[ExI] teachers

[efc at swisscows.email]

Hello Jason,

What are the contradictions with #2? I have a feeling that there are many 
versions of 2, with strong proponents, and equally, many different kind of 
contradictions.

When it comes to #1, it does sound philosophically unfeasible to me, since 
we're two selves havinga discussion. If all is illusion, how can there 
even be any knowledge at all?

When it comes to #3, I tried to google it, but it looks as if it is not a 
very popular stance among philosophers. Why do you think it is not 
popular?

Best regards,
Daniel


On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:

> The question you are asking about below concerns the topic in philosophy known as personal identity. That topic asks: which I
> experiences belong to which person's, in other words, how do we define the temporal borders of a person. There are in general three
> approaches generally taken:
> 1. No-self/Anatta/empty individualism: each observer-moment, or thought-moment is its own isolated thing, there's no such thing as a
> self which has multiple distinct thought-moments.
> 
> 2. Continuity theories/closed individualism:  either bodily or psychological continuity. A self is a continual things either though
> the continuation of some physical body, or some more abstractly defined psychological organization.
> 
> 3. Universalism/open Individualism: There are no bodily or psychological preconditions for an experience being yours, all experiences
> are I, and in truth there is only one mind.
> 
> I think #2 leads to contradictions. #1 and #3 are logically consistent. Between #1 and #3, #3 is more useful (it permits decision
> theory) and further, there are strong probabilistic arguments for it. For example, those given in "One self: the logic of experience"
> which I cite here:
> 
> https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_Individualism_and_the_Afterlife
> 
> One consequence of Open Individualism is that it dissolves any concern of whether some particular copy is you, as all conscious
> perspectives are you.
> 
> Jason 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>       My position is that a separate uploaded copy of me is not me, thus would not grant the physical me immortality. I would
>       look at it as a mind-seed, or something slightly similar to a part of me that lives on, just as a part of me lives on in
>       a child, although actually that part is way more of me, than in a child.
>
>       However, when talking about continuity and uploading, I think the ship of theseus uploading is much more interesting from
>       an identity point of view.
>
>       As some, or all of you already know, imagine that I'm uploaded neruon by neuron, over time. I would not have a break, and
>       my mind would transition onto the new media.
>
>       I would like to know what the people here who do not believe uploading grants a form of immortality think about that
>       scenario? Would it fit in with your idea of identity and would you see yourselves being "immortal" through a shop of
>       theseus procedure if it were possible?
>
>       As for the copy approach, a starting point for me would be that my identity is probably based on my mind, sense of
>       continuity and location. In a copy, continuity and location would go 2x, and thus not work with the definition of
>       identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x, both continuity would be perserved, and location would be single.
>
>       Best regards,
>       Daniel
> 
>
>       On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat wrote:
>
>             On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:
>
>                   An important component of what a lot of people want out of immortality is not so much continuity
>                   as it is not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no, they're not the same thing].
>
>                   If I'm dying of cancer, and you do a brain scan, the resulting upload will remember being me, but
>                   /I'm/ still gonna experience a painful death. And no, killing me painlessly, or even
>                   instantaneously, during or in the immediate aftermath of the brain scan doesn't solve the problem
>                   either.
>
>                   If "me" is ever on two substrates simultaneously, you may have copied me, but you haven't moved
>                   me, and a copy, by definition, isn't the me I want to be immortal.
> 
>
>             So this 'me' that you are talking about, must be something that, when copied, somehow changes into 'not-me'.
>             I don't understand this. If it's an exact copy, how is it not exactly the same? How can there not now be two
>             'me's? Two identical beings, in every way, including their subjective experience, with no discontinuity with
>             the original singular being?
>
>             When I hit 'send' on this message, everyone on the list will get a copy, and I will keep a copy. Which one is
>             the real message? If they were conscious, why would that make any difference?
>
>             You say "you may have copied me, but you haven't moved me". But how do you move data? You make a second copy
>             of it then delete the first copy. So destroying copy 1 when copy 2 is made would be 'moving me', yet you say
>             it wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I can't see (short of a belief in an uncopyable supernatural 'soul') how
>             this could be.
>
>             This is a crucial point, for those of us interested in uploading, so I think we should really understand it,
>             yet it makes no sense to me. Would you please explain further?
>
>             Could you also please explain the comment about continuity and not-discontinuity not being the same thing?
>
>             Ben
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