[ExI] teachers

[Jason Resch]

On Sunday, August 27, 2023, efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> Hello Jason,
>
> What are the contradictions with #2? I have a feeling that there are many
> versions of 2, with strong proponents, and equally, many different kind of
> contradictions.



Let's break #2 into two categories:
A) Bodily continuity
B) Mind continuity

For A, consider: we could make small changes, atom by atom, cell by cell to
slowly morph you into becoming any other person, or even any other animal.
Since there is a continuity there's no limit to what form you might
ultimately gradually change into any form, then there is in reality no
limit or border that constrains your form, or who you could be, it refutes
itself and ends up leading to #3.

For B, consider: we can make small changes to ones mind, adding a memory
here, forgetting a memory there, so that, over time we could completely
change the mentality of a person, and they would have no memories in common
with their former self and instead have entirely new ones, making their
mind, in effect identical to any other being. Again we find no clear point
where the continuity fails, and again we are led to something like #3.

Then there are all the problems for which these give no good answer:

For A:

Why are two identical twins not the same person, when each is a continuity
of the same fertilized egg (same body)?

Why would receiving a neural prosthesis not be regarded in the same way as
death?

For B:

Why are two duplicates created by a faulty teleporter not the same person,
when each is a continuity of the same mind?

Why is total amnesia not regarded in the same way as death?

For both A and B:

If two people are each slowly morphed into the other person, where are the
two people after the procedure? Have they teleported to the other's
location, or has each changed, but remained in the same spot? Why?

When a brain is split by cutting the corpus callosum, the result is two
independently consciousness minds. Are they the same as the mind that was
there before? If not, where did the two minds come from? If the connection
were to be restored to fuse the minds, what happens to the two minds when
they become one?

If the same person can exist in the same place at the two different times,
then why can't the same person exist at two different places at the same
time?



>
> When it comes to #1, it does sound philosophically unfeasible to me, since
> we're two selves havinga discussion. If all is illusion, how can there even
> be any knowledge at all?



There would still be individual conscious states, each with they're own
consciousness, but nothing (actually) connecting one to any other. It's
consistent in my view, but unworkable as it provides no justification to
doing anything since we would each be trapped in our own thought moment
forever.


>
> When it comes to #3, I tried to google it, but it looks as if it is not a
> very popular stance among philosophers. Why do you think it is not popular?



It's relatively new, and highly counter to the brain's self-imposed
ego-illuision, which is hard to escape without serious meditation, drugs,
traumatic brain injury, or logic.

Jason


>
>
>
>
> On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> The question you are asking about below concerns the topic in philosophy
>> known as personal identity. That topic asks: which I
>> experiences belong to which person's, in other words, how do we define
>> the temporal borders of a person. There are in general three
>> approaches generally taken:
>> 1. No-self/Anatta/empty individualism: each observer-moment, or
>> thought-moment is its own isolated thing, there's no such thing as a
>> self which has multiple distinct thought-moments.
>>
>> 2. Continuity theories/closed individualism:  either bodily or
>> psychological continuity. A self is a continual things either though
>> the continuation of some physical body, or some more abstractly defined
>> psychological organization.
>>
>> 3. Universalism/open Individualism: There are no bodily or psychological
>> preconditions for an experience being yours, all experiences
>> are I, and in truth there is only one mind.
>>
>> I think #2 leads to contradictions. #1 and #3 are logically consistent.
>> Between #1 and #3, #3 is more useful (it permits decision
>> theory) and further, there are strong probabilistic arguments for it. For
>> example, those given in "One self: the logic of experience"
>> which I cite here:
>>
>> https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_
>> Individualism_and_the_Afterlife
>>
>> One consequence of Open Individualism is that it dissolves any concern of
>> whether some particular copy is you, as all conscious
>> perspectives are you.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>       My position is that a separate uploaded copy of me is not me, thus
>> would not grant the physical me immortality. I would
>>       look at it as a mind-seed, or something slightly similar to a part
>> of me that lives on, just as a part of me lives on in
>>       a child, although actually that part is way more of me, than in a
>> child.
>>
>>       However, when talking about continuity and uploading, I think the
>> ship of theseus uploading is much more interesting from
>>       an identity point of view.
>>
>>       As some, or all of you already know, imagine that I'm uploaded
>> neruon by neuron, over time. I would not have a break, and
>>       my mind would transition onto the new media.
>>
>>       I would like to know what the people here who do not believe
>> uploading grants a form of immortality think about that
>>       scenario? Would it fit in with your idea of identity and would you
>> see yourselves being "immortal" through a shop of
>>       theseus procedure if it were possible?
>>
>>       As for the copy approach, a starting point for me would be that my
>> identity is probably based on my mind, sense of
>>       continuity and location. In a copy, continuity and location would
>> go 2x, and thus not work with the definition of
>>       identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x, both continuity would
>> be perserved, and location would be single.
>>
>>       Best regards,
>>       Daniel
>>
>>
>>       On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat wrote:
>>
>>             On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:
>>
>>                   An important component of what a lot of people want out
>> of immortality is not so much continuity
>>                   as it is not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no,
>> they're not the same thing].
>>
>>                   If I'm dying of cancer, and you do a brain scan, the
>> resulting upload will remember being me, but
>>                   /I'm/ still gonna experience a painful death. And no,
>> killing me painlessly, or even
>>                   instantaneously, during or in the immediate aftermath
>> of the brain scan doesn't solve the problem
>>                   either.
>>
>>                   If "me" is ever on two substrates simultaneously, you
>> may have copied me, but you haven't moved
>>                   me, and a copy, by definition, isn't the me I want to
>> be immortal.
>>
>>
>>             So this 'me' that you are talking about, must be something
>> that, when copied, somehow changes into 'not-me'.
>>             I don't understand this. If it's an exact copy, how is it not
>> exactly the same? How can there not now be two
>>             'me's? Two identical beings, in every way, including their
>> subjective experience, with no discontinuity with
>>             the original singular being?
>>
>>             When I hit 'send' on this message, everyone on the list will
>> get a copy, and I will keep a copy. Which one is
>>             the real message? If they were conscious, why would that make
>> any difference?
>>
>>             You say "you may have copied me, but you haven't moved me".
>> But how do you move data? You make a second copy
>>             of it then delete the first copy. So destroying copy 1 when
>> copy 2 is made would be 'moving me', yet you say
>>             it wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I can't see (short of a
>> belief in an uncopyable supernatural 'soul') how
>>             this could be.
>>
>>             This is a crucial point, for those of us interested in
>> uploading, so I think we should really understand it,
>>             yet it makes no sense to me. Would you please explain further?
>>
>>             Could you also please explain the comment about continuity
>> and not-discontinuity not being the same thing?
>>
>>             Ben
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>>
>>
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