about that scenario? Would it fit in
> with your idea of identity and would you see yourselves being "immortal"
> through a shop of theseus procedure if it were possible?
>
> As for the copy approach, a starting point for me would be that my
> identity is probably based on my mind, sense of continuity and location. In
> a copy, continuity and location would go 2x, and thus not work with the
> definition of identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x, both continuity
> would be perserved, and location would be single.
>
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> An important component of what a lot of people want out of immortality
>>> is not so much continuity as it is not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no,
>>> they're not the same thing].
>>>
>>> If I'm dying of cancer, and you do a brain scan, the resulting upload
>>> will remember being me, but /I'm/ still gonna experience a painful death.
>>> And no, killing me painlessly, or even instantaneously, during or in the
>>> immediate aftermath of the brain scan doesn't solve the problem either.
>>>
>>> If "me" is ever on two substrates simultaneously, you may have copied
>>> me, but you haven't moved me, and a copy, by definition, isn't the me I
>>> want to be immortal.
>>>
>>
>> So this 'me' that you are talking about, must be something that, when
>> copied, somehow changes into 'not-me'. I don't understand this. If it's an
>> exact copy, how is it not exactly the same? How can there not now be two
>> 'me's? Two identical beings, in every way, including their subjective
>> experience, with no discontinuity with the original singular being?
>>
>> When I hit 'send' on this message, everyone on the list will get a copy,
>> and I will keep a copy. Which one is the real message? If they were
>> conscious, why would that make any difference?
>>
>> You say "you may have copied me, but you haven't moved me". But how do
>> you move data? You make a second copy of it then delete the first copy. So
>> destroying copy 1 when copy 2 is made would be 'moving me', yet you say it
>> wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I can't see (short of a belief in an
>> uncopyable supernatural 'soul') how this could be.
>>
>> This is a crucial point, for those of us interested in uploading, so I
>> think we should really understand it, yet it makes no sense to me. Would
>> you please explain further?
>>
>> Could you also please explain the comment about continuity and
>> not-discontinuity not being the same thing?
>>
>> Ben
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>>
>>
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